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DEVEKUTH, OR COMMUNION WITH GOD*

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I

EVERY DISCUSSION OF HASIDIC DOCTRINE has to start with a basic question, namely: Is there a central point on which Hasidism is focused and from which its special attitude can be developed? I think there can be little doubt that there is, indeed, such a focal point, the discussion of which will take us right into the heart of the problem. This is the doctrine of *Devekuth,* the practical application of which has determined the spiritual physiognomy of Hasidism.

Devekuth, the meaning of which I am going to analyze, is, of course, neither an exclusively Hasidic concept nor a novel invention of the Baalshem. Exactly where the new departure in its Hasidic application is found, will become clear if we proceed to consider both its "prehistory" and its position in Hasidism.

Throughout Kabbalistic literature, *Devekuth* is frequently mentioned as the highest ideal of the mystical life as the Kabbalists see it. This is not to be wondered at, considering the meaning of the term as used in many books. In general Hebrew usage, *Devekuth* only means attachment or devoutness, but, since the thirteenth century, it has been used by the mystics in the sense of close and most intimate communion with God. Whereas in Catholic mysticism, "Communion" was not the last step on the mystical way—although a book *De adhaerendo Deo,* ("On communion with God"), ascribed to Albert the Great but actually by the Bavarian monk Johannes of Kastl, was one of the outstanding mystical manuals of the later Middle Ages—in Kabbalism it is the last grade of ascent to God. It is not union, because union with God is denied to man even in that mystical upsurge of the soul, according to Kabbalistic theology. But it comes as near to union as a mystical interpretation of Judaism would allow. I have already spoken briefly of this Kabbalistic concept of *Devekuth* in my former lectures on Jewish mysticism, but I may be permitted to add

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some remarks on the subject. *Devekuth,* or as we may also call it, communion, is characterized in Kabbalistic literature by the following three traits:

1. It is a value without eschatological connotations, i.e., it can be realized in this life, in a direct and personal way, by every individual, and has no Messianic meaning. It is a state of personal bliss which can be attained without having recourse to the vast field of eschatology, utopianism, and Messianism. Being a strictly individual attainment, it is not an experience of the group, the social community of men, as is Messianic redemption, nor is it rooted in a hope or, for that matter, an anticipation of the Hereafter, of the World-to-come. In an eschatological sense, man cannot be redeemed *alone,* individually. Such individual redemption or salvation, carries in Judaism no Messianic meaning. It is essentially a private experience; *Devekuth* can be reached alone. The only exception, when *Devekuth* became an experience of the whole community of Israel, was—at least according to some Jewish theologians—the Revelation at Mount Sinai, but even then it was more in the nature of a multiplied experience of many single individuals than of the community as an integrated whole.

2. Furthermore, such *Devekuth,* although attained within the framework of this world, is, for the most part, realized only by the paradoxical means of abnegation and denial of the values of this world. Moses Nahmanides for instance, speaks of "those who abandon the affairs of this world and pay no regard to this world at all, as though they were not corporeal beings, but all their intent and purpose is fixed on their creator alone, as in the cases of Eliyahu and Henoch, who live on forever in body and soul, after having attained Communion of their souls with the Great Name" (on Leviticus 18:4). The realization of *Devekuth* means, therefore, a constant being-with-God which is not dependent on death and life after death.

3. For the understanding of the new turn of the idea of *Devekuth* in Hasidism, however, no passage is more important than Nahmanides' commentary on Deuteronomy 11:22 "To love the Lord your God, to walk in all His ways and to cleave unto Him." The old commentaries are divided on the question of whether this cleaving, which is *Devekuth,* is to be understood as a *promise* held out to the faithful, or as a *commandment* binding upon everyone. Abraham Ibn Ezra is of the first opinion; Nahmanides of the second. He explains the verse as follows:

It warns man not to worship God and somebody beside Him; he is to worship God alone in his heart and his actions. And it is plausible that the meaning of "cleaving" is to remember God and His love constantly, not to divert your thought from Him in all your earthly doings. *Such a man may be talking to other people, but his heart is not with them since he is in the presence of God.* And it is further plausible that those who have attained this rank, *do, even in their earthly life, partake of the eternal life,* because they have made themselves a dwelling place of the Shekhinah.

This statement, by the way, bears a strong resemblance to a similar one by Maimonides about the highest rank of prophecy, at the end of the *Guide for the Perplexed* (III, 51). In Nahmanides' definition, there appears, for the first time, an element which has played no great part in the Kabbalistic doctrine of *Devekuth,* although it is mentioned often enough in quotations of this classical passage, but which was given great prominence by the Baalshem, and even more by his followers. I am referring to the combination of earthly action and *Devekuth.* Of course, it was *not* Nahmanides' intention to say that *Devekuth* could be realized in social action and association too. But he clearly thought that it could be *sustained* even in social intercourse, although such intercourse in itself is considered rather as a hindrance which must be overcome by special effort. *Devekuth* is a value of contemplative, not of active life. But Nahmanides' saying could be used to prove the possibility of the coincidence of the two spheres. A man might appear to be with other people, to talk to them and, perhaps, even to participate in their activities, but in reality he is contemplating God. This is the highest attainment in the Kabbalistic scale of values and represents a blend of action and contemplation. For Nahmanides, *Devekuth* has always the specific meaning of communion with the last of the ten Sephiroth or grades of divine manifestation, namely, with the Shekhinah, but this detail was not retained by other Kabbalists, who keep to the more general definitions of *Devekuth* given by other members of Nahmanides' circle of Gerona. His older colleague, Rabbi Ezra ben Solomon, already speaks of *Devekuth,* or communion with the Naught, which is certainly a much higher rank than communion with the Shekhinah, the Naught being the most hidden recess of Divinity which contemplation may behold.

This idea of *Devekuth* as the ultimate fulfillment of the mystic's path permeates the theosophical and ethical literature of the Kab-

balists. Isaiah Horovitz connects the state of *Hasiduth* with that of *Devekuth:* "Who is a Hasid? He who acts in piety towards God and gives pleasure to his Creator and all of whose intention is bent on cleaving to Him and thereby becoming a chariot for God." Characteristically, it still appears in Moses Hayim Luzzatto's *Path of the Upright* as the last stage of the Path. In the opinion of this contemporary of the Baalshem, it is a special grace granted to the Hasid, a gift of grace for which man can only *prepare* himself by incessant striving for knowledge and cognition and by the sanctification of all his actions. It is at the very *end* of the Path that God Himself takes over his guidance and causes divine holiness to dwell on him. Then only—says Luzzatto—may man succeed in his quest for such *Devekuth* with God as may last *forever,* for he may be helped by God to what Nature withholds from him. "If a man attains such spiritual rank, even his earthly actions become actually holy matters, and this is alluded to in the biblical prescriptions on meals made of holy offerings."

Here we find two basic *motifs* in connection with the doctrine of *Devekuth* which reappear and are given prominence in the Hasidic teaching of the Baalshem: (1) the sanctification of the profane sphere in the life of the perfect Hasid, its transformation into one single sphere of holy action which leaves no room for the concept of a separate state of "profane" action; (2) the paradigm of eating in holiness as the perfect example of this supreme state of man. What is generally considered as an earthly performance *par excellence,* is transformed into a holy, nay, a mystery rite. This paradigm, by the way, is by no means a late addition, nor is it a specific trait of Hasidism, as it is sometimes considered to be. It is common to the whole Kabbalistic renaissance of Safed. The transformation of the profane sphere of human activity is stressed by Luzzatto, who says that he who has attained communion lifts up the earthly things which serve his needs, and does so by the very act of using them. "He raises them up to himself, rather than descending from his rank and state of *Devekuth* by using them." But Luzzatto draws no social conclusion from this conception of *Devekuth.* With him, everything connected with it remains wholly within the sphere of contemplation. He only follows in the footsteps of the older masters of Kabbalism by insisting on retreat and withdrawal from social intercourse as the principal means of attaining such "holiness" or "communion" (to him the two terms cover

the same meaning). If *Devekuth* is the last stage on the path of ascetic self-abnegation, it would obviously be difficult to interpret it in terms of social ethics.

Luzzatto's book cannot be considered a literary source of the new Hasidic turn, but rather, the opposite. But among the books with which the Baalshem and the old Hasidic conventicles were undoubtedly conversant, there is the *Sepher Haredim* ("The Book of the God-Fearing"), one of the popular classics of Kabbalistic ethics, composed before 1600 at Safed by Eliezer Azikri. The three highest values which, according to him, the "Hasidim of Israel" cultivate, are "loneliness or retreat from society, asceticism, and *Devekuth*." He defines the latter as the fixing of thought on God (Ed. 1601 fol.66b). When Beshtian Hasidism, in the eighteenth century, said that *Devekuth* was more important than study, this thesis aroused considerable hostility and was quoted in all polemical writings against the movement as proof of its subversive and anti-rabbinic tendencies. But it is noteworthy, and has been overlooked, that this fundamental tenet of Hasidism is quoted by Eliezer Azikri in the name of no less an authority of Kabbalism than his teacher, Isaac Luria himself. "These three principles of conduct are seven times more useful to the soul than study," Luria is reported to have said.

The bond between the old Kabbalists of the thirteenth century school of Gerona and latter-day Hasidism, in their evaluation and elaboration of *Devekuth* as a mystical state of mind, is proved conclusively by a statement of Eliezer Azikri to which no attention has been paid. This author tells us that the "Hasidim of old times" took off no less than nine hours daily from their study of the Torah

> for the spiritual activities of retreat and *Devekuth* and used to imagine the light of the Shekhinah above their heads, as though it were flowing all around them and they were sitting in the midst of the light, and this is the way I have found it [the meaning of *Devekuth*] explained in an old manuscript of the ancient ascetics. And while in that [state of meditation], they are all trembling as a natural effect, but [spiritually] rejoicing in trembling.

Azikri's source, the "old manuscript," is known to us. It was my good fortune to discover it some years ago in a lengthy and extremely interesting description of the meaning of Kabbalistic meditation *(Kawwanah)* whose author was none else than the great mystic, Azriel of Gerona. Through the intermediacy of the sixteenth century moralist

of Safed, this description had come down to the Baalshem and his followers, and the description of the state of *Devekuth,* which I quoted in my former set of lectures from a book of one of the Great Maggid's disciples, is taken, albeit without naming the source, from Azikri's work. This little example may serve to demonstrate the hidden after-life of the old Kabbalistic manuscripts, the impact of which is too easily overlooked.

II

But let us return to the crucial point which our discussion of *Devekuth* has now reached. The questions can now be asked: What is the difference between the old Kabbalistic idea of *Devekuth* and the Hasidic one? Why could Luria and Azikri, in the sixteenth century, make the statements I have quoted without being attacked, whereas the rabbinical antagonists of Hasidism lost their tempers when they found an essentially identical statement in the writings of Baer of Mezritch and Mendel of Pzremyslamy? Was it only a question of the different time and environment that made a perfectly orthodox statement sound wicked and heretical two hundred years later? This, of course, would by no means be impossible. The history of religion abounds in examples of such different evaluations of the same tenet under different historical conditions. But the true answer to our problem is to be found in another consideration which, in my opinion, will take us into an even deeper understanding of the essential nature of Hasidism.

It is not so much the *meaning* of *Devekuth* that has changed in Hasidism as its *place,* and this is a most significant change indeed. The novel element is the radical character given to *Devekuth* by this change. Hasidic *Devekuth* is no longer an extreme ideal, to be realized by some rare and sublime spirits at the end of the path. It is no longer the *last* rung in the ladder of ascent, as in Kabbalism, but the *first.* Everything *begins* with man's decision to cleave to God. *Devekuth* is a starting point and not the end. Everyone is able to realize it instantaneously. All he has to do is to take his monotheistic faith seriously. It is, therefore, small wonder that the Baalshem identifies *emunah,* faith, and *Devekuth.* "Faith," he says (Toldoth 195b), "is the intimate communion of the soul with God." And the first, and

most pointed, consequence of this identification is the frequently repeated formula that to fall away from the state of *Devekuth* is essentially equivalent to separation of the creature from its Creator, nay, to idolatry *(abodah zarah)*. God pervades everything, or, as the old adage goes, "no place can be void of the Shekhinah." Therefore, to be aware of this real omnipresence and immanence of God, is already the realization of a state of *Devekuth*. In the opinion of the Baalshem, to be out of *Devekuth* is not simply a state of estrangement from God, it rather implies the negation of His oneness and all-pervading presence. This idea is not an accidental *obiter dictum* of no consequence. It is continually repeated from the Baalshem's teaching in all the early writings of Hasidim before 1790. The Baalshem formulated it in the words of the Torah (Deuter. 11:16), *we-sartem wa-abadtem elohim aherim*, "lest you turn aside and serve other gods," meaning, "once a man turns aside from *Devekuth* and the fixation of his thought on God, he is considered as one who serves other gods and there is no mediating path."

This change of position in the scale of values explains, to my view, much of the attraction Hasidism has held for the "common Jew." On the one hand, there could be—and, indeed, has been—the continued stress on the mystical implications of the state of *Devekuth* as an extreme attainment, and Nahmanides' passages on it are frequently quoted by those who consider it ultimate. On the other hand, it could be considered the focal point in the religious life of every Jew. Even if the leaders and saints took *Devekuth* in its most exalted meaning, this novel turn explains why it could very quickly become externalized when put as a demand to the average man. To be sure, it was a comfort to the masses that to cleave to God was no longer a remote ideal for the few, but there is also the second aspect which cannot be overlooked: if *Devekuth* was demanded from everybody and, in a way, forced upon the masses, it was bound to assume rather crude and vulgar forms. Once the radical slogan, "Judaism without *Devekuth* is idolatry," was accepted, its very radicalism already contained the germ of decay, a dialectic typical of radical and spiritualist movements. Since not everyone was able to attain that state of mind by mere introspection and contemplation, external stimulants, even liquor, had to be employed. In an earlier lecture we have seen that *Devekuth* in its popular and even objectionable forms was not a

phenomenon of later degeneration, but was well known from the very beginnings of the new-fangled Hasidic conventicles. As Moses of Satanov tells us, *Devekuth* was practiced about 1740 by rather simple people, who found in it an outlet for their emotional piety.

It is important to note that the same connection between *Devekuth* and the state of retreat and isolation constantly emphasized in the older literature of Kabbalistic ethics continues to prevail in the writings of eighteenth century Hasidim. In this respect, there is no difference between the old-fashioned ascetic, such as Moses of Satanov, and the new school of the Baalshem. *"Devekuth"* says the former, "can be mainly attained during the time one spends in solitary retreat, for it is then that the soul actually cleaves to its Creator, for the whole earth is full of His glory." The reason given here that *Devekuth* is possible because God is everywhere, is exactly the same advanced by the Baalshem and the Maggid of Mezritch.

III

A closer analysis of the Baalshem's sayings on *Devekuth* will enable us better to understand its twofold aspect in Hasidic teaching. We have already mentioned the connection between "faith" and *Devekuth*, but the authentic dicta of the Baalshem provide us with several other elucidations which are relevant to our discussion.

As a classical illustration of the meaning of *Devekuth* and, incidentally, also of the way famous Hasidic dicta have travelled through Hasidic tradition, we have the daring re-interpretation of Psalm 81:10, "There shall be no strange God in thee." These words, said the Baalshem, can be taken according to the Hebrew sequence of words, to mean "God shall not be a stranger to thee." And when is God no longer a stranger to man? When man constantly fulfills the admonition of the psalmist, "I set the Lord always before me." It is the communion with God through *Devekuth* that makes God an intimate friend of man, instead of a forbidding and remote stranger. This saying, quoted by Gedalya of Linietz, was not, even in Hasidic circles, generally known to belong to the Baalshem. It is frequently quoted as one of the epigrams of Rabbi Mendel of Kotzk, in the fourth generation after the Baalshem, who used to translate the biblical passage in a literal manner, *Nit zol zejn in dir Gott fremd.* The Rabbi of

Kotzk obviously liked the saying, and it is considered by many as one of his great words. Since there was no critical examination of the old and authentic sayings, many of them have, in the course of time, come to be ascribed to later authorities who were wont to quote them.

The performance of the commands is in itself an act of *Devekuth,* as is shown by an etymological pun. According to the Baalshem, *Mitsvah* means a bond. The talmudic adage, "each good deed brings about another one," is taken to mean that every communion with God leads to ever closer communion. *Devekuth* is thus not a *state* but is in itself a *path* comprising an infinity of ever more intimate communions.

If the essence of religious action is communion or *Devekuth,* it follows that leaving this state of communion is the essence of sin. Even he who "falls away from the fixation of his thought on God for a moment only" is called a sinner. But this statement, mentioned by the Baalshem's grandson, sets such a high standard for *Devekuth* that it had to be qualified and mitigated, as will be shown presently.

The Maggid Rabbi Mendel of Bar used to quote the following literal translation of Psalm 32, 2 in the name of his teacher, the Baalshem, "Blessed is the man to whom not to think of God is iniquity." Here the primitive radicalism of the demand of *Devekuth* is somewhat mitigated. Blessed is the man who has no other sin to repent of than his falling or stepping out of *Devekuth.* It is a sin, but the sin of a blessed man, of the perfect Hasid who has attained a higher level than the rabbinical Zaddik. It is *Devekuth* as the final stage on the Kabbalist's path that is reflected in this and similar statements. Incidentally, this is the only word of the Baalshem quoted (though anonymously) in a book of an old-fashioned Hasid like Simhah of Zolozitz, a contemporary of the master.

Of what does that *Devekuth* consist which is realized in study and prayer? The answer is given in many authentic dicta of the Baalshem stressing that *Devekuth* is a spiritual or contemplative act by which a man binds himself to the spiritual element inherent in the letters of Torah and prayer. The words and their element, the letters, are the vessels which contain a priceless jewel, the light of The Boundless *En-soph. Devekuth,* in the opinion of the Baalshem, is communion with this inner light that animates the letters of the Torah or, for that matter, everything. For he accepts the Kabbalistic conception of

creation as externalized speech: Everything that exists consists of letters of the divine language. Each of them is only the vessel which contains unfathomable depths of divine light, a light which is not created, but is the light of the Shekhinah herself. What is required, therefore, is to concentrate in study and prayer not on the external figures of speech, nor on the "letter," but on the "spirit" that animates it. That is what *Devekuth* can perform. Meir Margalioth, the Rabbi of Ostrog, says that it is this special conception of *Devekuth* that he learned from his master, the Baalshem, and that he had actually observed how it was practiced by him. This definition, which occurs also in the Baalshem's authentic letter to his brother-in-law, puts the emphasis on a definite technique of contemplation which the Baalshem practiced and taught, and there can be no doubt that it goes far beyond the earlier definitions of *Devekuth* which I have discussed. I am inclined to think that the dialectic of *Devekuth* to which I have made reference is fully reflected in this conception: It sounds very simple and anyone might start practicing it, but it is extremely difficult to attain as a sustained state of communion. Why should not anyone be able to concentrate on the inwardness of the spiritual element in everything? As a matter of fact, it is a counsel given not to the accomplished Kabbalist at the end of his path, but repeatedly addressed to everybody. Yet, it has the unmistakable ring of a mystical practice which has its esoteric side and is by no means as easy to carry out as it appears to be.

Sometimes the letters and the holy names composed of them are identified with the light that dwells therein, the letters themselves being transformed into the spiritual element with which communion must be established. In this connection, great interest attaches to the mystical turn the Baalshem gave to an old Jewish saying which extols the merit of the study of the Torah *for its own sake (torah lishmah).* Several dicta explain the new meaning infused into the old phrase. This high ideal—the Baalshem is reported to have said—must be understood according to the precise meaning of the phrase, which is "for the sake of its name." It is the name of God, the spiritual element, which is evoked by true study and which should be aimed at in study and worship. Study of the Torah *(lishmah)* is not a principle like "art for art's sake," but reflects the longing to discover the hidden element inherent in the letters and words. There are many variations of this *motif* among the Baalshem's sayings, and it is obvious that he used the

idea very often. Lurianic Kabbalism knew of a parallel explanation of *lishmah,* but whereas the Lurianic idea aimed at some theosophic detail in the mechanism of the Upper Worlds, the Hasidic exegesis of the saying is of a much more general nature. It is interesting that Jacob Joseph of Polnoye quotes both explanations, the Kabbalistic and the Hasidic; he senses that there is a difference between them, but he strives to efface it.

As I have said, this definition of *Devekuth* as man's binding himself to the core *(penimiuth)* of the letters, the Torah and the commandments, instead of to their external aspects only, seems to be a new point made by the Baalshem. He was in dead earnest about the religious implications of this thesis. How much so is shown by one of his sayings, where he infers from this definition that he who does *not* bind his thought to the "root" or core of the action which he performs, is positively sinning by introducing separation into the world of spiritual unity and by "cutting down the trees of paradise." This is the familiar Hebrew phrase for falling into heresy. Therefore—and this idea is hammered into the readers of Jacob Joseph of Polnoye's books —he who keeps the Torah in its externals only, without *Devekuth,* is an arch-heretic in the sense of Kabbalism: instead of binding and uniting things to God, he separates and isolates them from Him. This, of course, is a radical and essentially spiritual thesis. It is interesting to observe how early Hasidic authors strove to discover a Kabbalistic authority for it. The Rabbi of Polnoye tries to read it into a statement found in Abraham Azulai's *Hesed le-Abraham* (written about 1640). But Azulai's statement is of an altogether different nature and lacks the radicalism of the Hasidic thesis. The fact that it was necessary to twist quite innocuous Kabbalistic sentences in order to extract from them this new meaning of *Devekuth,* tends to show that we are dealing here with a novel departure. This central thesis that the core of every true worship is *Devekuth* could not be held by Kabbalists as long as they placed *Devekuth* at the end of the Path, and, as a matter of fact, Azulai never said it. He says only that the prayer of man is heard if he succeeds in *drawing* out the spirituality of the supernal spheres into the letters. This is quite different from *discovering* them there as an ever-present reality. And, of course, no mention is made by Azulai of the absence of *Devekuth* constituting a sin or transgression.

Devekuth, or "communion," is not "union" in the sense of the mystical union between God and man of which many mystics speak. But it leads to a state, or, rather, implies an action which in Hebrew is called *yihud,* which means unification, the realization of union. The term has not always a mystical connotation, and it is not always easy to determine what is meant by it. Sometimes it only means concentration of mind by uniting all its powers on one focal point, sometimes it means even less, namely, the acknowledgement of God's unity. This latter meaning, however, is more or less restricted to non-mystical literature, where it is frequently found, whereas Hasidic literature uses the term in the same special sense given to it by the Kabbalists. If a man binds his thought to the root of the Torah, this is called a *yihud,* both because he concentrates on it and because he breaks down the barriers and brings about unification by making into an organic whole what seemed separated and isolated. He does not become God, but he becomes "united" with Him by the process in which the core of his own being is bound up with the core of all being. There is one saying of the Baalshem—apparently the only one—stating that the process of *yihud,* which is accomplished through *Devekuth,* transforms the Ego, or *ani,* into the Naught, or *ain.* This idea, which plays no central part in the Baalshem's conceptions, was taken up with great vigor by the Maggid of Mezritch who, as a radical mystic, made it one of the corner-stones of his thought. The hidden naught, an old Kabbalistic symbol of the depths of the Godhead, held no special attraction for the Baalshem, but it takes on a new vitality in the teachings of Rabbi Baer and his pupils. Many of the classical writings of Hasidism overflow with lucubrations on the communion with "Nothingness" and the path by which man retraces his steps from "aught" to "naught." The strange enthusiasm which characterizes these sermons on a truly paradoxical symbolism wanes after the generation of Rabbi Baer's pupils. But for the first generation after the Baalshem it held a fascination unequalled in Jewish literature and not easily explained. It seems to express a degree of abandonment to emotionalism that has no precedent, except for the short upsurge of Sabbatianism in 1666, and could find no adequate expression but in the most daring paradoxes of mysticism. The Baalshem never said that *Devekuth* represented a state where man was able to stand within the naught, an idea cherished by the Maggid. Of course, the new departure introduced by

Rabbi Baer did not prevent him from using definitions and theses about *Devekuth* which he had inherited from the Baalshem.

There is a point in connection with the Baalshem's conception of *Devekuth* that deserves further attention. I am referring to the relation between talmudic study of the Torah and the new central virtue. As far as I am aware, it has been overlooked that this shifting of the place of *Devekuth* in the scale of values, and the new definition given to it, has something to do with the evaluation of talmudic learning in early Hasidism. The old Safed school clearly already knew that the "Hasidim of Old" took nine hours off their time of study in order to practice solitude and *Devekuth*. Now, when *Devekuth* was no longer considered a final stage for the few, but a demand on anybody who harkened to the voice, this was bound to hasten the clash between a purely talmudic orientation and the new school. If you concentrate on the spiritual core of the Toarh, on the mystic light shining through the letters, and if this is *Devekuth,* it follows that you cannot concentrate with equal fervor on the specific and concrete meaning of the words, and certainly not on the intricacies of talmudic lore and discussion. To penetrate an intricate discussion is one thing, and to contemplate the divine light that pervades the words is another.

The Baalshem, and still more his main disciples, were fully aware of this gulf between the understanding of the specific detail and the contemplation of the all-enveloping light which transcends human grasp and understanding. They did not think it possible to unite both of them in one and the same act. (The Baalshem said to the Rabbi of Polnoye that on Sabbath there was almost no time to study, because all of it ought to be devoted to *Yihudim,* i.e., contemplation.) Hence the insistence on taking time off from study and devoting it to contemplation and meditation. The two did not go together. Mendel of Przemyslany, who counselled not to devote too much time to talmudic study, only drew the logical conclusion from the basic demand of *Devekuth*. The famous warning so vehemently assailed in the struggle between the two camps is to be found in a context where special emphasis is laid on the practice of *Devekuth*. The radicalism of the mystics and protagonists of popular revivalism, which necessarily brought about the clash, had not yet been watered down. Later on, it would be argued, as some Kabbalists, including Moses of Satanov, had done before, that *Devekuth* and penetrating study were not mutually exclusive

and might be practiced together. Honesty requires us to state that Hasidism, in its beginning, was far removed from such an irenic attitude. Talking about *Devekuth* and contemplation, it meant what it said, and meant it in an uncompromising sense. The emphasis on *Devekuth* had, of course, two aspects: one for the average man, to whom it opened up a new vista and, especially through the practice of fervent and ecstatic prayer, a path to God; the other, for the learned, from whom it required a new balance between the intellectual and emotional sides of his nature. In both cases, the problem could not have arisen without the aforementioned shifting of the place of *Devekuth* into the center of man's spiritual activity.

So far, we have found in *Devekuth* a value which, to the Baalshem no less than to his forerunners, is connected primarily with solitary meditation and prayer. In prayer, even in communal prayer, man is alone with God, much as he may strive to bind himself spiritually to "Catholic Israel." What I said at the beginning of the characteristics of *Devekuth* in Nahmanides holds emphatically true for the Baalshem's conception too, in spite of the change I have just been analyzing. The possibility of a social meaning of communion with God begins to show here and there and seems to be based on the practice of the Baalshem. His disciple, Moses of Dolina, reports in his name that *Devekuth* can be sustained even in seemingly idle talk and in attending to one's business. But to accomplish this, he says, special zeal and fervor are required. The very close relation between *Devekuth* and *Yihud* is also shown by the fact that the same saying that Moses of Dolina quotes about *Devekuth* is mentioned by the Baalshem's grandson in connection with the possibility of performing *Yihudim* not only by prayer and contemplation, but by every earthly performance. Even in social intercourse, in attending to business, etc., it is possible to continue the contemplative attitude by binding oneself to the spiritual core of the matter. In other words, *Devekuth* and *Yihudim* are not concerned so much with the concrete as such, but rather with emptying it of its concrete content and discovering in it an ideal aspect which opens a vista into the hidden life which flows everywhere. *Devekuth* was not preached as an active realization of the concrete, but as a contemplative realization of the immanence of God in the concrete.

In the teaching of Baer of Mezritch, the re-evaluation of *Devekuth* has proceeded a step further, in harmony with the general trend of his thought, which could be characterized as a transformation of Kab-

balistic theosophy and its terminological apparatus into mystical anthropology. It is remarkable that the central concept of Lurianic Kabbalism, the idea of *Tikkun,* restoration, plays no great part in the first Hasidic writings. Its place is taken by *Devekuth,* a substitution which I have found nowhere in pre-Hasidic literature, and which, indeed, could never be found there. Why? Because the idea of *Tikkun* in Lurianic doctrine had a strong Messianic connotation and implication on which I have dwelt elsewhere. But *Devekuth* is essentially a non-Messianic and non-eschatological value. When it took the place of *Tikkun* in the mending of the "broken vessels," in the restoration of harmony in the broken state of our being, it could do so only because something had fundamentally changed in the outlook of the Hasidim. About this change, namely, the neutralization of Messianism as a driving power, I shall speak at greater length later. Before this liquidation of Messianism had taken place, nobody could have thought of substituting the private and contemplative experience of *Devekuth* as a healing force for the broad and comprehensive action that was the essential meaning of *Tikkun.* This substitution tells much about the real difference between Lurianism and Hasidism.

Rabbi Baer enumerates three factors which may induce the state of *Devekuth:* retreat from association with other people; the writing down of Kabbalistic mysteries on the Torah; and the practice of *Yihudim,* in the sense of special meditations. No special emphasis is laid as yet on the attainment of *Devekuth* within the group. He does not change the basic meaning of *Devekuth* as a value of introspection which consists of solitary intercourse with God. It is not a social value. In his opinion, it is a high degree of perfection if a man is "sometimes" able to be alone with himself and God "even when in one room with many other people." It was left to Rabbi Baer's disciples, especially to Elimelech of Lizensk, to take the final step and demand the realization of *Devekuth* as a social value. But this could be done only at a high price, namely, by binding *Devekuth* to the institution of Zaddikism, a connection wholly foreign to primitive Hasidism.

Looking back on our analysis, there is one point which deserves to be amplified. It is remarkable that *Devekuth,* an essentially emotional value, is linked in a surprisingly large number of sayings of the Baalshem and his various pupils or associates with a seemingly intellectual effort. *Devekuth* is reached by a fixation of one's *thought (mahshavah)* or mind *(sekhel)* on God. True, there are some sayings which mention

the souls as a whole, and not only its intellectual power, as the instrument of *Devekuth*. But the insistence on the use of mind and thought cannot be accidental, even if we concede that "thought" is sometimes used in a rather loose sense. For it does not always mean the purely intellectual and intentional act of the mind, but rather indicates in some places any intentional act of the soul, including its voluntaristic and emotional spheres. I assume, however, that the strong emotional coloring of the "thought" of man in the dicta about *Devekuth* has something to do with the nature of this act. In fixing all one's attention on God, thought, sunk in contemplation of the ineffable light, loses its definite content as an intellectual act. *By the practice of Devekuth, thought is transformed into emotion;* it is, if I may be permitted to use the expression, de-intellectualized. In other words, the insight which is won by *Devekuth* has no rational and intellectual content and, being of a most intimate and emotional character, cannot be translated into rational terms.

This point is very succinctly put forward by Meshullam Feibush Heller, a pupil of the Maggid of Mezritch and the Maggid of Zlotchov. His classic epistle on the fundamentals of Hasidism contains pointed criticism of the contemporary study of Kabbalah. True mystery, he says, is not what can be read and studied by anybody in the printed volumes of Kabbalistic teaching, which is a purely intellectual affair, like so many other studies; there is no point in calling this an "esoteric" knowledge when it is, in truth, as exoteric as any other knowledge that can be imparted by books. The real mystery and esoteric wisdom is that of loving communion with God, *devekuth ha-ahabah ba-shem yithbarakh*. It cannot be told nor transmitted, and "everyone knows of it only what he has found out for himself, and no more."

It is, however, not without interest that the link between *Devekuth* and intellectual effort may have come down from Kabbalistic tradition. Joseph Gikatilia (about 1300) defines *Devekuth* as the process by which man binds his soul to God by way of intellectual thought, and he labors this intellectual view of *Devekuth* at some length in his book on the Kabbalistic reasons of the commandments.

IV

If Hasidic piety was focused to such a degree on *Devekuth*, there could be no doubt that the great demand could not be fulfilled con-

tinuously. There are two ways in which the Baalshem dealt with this question in his sayings. Sometimes he admits the necessity of an interruption of *Devekuth*. The soul, too, must take a rest from the exertions and the emotional strain. By simple and unstrained activities it must gather new strength for the renewed exercises of *Devekuth* (*Ben Porath* fol. 34a). Seen in this light, attending to the business of daily life is a necessary interruption and preparation for the adventure of spiritual life, and therefore no reproach attaches to it. In *Devekuth,* man is cleaving to the spiritual life of all worlds which is the Shekhinah or the immanence of God. This vital force, which is aroused by communion, cannot operate without interruption. A "descent," a *Yeridah,* from the state of *Devekuth* is therefore part of human nature. The Baalshem used to apply to this the verse in Ezekiel 1, 14, which he interpreted to mean, "the force of life" *(hiyuth),* instead of *hayoth* of the text, "runs and returns," i.e., operates not steadily but with interruptions. The meaning of all this, of course, is that the force of life, although it is there, cannot be continuously realized and made conscious. Jacob Joseph of Polnoye mentions twice such a "fallen state" or *yeridah* of the Baalshem himself when he had gone to another country; it is to be regretted that he gives no further details, but contents himself with the remark that after that he had double power of "ascent," *aliyah.*

But it must be admitted that in the light of his own pronouncements, this is not a satisfactory solution. If it is sin, or even heresy, to fall out of *Devekuth,* how could an explanation such as this one hold good? Out of this dilemma came a fundamental thesis of the Baalshem, meant as a qualification of the doctrine of *Devekuth* and which, indeed, played a very important part in early Hasidism. This is the doctrine of *Katnuth* and *Gadluth,* the minor and major states of man.

As a matter of fact, *Katnuth* and *Gadluth* are not only states of man's mind or being, but, according to the Baalshem, two basic states of every being. "Just as there exists a state of *Katnuth* and *Gadluth* in the supernal Sephiroth, there is a similar state in every thing, even in the clothes that a man wears," his grandson quotes him as saying. We have here another striking example of the metamorphosis of Kabbalistic terms. In Lurianic Kabbalah these terms have a specific theosophic meaning, as states of the divine mind in some of its manifestations. The chapters on these states in Vital's *Ez Hayim* are famous for their

difficulty and their daring use of anthropomorphic symbolism. The Baalshem takes the terms back into the human sphere and gives the theosophic idea a new turn or twist.

With him, *Katnuth* and *Gadluth* are phases of life, everywhere and at all times, from purely natural and even artificial things up to the configuration of the divine Sephiroth where the same rhythm and the same law prevail. *Katnuth,* the minor state, is the state of imperfection, even of degradation, whereas *Gadluth* means the full development of a thing to its highest state. Everywhere in time, space, and the soul there is the same organic law of the two states, an idea which the Rabbi of Polnoye was tireless in preaching and applying.

There is a higher and lower state in human existence and human affairs, and particularly in worship. But everything depends on the rank a man has reached in his spiritual struggle for perfection. With one, *Katnuth* may mean an outward and mechanical way of worship "without soul" or, as the Baalshem was fond of putting it, "without joy." But with another class, it may mean only a lower standard than their customary one. *Katnuth,* then, is the time of man's struggle with his lower instincts in order to lift himself up to *Gadluth,* a state that knows of no struggle, but only of the enjoyment that comes with victory over the darker side of his nature.

The same verse in Ezekiel I used by the Baalshem in support of the interruption of *Devekuth* is also adduced by him in connection with this rather different theory. There is a steady flow of life, up and down, and no state is void of its manifestation. There can be a modest form of *Devekuth* even in the minor state. It is limited and without that exuberance and exhilaration that comes to man only when joy sweeps him off *Katnuth.* But still, it enables him to keep some sort of communion even in that state of estrangement from God as which *Katnuth* is frequently pictured. One saying has it that "in the time of *Gadluth* man is literally cleaving to God, which cannot be said to apply in the time of *Katnuth.*" For when man falls into this state—and there is no exception to the law that necessitates this periodic occurrence—he finds himself in melancholy sadness and estrangement. His worship contains an element of compulsion and not those high qualities of pure fear and love which characterize that worship out of an overflowing heart which is essentially what *Gadluth* means. Only by constantly striving to overcome this state of separation and to attain

anew the higher state, by the very struggle to get oneself out of the spiritual desert, there remains some indirect approach to God. This is the point on which the Baalshem's defense of his behavior with simple folk is centered. *Katnuth* is the time to serve God even through idle talk or story-telling! For, even by this means, can man bring about the spiritual concentration which will help him to attain *Devekuth.* In *Katnuth,* man should devote himself to external action or worldly talk, but even then the true Hasid will be meditating on the spiritual side of what seems to be a purely material undertaking. Nobody may notice it, yet he transforms the lowest forms of activity into something of a higher order. It is obvious, and I need not labor the point, that this thesis can be as sublime as it may prove dangerous. The mystic content of idle talk—that is certainly a thesis full of perverse possibilities! And a very popular thesis at that. It is constantly emphasized in the doctrinal tradition of early Hasidism and must be considered as an active factor in its propaganda.

Katnuth is, therefore, the time of trial through which the perfect man, no less than anybody else, must pass. There is, to be sure, a twofold aspect of *Katnuth:* it can be the natural relaxation after the strain of *Devekuth,* but it can also be an intentional descent, because of some hidden purpose. This second aspect plays an important part in Hasidic doctrine. It is connected with the *motif* of the falling, or stepping down, of the Zaddik, a problem that had a special fascination for the Hasidim. I do not think it could have acquired this importance had it not been for the Sabbatian theories of the necessary fall of the Messiah and its later Podolian metamorphosis. Only after Sabbatianism, the problem of *"Nephilath ha-Zaddik"* became an acute one that needed to be discussed. Earlier Kabbalistic ethics does not know it as a pressing one. Now, from the Baalshem's sayings till Elimelech of Lizensk, it takes on rather astonishing dimensions. In my view, it is a sublimation of an antinomian thesis, on a plane where it was calculated to lose its sting. The deliberate stepping down from holiness into a state of *Katnuth*—says the Baalshem—is very dangerous, and there are many who have remained there and could not rise again. This sounds very much like an echo of the Sabbatian turmoil!

Another saying of the Baalshem has it that, "if it happens to a perfect man that he cannot study or pray, he should realize that this also shows the hand of God who is pushing him back in order that he

may come nearer." Here we have essentially the principle which, as far as I can see, was formulated in its final shape by Rabbi Baer of Mezritch, if not by the Baalshem himself. The formula *Yeridah zorekh aliyah,* "The descent, or stepping down, is necessary in order to ascend to a higher rank"—something perhaps best translated by the French phrase, *reculer pour mieux sauter*—recurs constantly in Rabbi Baer's sayings on the meaning of *Katnuth.* But he admits two kinds of "stepping down": "Sometimes," he says, "a man falls from his rank because of himself . . . and sometimes the state of the world causes him to fall, and in both cases the descent is for the sake of an ever higher ascent." *Katnuth,* then, for all its personal color, is not only a matter of purely personal causation. It may depend on the surroundings of a man, his fellowmen or other factors. This explanation was very frequently used to justify the deliberate or quasi-deliberate stepping down of a perfect man, a Zaddik, in the Hasidic sense of the term. If all the world is in a state of *Katnuth,* he should join in and associate his efforts with theirs in order to reach *Gadluth.* It is in this context that Jacob Joseph of Polnoye uses almost the same formula as the Maggid of Mezritch. (Incidentally, since he uses it immediately *before* a quotation from the Baalshem, we may infer that the formula itself was not known to him as a saying of his master; otherwise he would have acknowledged it as such.)

We even have the prescription of the Baalshem as to which parts of prayer should be said in a state of *Katnuth* in order to be able to pray the other parts in the ravishment of *Devekuth.* It is obvious, therefore, that a state which is considered as preparatory to *Devekuth* does *not* constitute a sin in the sense I have explained before. Of course, there is danger in *Katnuth,* namely the danger of remaining in what should be only a transitory stage. But the whole teaching of the Baalshem is centered around this conception of a steady ebb and flow in the spiritual life of man: in *Gadluth,* there is communion and even ecstasy, but in *Katnuth,* there is preparation for it. Understood in this right sense, no fault is to be found in such a state.

V

In the foregoing analysis of *Devekuth,* I have laid stress on those points which characterize the specific color and significance the term has taken on in Hasidic parlance, and particularly with the Baalshem.

They are more or less typical of the conception of *Devekuth* in the bulk of Hasidic literature. But there is one further point which I think should be discussed here. I have said that communion, for all its depth and importance, is not union. But is this truly so? Are there no stages of deeper contemplation, ravishment, and ecstasy where one state passes into the other? Since much has been made of the allegedly pantheistic leanings and doctrines of the Baalshem and his early pupils, especially by Horodezky and Minkin, it may be worth while to go into the matter. All the more so, since Horodezky uses the term pantheism in a very loose way which tends to make pantheists of a great many inside and outside of the Hasidic camp who might never have so much as dreamed of such a faith as that venerable author ascribes to them. If creator and creation are essentially one, then *Devekuth* may indeed be union. I propose, therefore, to examine this question, if only briefly, in order to reach a better understanding of some shades of the concept of *Devekuth* which deserve our attention.

As to the Baalshem himself, there is no proof, in his authentic sayings, of any doctrine which might properly be called pantheistic. In contradistinction to this absence of an *identification* of God and the universe, of the Creator and creation, there is full proof of his belief in the immanence of God in every one of His creatures. It is at most what philosophers call "panentheistic" teaching—all Being *in* God, but not all Being God. This sort of teaching was current in Kabbalism, especially in Cordovero's works. If we knew for sure that the Baalshem had studied Abraham Azulai's *Hesed Le-Abraham,* which is an abstract of Cordovero's Kabbalah, we would better understand the genesis of some of his formulas as quoted in the books of the Rabbi of Polnoye. For Azulai sharply accentuates the panentheistic core of Cordovero's teaching. But all we know positively is that this rabbi himself had read the book, which was printed as early as 1685. Whether his master knew it we can only guess. Azulai states, for instance, that man is "in communion with God," because "there is nothing that is separated from Him." But the reason he adduces for the latter statement is perfectly orthodox and non-pantheistic; it is the chain of cause and effect which, in the last resort, links God with His creation. The formula of the "chain of causes" enables the mystics to reinstate God as the immanent soul or life of all being. And it is only in this quality, and not as the last and transcendent cause, that God

appeals to the mind of the Baalshem. His thinking on this score is very simple and unsophisticated. He repeats the old formulas which every Kabbalist had used before him, and, with one notable exception, without additions of his own: "Everything is full of His glory," "No place is void of Him," "Thou keepest them all alive" (Nehemia 9, 6), which was frequently understood to mean: Thou are the vital force, *hiyuth,* of everything. To this last quotation the Baalshem made the significant addition, of everything, *even of sin,* an idea which he repeated in a great many variations.

On the other hand, the Baalshem was fond of telling a parable which recurs in several variations in the books of his disciples and apparently carries quite a different meaning.

A king had built a glorious palace full of corridors and partitions, but he himself lived in the innermost room. When the palace was completed and his servants came to pay him homage, they found that they could not approach the king because of the devious maze. While they stood and wondered, the King's son came and showed them that those were not real partitions, but only magical illusions, and that the king, in truth, was easily accessible. Push forward bravely and you shall find no obstacle.

The interpretations put on this parable in Hasidic literature differ widely. Its literal sense conveys no pantheistic meaning but rather an "acosmic" one: the world is denied real existence, reality is seen rather as a sort of "Veil of Maya." The perfectly devout man, the "son of the King," discovers that there is nothing that separates him from his father. External reality is but an illusion. This is the way the parable is commented on by the Baalshem's grandson. But others, as for instance the Rabbi of Polnoye, give it a pantheistic turn: "People with true insight know that all the walls and partitions, all the outward clothes and covers are in truth of His own essence, for there is no place void of Him." If the *formula* alone were decisive, we might safely say that there is, indeed, a pantheistic element to be found, at least in some of the Baalshem's disciples. But the ideational *content* of the formula is, almost in every case, limited to a much less radical interpretation, by reading into it either the doctrine of divine immanence or that of the annihilation of reality before the contemplative mind. For if one looks closely into the context of such passages, all that remains of the highflown formulas is always the omnipresence of the divine influxus, *shefa,* and *hiyuth,* the vitalizing power, instead of that of the

divine substance. I think that the numerous writers who have compared the Baalshem's teaching to that of Spinoza have considerably overshot the mark. I, for one, am unable to find any specifically Spinozistic teaching in the Baalshem's doctrinal sayings.

An excellent example of the shifting of emphasis in the use of extreme formulations is provided by a saying of Pinhas of Koretz on the subject, in his *Midrash Pinhas* (1872f. 9b, 60):

> If a man fulfils the commandments of the Torah, such as the commandment of the phylacteries, and says the formula prescribed by the Kabbalists, namely, "In the name of all Israel (I am doing this)" then he lifts up the whole universe to its "root" above, *for the world is really God Himself,* like the locust whose clothing is part of its own self. Therefore, he annihilates (by his action) the (outward) existence of the whole universe. And if we see that in spite of all this the world is still there, it is because the vital energy of God is always active and the world is incessantly renewed.

Here, then, we have *within one sentence* the different motives I have just mentioned, and this, I think, should warn us against over-stressing such formulas as "the world is really God Himself." What is particularly interesting in this view is that the performance of the *mitsvah* does not give more meaning and reality to the world, as modern interpretations of Hasidic theology would lead us to expect but, on the contrary, detracts from its apparently illusory-reality and leads from the aught to the verge of the naught. For the "root" of the world is the naught which the mystic contemplates, with which he communes and in which he longs to "stand." At their "root" the created things lose their identity as creatures, because all that can be beheld there is God alone. But we should not forget that, to reach that state, *creation as creation* must be "annihilated," which implies that creation, in its own right, is not what pantheism would declare it to be, namely a mere mode of Infinity. We are indeed, as we may put it, dwelling in God, but we are not God. Also, it should be borne in mind that the "son of the King," who pushes through to his father, sees his father and cleaves to him, but does not become one with him.

This, then, brings us back to the point I have raised: are there, in original Hasidic teaching, more radical formulations of the central doctrine of *Devekuth* than those we have been considering? The answer is that there is a definite turn towards a more mystical formulation of it in the teaching of the Maggid of Mezritch and some of his

pupils. The Baalshem and Jacob Joseph of Polnoye do not emphasize a "union" or "unity" *(ahduth)* between God and man, and their formulations are much more careful than those current in Rabbi Baer's sayings. This adds further weight to what I have said about the necessity of taking Jacob Joseph's allegedly pantheistic statements with not too small a grain of salt. Comparing the two most conspicuous pupils of the Baalshem, there can be no doubt that Jacob Joseph is the relatively sober one, whereas Rabbi Baer of Mezritch has gone far on the way of what must be described as mystical intoxication. The difference between the sermons of the two which have come down to us is tremendous. I have mentioned the streak of soberness that characterizes the Baalshem. In Rabbi Baer, this trait has disappeared. He is no longer the friend of God and the simple folk, who roams through the markets. He is the ascetic whose gaze is fixed on, or I might rather say, lost in God. He is a mystic of unbridled radicalism and singularity of purpose. His predilection for the more paradoxical figures of mystical speech colors his sermons to a degree equalled by few of his predecessors in the history of Jewish mysticism. It is, therefore, not astonishing that he should use the terminology of mystical union in describing some stages of *Devekuth,* although here, too, it may be wise not to lose ourselves in his terminology, which is radical indeed, but to consider the context of his thought.

It will serve as an illustration of this peculiar mystical bent of Rabbi Baer if I close by summarizing his bold explanation of Numbers 10:2 which, as a description of the ultimate goal of *Devekuth,* goes as far as anything in early Hasidism. The rather inoffensive prescription of the Torah: "Make thee two trumpets of silver, of a whole piece shall thou make them," gives birth in Rabbi Baer's mind to the following enthusiastic explanation based on a mystical pun, the word *hatsotseroth,* trumpets, being taken as two words, *hatsi-tsuroth,* halves of forms. Man and God, he says, are each only a half-finished, incomplete form. Man without God is really not man, *adam,* a sublime and spiritual being, but only *dam,* blood, a biological entity. He is lacking the *a* or *Aleph,* which is God, *alupho shel olam,* the master of the world. Only when the *Aleph* and *dam,* God and man, get together, the two form a real unity, and only then does man deserve to be called *adam.* But how is such unity, *ahduth,* accomplished? By *Kissuph* which means the constant striving for union with God." If man casts off all

earthly or material elements and ascends through all the worlds and becomes one with God to the degree of losing the feeling of separate existence, then will he be rightly called *adam,* Man, "being transformed into the cosmic figure of the primordial man whose likeness upon the throne Ezekiel beheld." This, according to Baer, is the transfiguration of man which is reached through, or in, the state of *Devekuth: man finds himself by losing himself in God,* and by giving up his identity he discovers it on a higher plane. Here, and in many other sayings of Rabbi Baer, *Devekuth* is said to lead not only to communion, but to *ahduth,* union. But—this union is, in fact, not at all the pantheistic obliteration of the self within the divine mind which he likes to call the naught, but pierces through this state on to the rediscovery of man's spiritual identity. *He finds himself because he has found God.* This, then, is the deepest meaning of *Devekuth* of which Hasidism knows, and the radical terms should not blind us to the eminently Jewish and personalistic conception of man which they still cover. After having gone through *Devekuth* and union, man is still man—nay, he has, in truth, only then started to be man, and it is only logical that only then will he be called upon to fulfill his destiny in the society of men.

JOHN WESLEY'S FIRST HYMNBOOK

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Long before Aldersgate—in fact, more than thirteen years before his heart was "strangely warmed"—John Wesley began that intimate record of his day-by-day and hour-by-hour spiritual experiences which, for more than a century after his death, remained unpublished. Only at last, during our own century, did the breaking of the cipher in which the Diaries were originally written give the Wesley student access to the detailed secrets of those early formative years at Oxford, and of those later hectic months in Georgia which preceded the celebrated event of May 24, 1738, when he found himself ushered into a new dimension of spiritual experience.

These Diaries, then, cover a period of greatest significance—the dozen or so years before Aldersgate, and they continue to supply us with information for the period lasting until August, 1741, three years after Aldersgate, and two years after his début as field preacher at Bristol, where he had "submitted to be more vile, and proclaimed in the highways the glad tidings of salvation." If that Aldersgate experience in his thirty-fifth year was indeed *the* watershed, undoubtedly, then, the whole tenor of his spiritual life must have changed after May 24, 1738.

And yet, did it really change as drastically as the classical theory of the Aldersgate conversion might imply? Fortunately, the Diaries open up their revelation of the closely guarded sanctuary of Wesley's innermost spiritual life. True, he may have broken with the non-juror William Law after 1738 (although the letter precipitating the rupture was, interestingly enough, written ten days before, rather than after Aldersgate),[1] and he may later have told a select company on Sunday, May 28, "that five days before he was not a Christian,"[2] but, nevertheless, his day-by-day and hour-by-hour spiritual routine, both before and after May 24, exhibits strange likenesses. Dr. Umphrey Lee has by no means been the only Methodist historian who has regarded "May 24

1. John Wesley, *The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A. M. . . .* edited by Nehemiah Curnock, VIII (London, 1916), 319-20.

2. Umphrey Lee, *The Lord's Horseman* (New York, 1928), p. 73.

as in no sense a *terminus ad quem* and *terminus a quo* of Methodist tradition."[3]

A significant likeness in spiritual routine both before and after Aldersgate, as revealed in the Diaries, for instance, is Wesley's uniform devotion to the singing of psalms and hymns as a daily and even hourly part of his own spiritual life. Long before Aldersgate, Wesley was a "singing" man. Those who have equated his spiritual condition before Aldersgate with some such state as *The Dark Night of the Soul* might well remember that, in the Diaries both before and after 1738, "with the exception of 'prayer' and 'conversation' no word appears more frequently than 'singing'."[4] Certainly long before he stood up in company witnessing that he had been no Christian before May 24, 1738, his had been a singing religion.

Even more to the point, however, than the mere fact that Wesley practiced singing some kind of religious song four or five times a day, both before and after Aldersgate, invariably including singing as an integral part of every group meeting, is the fact that he was still continuing to sing the same repertory of hymns at the close of his ministry that he had selected for the use of his slender congregations in the isolated settlements of Georgia during his legalistic days. Is it not remarkable that his *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* in 1738, and again his *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* issued in 1741, should, in large measure, have duplicated the choices of material for his first *Collection of Psalms and Hymns,* printed for Wesley at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1737? And is it not even more remarkable that, almost forty years later, when John Wesley in co-operation with his brother Charles, issued his last collection for use specifically in the Methodist Societies he, John Wesley, should have largely reverted to the very hymns he had chosen for his first hymnbook, the epoch-making collection issued at Charleston in 1737? Surely, if he had moved so far from his original moorings as some would have us believe, he would scarcely have returned in his last *Collection of Psalms and Hymns,* issued in 1784 in London, to those same psalms and hymns that had nourished his spiritual life during those parched years when he was yet wandering about in goatskins, being spiritually destitute, afflicted, and tormented, amidst the wilds of Georgia!

3. J. Ernest Rattenbury, *The Conversion of the Wesleys* (London, 1938), p. 118.
4. Wesley, *op. cit.,* II, p. 72.

What are the precise facts regarding the number of hymns carried over from the *Charlestown Collection* (as the collection is known today—Charleston was then Charlestown) into the last *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* published in 1784? Fortunately for purposes of comparison, the number of items in both collections is not too disparate. The 1737 collection has 70 items (we do not count as individual items the parts of those psalms and hymns which were divided by Wesley into shorter units for convenience in singing), and the 1784 collection (following the same method of counting) has 89 items. Of the 70 items in the *Charlestown Collection,* considerably more than a third, or 27 items, to be exact, were carried over into the collection published by two brothers at the very end of their ventures in collaboration. And it was this 1784 collection which then became later the nucleus of *The Morning Hymn Book,* an enlargement made by Dr. Coke, "and used in London and elsewhere at the forenoon service."[5] In connection with *The Morning Hymn Book,* it may be interesting to note in passing, there was used a Liturgy mentioned by Wesley in his letter dated September 10, 1784, when he said: "I have prepared a Liturgy . . . which I advise all the travelling preachers to use on the Lord's Day in all the congregations, reading the Litany only on Wednesdays and Fridays, and praying *extempore* on all other days."[6]

But to return to the hymns. Today, of course, we would call all the items in both collections, the first one issued in South Carolina, and the last one in London, not "psalms" but rather "hymns." The eighteenth century distinguished between metrical psalms inspired by Davidic psalms and hymns, but this question of nomenclature is a subsidiary one here. What must now be examined in detail is the exact character of those items, both "psalms" and "hymns," which were carried over from the 1737 collection into the 1784 collection. A few lines from several typical examples will give a better idea of them than a merely perfunctory listing of titles. Take as example these lines, "Amidst thy wrath remember love, Restore thy servant, Lord! . . . My sins a heavy burden are . . . . My thoughts are like a troubled sea."[7] Or the lines, "O Thou that hears't when sinners cry, My soul

5. Richard Green, *The Works of John and Charles Wesley,* A Bibliography (London, 1896), p. 225.

6. *Ibid.,* p. 224.

7. *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* (Charles-Town, 1737), p. 40; *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* (London, 1784), p. 10.

lies humbled in the dust, And owns thy dreadful sentence just."[8] Now is this the kind of thing we have been led to expect in a Wesley hymnbook? And yet, there are many more of this kind. Next in order of carry-over hymns found in the 1784 collection is that one originally culled from the pages of Addison's *Spectator,* containing these apprehensive lines, "When rising from the bed of death, O'erwhelmed with guilt and fear, I view my Maker face to face, Oh how shall I appear! . . . My soul with inward horror shrinks, And trembles at the thought!"[9] Perhaps we might expect Wesley to endorse this hymn for his bleak Georgia colonists, but how could he and his brother, Charles, endorse it for their last great collection? Then next we find, "From whence these dire portents around, That earth and heaven amaze?"[10] And, next in the list of carry-over hymns, "Wilt thou, O Lord, regard my tears, The fruit of guilt and fear? Me, who thy justice hath provok'd, Oh! will thy mercy spare?"[11] Passing over without comment two more hymns transcribed from Watts and another transcribed from John Austin, celebrated English Catholic of the seventeenth century (a hymn which, along with others from the same author, we shall discuss in a later connection), we pause to consider another egregious example of what some with condign justice might term legalistic religion. The hymn appears with these verses in both the 1737 and 1784 collections:

Long have I sat beneath the sound
Of thy salvation, Lord;
But still how weak my faith is found,
And knowledge of thy word!

Oft I frequent thy holy place,
Yet hear almost in vain;
How small a portion of thy grace
Can my hard heart retain!

How cold and feeble is my love!
How negligent my fear!
How low my hope of joys above!
How few affections there![12]

8. *Collection,* 1737, p. 41; *Collection,* 1784, p. 11.
9. *Collection,* 1737, p. 47; *Collection,* 1784, p. 26.
10. *Collection,* 1737, p. 44; *Collection,* 1784, p. 27.
11. *Collection,* 1737, p. 43; *Collection,* 1784, p. 28.
12. *Collection,* 1737, p. 50; *Collection,* 1784, p. 33.

Lines from the next hymn found in both collections seem, again, more suitable for the bondage of Hagar. "But pride that busy sin Spoils all that I perform, Curs'd pride that creeps securely in. . . . Create my soul anew, Else all my worship's vain; This wretched heart will ne'er prove true Till it be form'd again." Readers who have encountered this hymn in the 1737 collection have remarked: "How wisely Wesley diagnosed his spiritual malady!" But, then, what shall be said when it reappears, with scarcely an alteration, in the 1784 collection published by the venerable brothers near their journey's end?

If our analysis is correct, little real difference exists between the tone of the 1737 collection and that of the 1784 collection. It was again Dr. Umphrey Lee who presciently pointed out the change which Wesley made in a famous Addison hymn (later the favorite of President John Quincy Adams); in the last two lines of the first stanza Wesley struck out Addison's soaring thought and substituted the lines,

> Why my cold heart, art thou not lost
> In wonder, love and praise?[13]

Significantly, Wesley left these lines untouched in the 1784 collection, just as they had appeared in the 1737 collection.[14] Did Wesley, then, still feel cold seasons even after his heart had been strangely warmed? Surely, he must have felt a season of coldness when he wrote several months after Aldersgate on January 4, 1739:

> My friends affirm I am mad, because I said I was not a Christian a year ago. I affirm I am not a Christian now. . . . That I am not a Christian at this day I as assuredly know as that Jesus is the Christ. For a Christian is one who has the fruits of the Spirit of Christ, which (to mention no more) are love, peace, joy. These I have not.[15]

Then, again, there is the famous letter to his brother Charles, written June 27, 1766, in which he spoke of himself as only "an honest heathen, a proselyte of the Temple. . . . And yet I dare not preach otherwise than I do, either concerning faith, or love, or justification, or perfection."[16] And what is to be made of his hankering late in life for the spiritual peace and calm of the Oxford days, with all their rules: "Let me be again an Oxford Methodist! I am often in doubt whether it

13. *Collection,* 1737, p. 26; *Collection,* 1784, p. 96.
14. Umphrey Lee, *John Wesley and Modern Religion* (Nashville, 1936), p. 96.
15. Rattenbury, *op. cit.,* p. 122.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 123.

would not be best for me to resume all my Oxford rules, great and small. I did then walk closely with God and redeem the time."[17] These sentiments he expressed a dozen years before the last *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* appeared in 1784.

When the 1784 *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* finally did appear, we may surmise that John Wesley was in very much the same mood which prompted him later in life to recant some of the misleading statements which had appeared in his early Journals. If he had, at one time, asserted that he was a "child of wrath" in Georgia, he later wrote in a correction of this and other similarly enthusiastic condemnations of his Georgia spiritual estate, "I believe not."[18] He could not have believed he was a "child of wrath" in Georgia when he compiled his 1784 collection, in which he laid under tribute that same treasury of hymns which he had amassed in his 1737 collection. Recalling the Georgia years across the great viaduct of time, in 1781 Wesley wrote: "The first rise of Methodism, so called, was in November, 1729, when four of us met together at Oxford; the second was at Savannah, in April, 1736."[19] The date, May 24, 1738, does not figure in the three stages marking the growth of Methodism; the last date Wesley supplied for the unfolding of the Methodist movement, significantly antedated Aldersgate. The last stage, Wesley stated in 1781, was reached in 1738, on May 1, "at London . . . when forty or fifty of us agreed to meet together every Wednesday evening, in order to have a free conversation, begun and ended with singing and prayer."[20]

Those are the key words, then: every meeting "begun and ended with singing and prayer." Although some historians still feel constrained to overemphasize May 24, perhaps in the light of Wesley's own matured views and his own later assessment of the facts of Methodist history, time might now most profitably be spent in analysis of that assured foundation of all Methodist experience from the beginning, not the "strange warming" with its ecstasies, but rather the constantly renewed warming of the heart in "singing and prayer." This constantly renewed warming of the heart in "singing and prayer," at least as far as the singing was concerned, became possible only be-

17. Lee, *John Wesley and Modern Religion,* p. 94.
18. Wesley, *op. cit.,* I, 423.
19. Lee, *John Wesley and Modern Religion,* p. 101.
20. *Ibid.,* p. 101. Quoted from John Wesley, *Works,* ed. Thomas Jackson (1831), XIII, 307.

cause Wesley struck out on an entirely new line when he compiled his first hymnbook and issued it at Charleston.

Before the *Charlestown Collection* of 1737, there were no hymnbooks designed specifically for use in Church of England congregations. A modern scholar has justly called "this little book of seventy hymns . . . the first real Anglican Hymnal."[21] Singing as such was not new in Church of England congregations in 1737, but the singing of hymns was, indeed, an innovation. The permitted songs were metrical versions of the Davidic Psalms in either the Sternhold and Hopkins Version, compiled during the reign of Edward VI, or the Tate and Brady Version, compiled during the reign of William III. Interestingly enough, then, the singing of hymns as such was so much of an innovation in the Church of England during the eighteenth century that not until the early years of the nineteenth century did hymn singing come into vogue in the English Church, and, indeed, as late as 1819, a lengthy and now famous lawsuit was instigated against a clergyman who outraged decency by attempting to "introduce into his parish church a book containing . . . hymns."[22] Monstrous iniquity! And so, for more than a hundred years after John Wesley's precedent-shattering hymnbook, "bishops continued to issue formal charges to their dioceses against the introduction of hymns into parochial worship."[23]

Wesley had no bishop at hand in Georgia to guard the flock from the contamination of that wolf in sheep's clothing, the singing of hymns, but there did arise sturdy opposition to his hymn-singing activities before the ink on the pages being printed over at Charleston for the use of the Savannah and Frederica congregations had time to dry. Leading the movement against the nefarious innovation of hymn-singing was that egregious petty tyrant, the uncle of the pretty eighteen-year-old girl whom he wanted Wesley to marry, Thomas Causton. At the end of August, 1737, after intense ire had been aroused on various accounts, not the least of which was Causton's disgust at Wesley's dilatory tactics in the prosecution of his courtship with the niece, Wesley was haled before a Grand Jury to hear a list of grievances in the following order. First, "inverting the order and method of the

21. Winfred Douglas, *Church Music in History and Practice* (New York, 1937), p. 235.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

23. *Ibid.* One bishop even forbade the use of Bishop Ken's hymns.

Liturgy." Second, "changing . . . the version of Psalms publicly authorized to be sung in the church." (And of this changing of the version of the Psalms we shall hear more later.) Third, "introducing into the church and service at the Altar compositions of psalms and hymns not inspected or authorized by any proper judicature."[24]

And the most surprising thing about these presentments of the Grand Jury and Wesley's subsequent flight out of the colony while he was still a prisoner at large[25] is the truth of the charges. Wesley was, indeed, guilty of these three charges among others. During his sojourn in Georgia, he used as a manual of devotions George Hickes's *Reformed Devotions,* a manual compiled from an English Roman Catholic, the celebrated John Austin. To make matters even more confusing, George Hickes had himself become a non-juring bishop, and had, late in life (during Queen Anne's reign), returned to London with an overflow of enthusiasm for the first Edwardine Prayerbook. During his Georgia ministry Wesley, relied upon Hickes along with Thomas à Kempis and the Psalter for his daily devotional exercises.[26] The Diaries are replete with references to Hickes who, of course, provided in the *Devotions* suitable collects, scripture readings, and hymns for the principal hours of the day "in the Antient Way of Offices," that is to say, after the ancient pattern of monastic offices.[27] Both John and Charles followed Hickes and the non-juring tradition in preferring the 1549 Edwardine Prayerbook, governing their practice according to the rubrics of the Edward VI Prayerbook, "because they believed it to be more in harmony with the usage of the early church than any other, as undoubtedly it is."[28] No wonder, then, that Causton and his crowd fastened upon Wesley with the charge of "inverting the order and method of the Liturgy." Those who adhered to the 1662 Prayerbook would, indeed, have found Wesley's use of the 1549 Prayerbook captious and irritating.

From Hickes's manual Wesley derived seven hymns printed in the *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* at Charleston in 1737. Hickes, in turn, had

24. Wesley, *op. cit.,* I, 385.
25. *Ibid.,* I, 400.
26. *Ibid.,* I, 122.
27. *Ibid.,* I, 187, 201, 218, 267-69, 285, 295, 299, 307, 315, 347.
28. *Ibid.,* I, 210. On Sunday, May 9, 1736, John Wesley stated in his *Journal:* "I began dividing the public prayers, according to the original appointment of the Church." He therefore followed in the wake of those non-jurors such as Hickes who always celebrated according to 1549 usage.

derived his hymns from John Austin, a convert to Rome, whose perfervid hymns, thirty-nine in number, published at Paris during the early Restoration period (1668), exerted an influence far beyond the bounds of his own communion.[29] Hickes usually printed more stanzas in his *Reformed Devotions* than Wesley found space for in his own *Charlestown Collection,* but the changes which Wesley made in the words found in Hickes are few and far between. In conformity with his own dislike for "fondling expressions" addressed to Deity, Wesley changed the first word of a hymn entitled "Inconstancy" to read: "*Lord,* Jesu, when, when shall it be,"[30] whereas both John Austin and George Hickes have "*Dear* Jesu, when, when shall it be."[31] John Wesley later voiced a scathing denunciation of Isaac Watts, whom he also found too much addicted to expressions such as "Dear Lord," "Dear Saviour," and the like.[32] Wesley, we may rest assured, would never have approved of Whittier's "Dear Lord and Father of Mankind." Another instance of Wesley's changing a word in Hickes occurs at the beginning of Hymn XXXVIII, entitled "Hymn to Christ." Hickes, following Austin, has "*Sweet* Jesu, why, why dost thou Love";[33] Wesley gave the following first line: "*O* Jesu, why, why dost thou Love."[34] Perhaps the most beautiful of Austin's hymns preserved by John Wesley is the exquisite one,

> Come, Holy Spirit, send down those beams
> Which gently flow in silent streams
> From the eternal throne above . . .[35]

This hymn appears again in the last *Collection of Psalms and Hymns,* already discussed, published at London in 1784.[36] Another

29. Louis F. Benson, *The English Hymn* (Philadelphia, 1915), p. 69.

30. Wesley, *Collection,* p. 55.

31. George Hickes, *Devotions in the Antient Way of Offices, Reform'd by a Person of Quality,* 5th ed., 1717 (London, 1846), p. 36.

32. John Wesley, *The Works* (New York, 1856), II, 444.

33. Hickes, *op. cit.,* p. 266.

34. Wesley, *Collection,* p. 36. However, notice that, in reprinting a hymn culled from Watts's *Hymns and Spiritual Songs,* Wesley allowed an inconsistency—as he printed it in the 1737 collection the first line was still allowed to read: "Dear Lord, my Thankful Heart revives." According to Watts's superscription, copied by Wesley, this particular hymn paraphrased Song of Solomon 2: 14.

35. *Collection,* 1737, p. 22; Hickes, p. 316.

36. *Collection,* 1784, p. 32. The original in John Austin, *Devotions in the Antient Way of Offices,* 4th ed., 1685, p. 412. Austin's *Devotions* contained 43 hymns in this edition; nearly all are originals.

charming and fragrant hymn from Austin is the Christmas hymn found in the 1737 collection, "Jesu, Behold the Wise from Far."[37] Although space limitations deter us from further discussion of the other Austin hymns found in the 1737 collection,[38] we must mention with especial affection the vigorous hymn, "Hail, glorious Angels, Heirs of Light."[39]

Returning to the charges drawn up against Wesley by the Grand Jury, we now consider the second indictment: "changing . . . the version of Psalms publicly authorized to be sung in the church." The two versions of metrical psalms authorized in the Church of England were, as has already been mentioned, the Sternhold and Hopkins Version, and the Tate and Brady Version. The Tate and Brady Version, published in 1696, had been especially commended by Wesley's immediate ecclesiastical superior, under whose loose supervision all religious life in the colonies was organized, the Bishop of London. Shortly after the Tate and Brady Version, with its abounding periods and florid rhetoric had appeared, the Bishop of London had "heartily recommended the Use of this Version to all his Brethren within his Diocess."[40] Wesley certainly knew the Tate and Brady Version. During the voyage to Georgia he used it,[41] but evidently found it distasteful. The Diaries show him studying it again for possible use in his own collection,[42] but, when he came to the actual printing of his *Charlestown Collection,* he preferred to use psalms taken from Isaac Watts's 1719 volume, rather than from Tate and Brady. Fourteen "psalms" in Wesley's 1737 collection are derived from Watts; another four "psalms" are metrical versions published in a devotional manual by Samuel Wesley, John Wesley's father, entitled, delightfully enough, *The Pious Communicant Rightly Prepared.* As we might expect, this

37. *Collection,* 1737, p. 18.

38. The seven hymns from Austin in the 1737 collection are Hymns XVII (Austin, p. 363, Hickes, p. 278), XXII (Austin, p. 412, Hickes, p. 316), XXIV (Austin, p. 4, Hickes, p. 3), XXXIV (Austin, p. 493, Hickes, p. 351), XXXVIII (Austin, p. 349, Hickes, p. 266), LVIII (Austin, p. 52, Hickes, p. 36), LXVIII (Austin p. 86, Hickes, p. 59). None of the earliest Wesley collections was provided with index, and Austin followed by Hickes shared the same tantalizing defect. Sometimes Wesley began with a second or third stanza, thus still further complicating the task of locating originals. Even so painstaking a scholar as Louis F. Benson in *The English Hymn* (Philadelphia, 1915) never succeeded in tracing all the originals for Wesley's 1737 *Collection.*

39. *Collection,* 1737, p. 33.

40. L. F. Benson, *op. cit.,* p. 48.

41. *Op. cit.,* I, 123. Subsequent uses of Tate and Brady, pp. 184 and 302.

42. *Ibid.,* p. 175. (Diary, March 5, 1736).

1700 pious volume by Samuel Wesley, Senior, included in verse those psalms which Jesus, according to tradition, sang with his disciples before going out into the Mount of Olives after the Last Supper. Of the remaining "psalms" included in the *Charlestown Collection,* and we use the quotation marks in referring to these items because in modern usage they would assuredly be called hymns, rather than psalms, one is by "a gentleman of Exeter College," a student friend of the Wesleys, Thomas Broughton by name,[43] another (Psalm CIV, a favorite of Wesley, translated by him during his Oxford days,[44] but in a version which he never used in any of his collections intended for congregational singing) has been attributed, but incorrectly to George Sandys,[45] and still another, Psalm XIX, is the famous version by Joseph Addison, "The Spacious Firmament on High." It would be most pleasant to assume that Wesley's great favorite among the Book of Psalms, the 104th, had appeared in his *Charlestown Collection* in a rendering by George Sandys. Sandys, we remember, was secretary of the Virginia Company, and it was he who wrote out the first book prepared for publication by a Britisher in the New World. While Sandys was at Jamestown, more than a century before Wesley published the first hymnbook at Charlestown, he prepared a translation of Ovid which was subsequently published in England.[46] Be that as it may, the Sandys version of the psalms, probably the best poetical rendering before Watts, was highly appreciated by Wesley. From Sandys's version Wesley selected eleven psalms for his *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* issued after his return to England in 1741.

43. *Ibid.,* p. 456. For a transcription of this "psalm" in its earliest form, see John Telford, *The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, A. M.,* I (London, 1931), 31. Nine verses were included in Broughton's original paraphrase, which John Wesley copied at length in his letter of April 4, 1726, to his brother, Samuel.

44. Thomas W. Herbert, *John Wesley as Editor and Author* (Princeton, 1940), p. 48.

45. John and Charles Wesley, *The Poetical Works,* collected and arranged by G. Osborn, II (London, 1869), 6, line 20.

46. *Dictionary of National Biography,* L, (New York, 1897), 291: "Ten books [of Ovid's Metamorphoses] were rendered into English verse during the early years of his stay in Virginia [which lasted from 1621-1631]. . . . Sandys possessed exceptional metrical dexterity. . . . Alexander Pope liked Sandys's Ovid 'extremely.'" The literary accomplishments of Richard Mather and John Eliot, who collaborated in the new metrical translations, gathered into *The Bay Psalm Book,* 1640, such as they were, are far better known than Sandys's equally interesting activities in the colony of Jamestown a decade earlier. Sandys's and Wesley's literary accomplishments during their sojourns in the New World are interesting "firsts" which have not always been sufficiently emphasized.

But where was the authorized version of metrical psalms? The colonists had it right when they complained that Wesley had changed the "version of Psalms publicly authorized to be sung in the church." Later Wesley seemed to show some consideration for those in the Established Church who preferred Tate and Brady to Watts. Soon after his return to England, he published his second *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* in 1738, including 31 "psalms" and 45 "hymns"; in deference to sentiment in favor of Tate and Brady he included 16 metrical psalms from these "authorized" gentlemen, and reduced the number of Watts's renderings to 11. In 1741, Wesley issued his third *Collection of Psalms and Hymns,* this time including for the first time his own name on the title page; the Tate and Brady Version is represented by 21 items here, Watts by 22, and Sandys, as we have previously shown, by 11. After 1737, Wesley, we would think, might have bid fair peace to the sable shroud of his father and *The Pious Communicant Rightly Prepared,* but he seems to have felt no such inclination. Two of his father's psalm-renderings reappeared in the 1784 collection; much more frequently reappearing in the later collections, however, was the famous hymn miraculously rescued from the Epworth fire in which John was "plucked as a brand from the burning," the hymn still used, and entitled, "Behold the Saviour of Mankind."

At least three of the "psalms" included in the 1737 collection still retain wide usage. Addison's "The Spacious Firmament on High" has reappeared in countless hymnals, usually with the music of "The Heavens are Telling" from Haydn's oratorio composed near the end of the eighteenth century, *The Creation.* Another psalm-rendering found in the 1737 collection which retains its popularity today is that one by Watts beginning, "Come Ye that Love the Lord." Still another which has retained its hold on the affections of the public is Watts's version of Psalm C, "Before Jehovah's Awful (or as it is spelled in the Methodist Hymnal, *awe-full)* Throne." A fourth "psalm" found in the 1737 collection which is still included in the present Methodist Hymnal, and with a tune, surprisingly enough, included by Wesley in the very first Methodist tune-book of 1742,[47] is the historically impor-

47. *Collection of Tunes Set to Music as they are commonly sung at the Foundry* (London, 1742), p. 35. The words associated with this tune in the 1742 collection, however, are those of Samuel Wesley, the Elder: "Ye Priests of God whose Happy Days," his paraphrase of Psalm CXIII, words which his son, John Wesley, included in his first (1737) collection, p. 6.

tant rendering (Watts) of Psalm CXLVI, "I'll Praise my Maker While I've Breath."

This last wonderful version of a psalm was Wesley's own dying favorite. The general impression has been that he died with the words on his lips: "The best of all is, God is with us." But the record of those final days shows that on Tuesday, March 1st, 1791, he "broke out in a manner which, considering his extreme weakness, astonished us all, in these blessed words:

> I'll praise my Maker while I've breath,
> And when my voice is lost in death,
> Praise shall employ my nobler powers:
> My days of praise shall ne'er be past,
> While life, and thought, and being last,
> Or immortality endures.

. . . Which were also the last words our reverend and dear Father ever gave out in Chapel."[48] The account continues, showing that the next day when he died, those words, "I'll praise—I'll praise—!" were the last before "Farewell." One writer who spent Tuesday night with the eighty-eight year old Wesley before his death the next morning reported that "Wesley repeated 'I'll praise' at least some scores of times" during the night.[49] As a historical monument this hymn deserves more attention than it usually receives. What the record does show is that Wesley died with a Watts psalm-rendering on his lips. Those far-off days in Georgia must have seemed not so far off, but very near, when Wesley at the end returned to those very hymns, or "psalms" if you will call them that, which had formed the nucleus of the 1737 collection. Space and time were annihilated at the end, and he returned to that magnificently confident assertion he had made in the teeth of slander, ignominy, and vicious calumny, at the very inception of his ministry during the Georgia days: "My days of praise shall ne'er be past, While life, and thought, and being last, Or immortality endures."

The third charge which the Georgia colonists brought against him was that of "introducing into the church . . . hymns not inspected or authorized by any proper judicature." Certainly Austin's hymns had not been inspected or authorized by any proper judicature. Hickes,

48. Wesley, *Journal*, VIII, 138.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

who collected them, was a most improper person from every Established Church point of view. Only his reputation as a scholar in Anglo-Saxon and Old Icelandic permitted Hickes to escape bitter persecution at the end of his life.[50] Hickes, the non-juror, and Austin, the Roman convert, were an unlikely pair. What of the other authors of hymns included in the 1737 collection? Watts labored under the difficulty of being a Dissenter; the days were not too remote when Watts's own father had been imprisoned for his dissenting views. Certainly his hymns enjoyed small prospect of winning friends and influencing people in the ranks of the Establishment. Even Dr. Johnson, admirer of Watts's piety, could not forgive him for his Dissent.[51] But thoroughly respectable from an Established point of view should have been another author upon whom Wesley drew copiously for his 1737 collection, and upon whom he continued to draw intensively for his later collections—George Herbert. Herbert, author of *The Temple,* was an Anglican of unblemished virtue, a model parish priest, an Anglican Curé of Ars, if you will have it that way. His poetry, all published posthumously, partakes of the same virtues inherent in the poetry of the metaphysical seventeenth century group. It speaks volumes for the catholicity of Wesley's taste that he should have insisted upon the merits of Herbert. During the eighteenth century, Wesley, who had learned to love Herbert at Epworth, where Susannah Wesley had read his poetry to her children,[52] was almost alone in keeping alive the memory and reputation of Herbert. Of the six Herbert hymns in the 1737 collection, all have been radically altered from their source, in order to fit them for congregational usage. Perhaps most interesting, on account of changes related to doctrinal interests, is Hymn XLIX, "A Sinner's Prayer," beginning "Thou Lord my Power and Wisdom art."[53]

Charles Wesley had not yet found his creative muse when he accompanied John on the Georgia trip. Charles, in fact, caused his brother an enormous amount of difficulty. He credited Oglethorpe, for whom he was acting as secretary, with several scandalous actions imputed to the Governor of the colony by two foulmouthed women.

50. *Dictionary of National Biography,* XXVI (New York, 1891), 352. Hickes, interestingly enough, had been a tutor at Wesley's own Lincoln College.

51. Samuel Johnson, *Lives of the English Poets,* III (Oxford, 1905), 311. "Happy will be that reader [who imitates Watts] in all but his non-conformity."

52. J. A. Leger, *La Jeunesse de Wesley* (Paris, 1910), pp. 14 and 20.

53. *Collection,* 1737, p. 47.

Charles, of course, fled back to England long before John. More helpful, perhaps, from a practical viewpoint, was the brother Samuel Wesley, headmaster of a school in England, and donor of the paten and chalice used in the church at Savannah.[54] Five hymns by Samuel Wesley, Junior, are included in the 1737 collection, and all five of these reappear in the 1784 collection. Four hymns of the five by Samuel, Junior, sound like expansions of the famous later hymn by Heber, "Holy, Holy, Holy." Samuel published his poetry, so he remarked in the preface to his 1736 volume, *Poems on Several Occasions,* not because he thought his poems had such extraordinary merit, but rather because he had been assured of a handsome return for the publication[55]—a bit of specious modesty, we may feel. John read the proof sheets of this volume of Samuel's while he was in Georgia.[56] There is no record that Samuel ever returned the courtesy; the elder brother died shortly after Wesley began his field preaching, but not before he had expressed vehement disapproval of John's temerity in flouting Established Church precedent.[57]

The last significant group of hymns to be considered is that amazing list of translations from the German, starting with five in the 1737 collection. John Wesley was one of the few men of culture with a competent knowledge of German in eighteenth century England.[58] Unlocked to him were the treasuries of German Reformation piety, and more particularly the hymns of the Pietist group centering in Halle at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century. Wesley was the first scholar after Miles Coverdale to attempt presenting German hymns to the English speaking public. Almost two centuries before Wesley's *Charlestown Collection,* Coverdale had issued in 1531 the first collection incorporating translations from the German specifically designed for English congregations. Contemporaneously with Coverdale, a Scottish pair, the Wedderburn brothers, had issued a volume of *Gude and Godlie Ballatis* which also drew heavily upon German sources.[59] After the Wedderburns in Scotland, and Coverdale with his ponderous *Goostly Psalms and Spirituall*

54. *Journal,* I, 213.
55. Samuel Wesley, *Poems on Several Occasions,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1748), p. a4.
56. *Journal,* I, 103.
57. Umphrey Lee, *The Lord's Horseman,* pp. 111 f.
58. James T. Hatfield, "John Wesley's Translations of German Hymns," *PMLA,* XI (1896), 185.
59. Benson, *op. cit.,* p. 26.

Songes,[60] the lambent flame of interest in German hymns flickered and went out. Wesley was providentially thrown into company with the Moravians aboard ship on his voyage out, and immediately began his study of German, which, with his usual thoroughness, he quickly mastered. (In Georgia he also studied and used Spanish and Italian; he prepared, in addition, an *Abridged French Grammar,* tested with his pupil in Savannah, the inimitable Miss Hopkey, and published in an enlarged form in 1751.)[61]

His knowledge of the German language has been thoroughly analyzed by the late Professor Hatfield, of Northwestern University, who stated that Wesley's knowledge of German was, in some respects, superior to that of Scott and Coleridge in the next century.[62] In all, Wesley translated 33 German hymns, completing nearly all the translations while he was still in Georgia. When we consider that among these was that translation from the German mystic, Tersteegen, which, in its translated form, Emerson termed the "greatest hymn" in the English language[63] (one man's opinion, but a respectable opinion), and when we consider, furthermore, that the whole Wesleyan piety was nurtured on the bread of German pietism, the significance of the German translations becomes considerable. Among the five translated in the 1737 collection, one is by Count Zinzendorf, redoubtable spiritual leader of the Moravians, and the remaining four by intimates of A. H. Francke, famous spiritual leader of the Halle Pietists.[64] Again instancing the carry-over from volume to volume, we may stress the reappearance of these German hymns and others translated at the same time, but not published until after Wesley left Georgia. As late as 1780, we find again reappearing "O God, Thou Bottomless Abyss," the same hymn as number XVI in the 1737 collection, with a few minor alterations in meter, but otherwise the same.

Fortunately for the history of hymn singing, Wesley was thrown into contact not with the Salzburgers, but rather with the Moravians during his journey to America. The Moravians were baptized by episcopally-ordained ministers; the Salzburgers, another dissident

60. *Ibid.,* p. 25.
61. *Journal,* I, 295.
62. Hatfield, *op. cit.,* p. 185.
63. Henry Bett, *The Hymns of Methodism,* 3rd ed. (London, 1945), p. 13.
64. The five hymns from the German in the 1737 collection represented only a fraction of the total activity in translation during the Georgia period. Eventually 33 hymns from the German appeared in Wesley collections. See Bett, pp. 30 ff.

group amongst the Georgia colonists were not.[65] Wesley could commune with the Moravians, and could integrate himself into their societies. The Moravians did not think of themselves as a separate church seeking adherents. Rather, they thought of themselves as a leaven leavening the whole lump throughout the Christian Church. By act of Parliament in 1749, the Moravians (*Unitas Fratrum*) were acknowledged "an ancient Episcopal Church."[66] Their bishops were, therefore, accounted members of the apostolic succession; Wesley was, in no sense, denying his own convictions when he associated himself with them in religious enterprise. With the Salzburgers, whom he refused communion because they were defectively baptized, it would have been different, and Wesley might well have been denied access to those living fountains which seemed to spring from Herrnhut, had Moravian episcopacy appeared defective to him.

It must be abundantly clear to the reader that Wesley had a large library to work with in Georgia. He had two German collections and a far larger number of English source materials than a modern missionary in a colony with only one thousand inhabitants dispersed throughout an immense territory might expect. This large library represents, perhaps, the most worthwhile interest the English parent church displayed in the spiritual welfare of the colonies. Dispersed throughout all those colonies in which the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel retained missionaries (and we remember that Wesley was an S.P.G. missionary),[67] libraries of respectable proportions were available to her missionaries through the generosity of a group in England known as Dr. Bray's Associates. There was no separate chapel in Georgia during Wesley's sojourn there—the chapel was usually a room in the courthouse.[68] But there were books. In these books Wesley pursued a course of reading which staggers the best imagination nowadays. And from his private books, and the books which he borrowed from the Germans, he was able to compile a volume the uniqueness of which has not yet been adequately appreciated.

And now it remains to sum up the actual process of publication.

65. Leger, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

66. *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge,* XII (New York, 1912), 92.

67. On S.P.G. missionaries, see E. L. Pennington, "John Wesley's Georgia Ministry," *Church History,* VIII (September, 1939), 5 f.

68. *Journal,* I, 213.

The printer was Lewis Timothy, a Hugenot immigrant who came to Charleston by way of Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin set him up in the printing business in South Carolina with a six-year partnership contract which was to run from 1733 until 1739.[69] Unfortunately, Timothy died before the expiration of the contract period, and his son Peter was left later to take over the business. Lewis Timothy had been for a time librarian of the Philadelphia Library Society[70] during 1732, before coming to Charleston, and after his death Franklin spoke of Timothy as "a man of learning."[71] His was undoubtedly a spirit which Wesley found congenial on his first trip up to Charleston in August of 1736. Probably it was on Tuesday, August 3, that Wesley met Timothy and discussed the printing of the collection. This first visit to Charleston lasted only a week, but Wesley returned again the following April for another visit lasting ten days. The second visit was partly made in order to "stop the proceedings of one in Carolina, who had married several of my parishoners without either banns or licence," but he also managed to look after the interests of his publishing venture while there. The day of his arrival in Charleston for his second visit he immediately went to Timothy, and spent from eight until half-past nine discussing the printing of the collection.[72] This meeting was on Thursday, and Wesley saw Timothy again the next Tuesday at nine in the morning. The next and last visit to Charleston occurred during December of the same year, 1737, during Wesley's passage back to England. In Charleston Wesley seems to have been treated beautifully, and he came away with an excellent report on the character and learning of the Bishop of London's representative in South Carolina,[73] the Commissary for South Carolina, as he was called.

Timothy published a weekly magazine, *The South-Carolina Gazette,* but not until after his death did an advertisement of Wesley's book

69. Douglas C. McMurtrie, *A History of Printing in the United States,* II (New York, 1936), 315.

70. *Ibid.,* p. 315.

71. *Ibid.,* p. 320.

72. *Journal,* I, 347. It seems that Wesley placed the hymns in Timothy's hands for printing during the first Charleston visit; during the second Charleston visit, the sheets were ready for his proofreading. He mentioned in his Diary correcting proof at nine in the evening, April 18, 1737.

73. *Ibid.,* p. 349.

appear. On March 8, 1740, after the flurry of excitement caused by George Whitefield's visit to the colonies, the following notice appeared in the *Gazette:* "To be sold by the Printer hereof, Price 5 s. A Choice Collection of Psalms and Hymns, By the Rev. Mr. Wesley, Itinerant Preacher in England and Predecessor to the Rev. Mr. Whitefield."[74] Two items in the advertisement deserve attention—the price, which might appear in excess of the prices asked for later books Wesley published in England of the same kind, not a very different price, however, if one recalls the difference in value of the colonial currency. Secondly, the connection with Whitefield deserves mention. Whitefield's "Letter vindicating his having asserted that Archbishop Tillotson knew no more of Christianity than Mahomet"[75] had appeared under the imprint of Peter Timothy that same year, and the colony was agog with religious excitement. Whitefield was arrested by warrant from the Chief Justice for his part in the publication by Peter Timothy of a letter asserting that "the clergy of South Carolina broke their canons daily."[76] Whitefield's name had risen into a sort of meteoric prominence during this excitement, and undoubtedly Wesley's 1737 volume was thrust just at this time into the public eye with the hope of reaping a belated profit. Whitefield's name was used, as it were, to advertise Wesley. The exact financial picture, however, remains obscure. Franklin had already complained that Lewis Timothy, the father, "was ignorant in matters of account,"[77] and we are unable now to reconstruct the exact nature of the financial agreement between Wesley and Timothy. Wesley must have paid the initial printing costs. There is an interesting letter to the Georgia Trustees, written March 4, 1737, in which Wesley, in an unexpected vein, laments the sharp curtailment of "mission appropriations." Undoubtedly Wesley needed money in Georgia.

Timothy's only previous excursion into the printing of religious matter was the publication of a sermon by a Congregationalist min-

74. D. C. McMurtrie, "A Bibliography of South Carolina Imprints, 1731-1740," *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine,* XXXIV (July, 1933), 132.

75. Tillotson was William III's choice to succeed the deprived non-juring Sancroft.

76. Isaiah Thomas, *The History of Printing in America,* 2nd ed., I (Albany, 1874), 342.

77. McMurtrie, *A History of Printing in the United States,* p. 320.

ister in South Carolina, issued the year before Wesley's collection.[78] The sermon, printed in larger type, occupied 26 pages; Wesley's collection, published with a surprising number of misprints, if he actually "corrected proof" as has been assumed, was in smaller type, occupying 74 pages, and appeared on a quality of paper that has withstood the rigors of time and use in a distinguished manner. The only copy of the 1737 *Charlestown Collection* still extant in the United States is deposited in the Lenox Collection of the New York Public Library. The only other known copy is in England; it may be interesting to note also that only three copies of the 1738 volume, *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns,* still survive.

Detailed study of the 1737 collection has indicated that John Wesley possessed, even during the "Cimmerian darkness" of the Georgia period, much the same magnificent spirit of quest that later drove him back to England, to Herrnhut, and then relentlessly for a half century all over England, Scotland, and Ireland, and back and forth to the Continent in extreme old age—and always he was driven on everywhere by the same haunting desire for complete spiritual mastery that had first seized him during the Oxford Holy Club days. Even at journey's end, if our analysis be accepted, he was still thinking in very much the same categories of religious experience which characterized his basic outlook during the Georgia days. The 1784 collection and the 1737 collection are astoundingly enough like each other in contents to establish Wesley's loyalty, even in old age, to the religious insights of the Georgia days.

But even more significant in our analysis is an understanding of Wesley's colossal effrontery in pioneering with the first real Anglican hymnal—and of all places in the New World! Discussion of the Georgia episode has too often gravitated around the eighteen-year old Sophie Hopkey. This morbid concern with Wesley's amours must yield to an understanding of his solid achievements in that frontier colony during troublous times. The essential significance of the Georgia period only begins to illumine the careful student of the Diaries who pauses to analyze what Wesley was actually doing in Georgia, besides holding hands at rare moments with Miss Hopkey. Certainly it appears that John's was indeed the basic part in shaping Methodist

78. Whitmarsh, Timothy's predecessor at Charleston, had printed a Visitation Sermon in 1733. Printing did not begin in South Carolina until 1731.

hymnody, the crowning glory of the Methodist movement. His brother's "right Promethean fire" has sometimes deflected the student from a too exacting analysis of John Wesley's part—John Wesley was the instigator and, throughout, the controlling influence in the outburst of Evangelical Song.

At the end it was not "Jesus, Lover of My Soul," beautiful though we may find that hymn, nor was it any other Charles Wesley hymn that we prize today which haunted him at the close, but, rather, a hymn he had selected and revised those long distant years ago in Georgia. Wesley, who continues to dominate Evangelical thought, exerts his influence in the *methods* which he chose and perfected for the spread of Evangelical religion. Chief among his methods was hymn-singing. In the light of subsequent development, the *Charlestown Collection* assumes an importance that transcends the centuries.

BOOK REVIEWS

Die Religion in den Griechischen Zauberpapyri. By MARTIN P. NILSSON. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1948. 93 pp.

This brief monograph is undoubtedly a foretaste of good things to come in Volume II of the author's major work, *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion,* which is expected to appear shortly. (Volume I was published in 1941, but is not yet available in quantity outside Germany.) Dr. Nilsson has used the material gathered in Preisendanz's *Papyri Graecae Magicae* (I, 1928; II, 1931), and has singled out the references to Greek deities (the Egyptian are ignored, since the study is concerned with *Greek* religion). Reading between the lines, Nilsson has conducted an investigation somewhat like that of Franz Cumont, in his book *L'Égypte des Astrologues* (1937), Part II, especially chapters 9, 12-13, 16. That is, since magic presupposes religion (and is opposed to it, as Festugière maintains), one may examine these papyri in the hope of learning something of the actual state of religion and of religious beliefs in the area and period which they represent—in this case, *Greek* religion and religious beliefs. The investigation convinces Dr. Nilsson that there was an earlier body of magical beliefs and practices attached to the Greek gods, and that only survivals of this earlier phenomenon are observable in the late papyri. The evidence seems to lie in the fact that the older material is in hymns (mainly hexameter) while the later, i.e., from the fourth or fifth century, is in prose.

It is surprising how little Babylonian (or general Semitic) material is present; on the other hand, the Jewish element is extremely large—no divine names are commoner than Iao, Sabaoth, Adonai (except Helios, which rivals Sabaoth). Moses is regarded as the most prolific author of magical books. (Cf. "The Eighth Book of Moses," still, I believe, in print here in America!) Angels and archangels are common, with their Jewish names.

Another surprise is the infrequency of Christian names—but the explanation seems to be the strong antagonism between Christianity and popular paganism from the very beginning of the Christian movement in Egypt.

The Greek gods are the special subject of investigation—and they are all represented, though naturally the most frequently mentioned

are gods having some special connection with magic: Hermes (33 times), Hecate (12), Selene (18), Apollo (as an oracle-god, 9—not counting the great hymn in Volume II), Aphrodite (12), Eros (9), the last two in formulae for love-magic. Strangely enough, Zeus—though the all-ruler, whom magicians might presumably wish to invoke—is mentioned only rarely, once as one divine title, among others, of the supreme God, once as identified with Kronos, again as the chthonic Zeus. Presumably the "God of the bright blue sky" was still too pure and bright to be brought into the magician's nefarious trade—somewhat as the Logos doctrine of John precludes any tales of exorcism. The gods of the underworld are named—but, curiously, very infrequently; mythological figures are equally rare. Helios is very commonly named—this was characteristic of the age; so also was the invocation of the "nameless" God (p. 21). For example:

Draw near to me, thou from the four winds, thou all-ruling God, who hast breathed into men the breath of life, Lord of the world's beauty (XII.237; also XIII.762).

Who hath fashioned the forms of [living] beings, who hath formed the paths? Who is the begetter of fruits, who hath fashioned the towering mountain-heights? Who hath commanded the winds to continue at their yearly labors? Which Aion hath sustained the aion [age, *durée*] and ruleth over the aions? An immortal god; the begetter [creator] of all art thou, and impartest to all their souls, and rulest all, King and Lord of the aions [ages], before whom the hills and the plains tremble, and the waves of streams and rivers, the hollow places of the earth, and the demons, even everything that exists; the shining heaven above trembles before thee, and every sea—O Lord, the holy and almighty one, the ruler of all (XII.245).

I invoke thee, the Eternal and Uncreated, thou who art One, who alone sustainest [or holdest together] the whole creation, whom no one knoweth, whom the gods adore, [but] whose name even the gods are unable to utter (XIII.842).

I call upon thee, who encompassest all, in every voice and in every tongue, as he first hymned thee who was established by thee and by thee entrusted with all authority—Helios (XIII.138).

Thee, the one and blessed among the Aions and Father of the world, I invoke with cosmic prayers (IV.1169).

I invoke thee, who art greater than all, who hast created all, thee, the self-begotten, who seest all but art thyself unseen: thou hast given the sun its splendor and all its power; thou hast ordained that the moon should wax and wane and move in steady paths, and hast not diminished the former

darkness, but hast given it equal measure. When thou appearest, the cosmos and the light appear. To thee all things are subject; thy true form none of the gods can behold. Thou, who canst transform thyself into all things, art the unseen Aion and Aions (XIII.62; cf. XIII.571).

Open, open, ye four quarters of the cosmos, for the Lord of the world goeth forth. The archangels rejoice, the decans, the angels; for he himself, the Aion of Aions, the only and supreme [one] passes invisibly through the world (XIII.327).

I call upon thee, who hast created earth and bone and all flesh and spirit, and hast fixed the bounds of the sea and nailed fast the heaven, who hast separated light from darkness. Thou great Spirit, who as guardian of law rulest all things; eternal Eye, Demon of demons, God of gods, Lord of spirits, unerring Aion, Iao—hearken to my cry! I call upon thee, Lord of the Gods, Zeus who thunderest in the heights, Zeus the Ruler, Adonai, Lord Iao (V.460).

These few examples suffice to show the genuinely religious spirit and thought informing at least some of the magical formulae: the god invoked is the highest, most powerful; the invocation often takes the form of prayer—perhaps by borrowing from older religious, perhaps liturgical forms. "It is unthinkable that the magicians composed them; they merely appropriated them" (p. 25). The source from which they were drawn seems to be disclosed in IV.1135, where "brethren and sisters, pious men and women" are greeted. This is the language of a *community,* devoted to the worship of the unnamed God who created the world; and the language sounds strangely like what we find in the Hermetica—e.g., the "secret hymnody" in tractate XIII, or the final prayer of Asclepius (p. 25). However, Dr. Nilsson (like Professor Nock) questions the existence of Hermetic communities: these men won disciples, they did not found churches—"the *unio mystica* is not collective" (p. 26).

Not only is the supreme God, Helios, the nameless One, invoked, but the goddesses from whom magic was designed to set men free must also be named, Tychê and Anagkê, also the Moirai. There are some contacts with astrology—but again the purpose was to free men from mechanical determinism as well as from the oppressive decrees of Gods, and the fetters of astrology are adroitly slipped off by these daring spirits.

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The Bhagavadgītā. With an Introductory Essay, Sanskrit Text, English Translation and Notes. By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. 388 pp. $3.50.

Everyone interested in religion and philosophy has read the *Bhagavadgītā,* perhaps not once but several times, with or without the benefit of Hindu or Western commentary. It might have given wings to thought and, to those reading the original Sanskrit, the beauty of the meaningful verses might have had an overpowering effect. But it is open to doubt whether any text edition, translation and commentary of the *Bhagavadgītā*—and there have been many published—reveals to Western minds so lucidly, simply and directly the spiritual vistas and the enormous metaphysical and ethical significance of the Song of the Blessed One, as does this edition of Radhakrishnan's.

The book, as creditable to the publishers as to the author, represents the fruit of mellowed scholarship. The text is not printed in Devanāgarī, but in transliteration carefully checked by our American scholar, Franklin Edgerton, himself the author of a critical translation and interpretation of the *Bhagavadgītā.* The critical apparatus is kept down to a minimum, satisfying the general reader. References are both to Sanskrit and non-Sanskrit sources, and cover as wide a range as that from the Vedas and Lao Tze to Thomas Hardy and Jean-Paul Sartre. The commentary is scrupulously to the point, and when a parallel from Plato, Goethe, or the Bible is adduced, it is as if a spotlight had been trained on the passage and all shadows vanish. Radhakrishnan possesses that rare combination of insight and style which the Western man requires to dispel the feeling of otherness and make him value the *Gītā* as a book of world literature.

In this estimate, however, the worth of the *Bhagavadgītā* is not clearly implied. The Bible, too, is world literature; but it is more. To call the reasoning in the *Gītā* "simply unrelated to logic" is saying much too little. It is logic and mysticism, ethics and metaphysics, a theory of knowledge and of action, a statement of faith and a supreme reaffirmation of freedom, all in one. Those who are special pleaders know their *Gītā* ill. One thing this latest interpretation will do is to render wholly unrealistic the many attempts since Richard Garbe to cut out portions of the *Gītā* and make it out to be a thing stratified or conglomerated of conflicting thoughts held in different times and by camps far apart.

In Radhakrishnan's treatment, particularly in his Introductory Essay, which alone is worth the price of the book, the *Bhagavadgītā* emerges in its titanic unity. To many in the West, it may have remained incomprehensible why a simple poem in which a hero is depicted who does not want to fight against his relatives in battle because of sentimental reasons, but is made to see the necessity of it by his charioteer, a divine incarnation, should be held in such great esteem by the Hindus. They might even point out the inconsistency between the typical Hindu view of *ahiṁsā,* or injury to no living creature, and the apparently divine sanction of war. Whoever is not convinced, after reading Radhakrishnan's essay, that these views are utterly shallow, is hopelessly lost and will never appreciate not only what the *Bhagavadgītā* teaches, but what is the real meaning of religion, and particularly those deeper passages in the Bible which have occasioned so much philosophical discussion during the period of Christianity's first impact on classical civilization. May it be said that such passages, which figure so largely in the history of Christian dogmatism, receive not only an illumination but a confirmation in the *Gītā,* as has been brought out so skilfully by the dean of East-West philosophy. He makes us realize that religion is basically one, and bears no name.

This commentary revitalizes our appreciation of Western mysticism, the early Church Fathers, the Neoplationists, Plotinus and St. Augustine. Particularly the Church Fathers should rise to greater stature, because they were not afraid of philosophy in religion. Philosophy is ever the best ally in a dying faith. Of course, the broad tolerance of the *Bhagavadgītā,* expressed in chapter IV, verse 11: "As men approach me so do I accept them: men on all sides follow my path . . ." is the very antithesis of the fatal Christian either-or attitude. So long as the latter persists, the teaching of the wisest of Hindus must be considered perversive, and Radhakrishnan's remarks (p. 160) that unwillingness to recognize other gods than one's own spells spiritual immaturity, must be condemned and anathematized.

Yet the vision of Arjuna, that *mysterium tremendum* of which Rudolf Otto speaks, described in the eleventh chapter of the *Gītā,* holds such beauty, wisdom, and goodness that we might well wonder how it can fail to impress anyone with the "revelation of the potential divinity of all earthly life" (p. 274). After all, what the *Gītā* teaches is the "willing acceptance of the Divine" (p. 289). Hence the god of this

poem is not wholly immanent, nor is it emergent. He never perishes, though all else perish. He does not rely on the devil to do the world's work. These verses do not suffer from the human, all-too human concept of the deity. Its message to man is not renunciation, which is so generally and erroneously regarded the typical Hindu view, but action void of selfishness. Joyous assent to what the infinite spirit is and plans and how it manifests itself; to work while saving knowledge is enjoyed; to be devoted to the greater than human; to worship God by acting out the freedom of the spirit—that is the grand religion of the *Bhagavadgītā*. In that it reconciles all systems it is, indeed, a comprehensive irenicon (cf. p. 75).

That some verses of the *Gītā* could have been rendered better, especially in the sixteenth chapter; that American usage might have been preferred in a book printed in America; that if the purpose of printing the Sanskrit along with the English was to bring out for those knowing the language the "dignity of phrase and the intensity of utterance" (p. 6), something equivalent might have been accomplished for those unfamiliar with Sanskrit by a table of pronunciation of Sanskrit words,—these criticisms pale before the splendid accomplishment of Radhakrishnan, who is the true and outstanding apostle of East-West relationships.

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Studies in Daniel. By H. LOUIS GINSBERG. New York: The Jewish Seminary of America, 5708-1948. xiv, 92 pp.

Of the five essays making up this little book, two consist of only a few pages each; but those entitled, "Pre-Epiphanian and Epiphanian Four-Monarchy Theories," "On the Genesis of the Book," and "The Hebrew of Daniel as a Translation" are extended discussions, which, indeed, present the main content of Ginsberg's contribution. Yet all cohere in a higher unity than the title of the book might imply.

Ginsberg is unequivocal in regard to the problem of structure which has engaged the thought of critics for many years; the two sections of the Book of Daniel are of independent origin. Chapters 1-6 were written in the first half of the third century, with then a few additions

inserted between 246 and 220 B.C., but chapters 7-12 are from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes. The two were brought together about 140. The position rests on two acute observations. (1) Chapter 2 speaks of a world empire established by God, but says nothing of the place of the Jews in it, whereas the corresponding description, in chapter 7, tells clearly that the empire is to be Jewish. This difference, while susceptible of many explanations, yet "combines with the others to prove that chapter 2 is pre-Epiphanian . . . and chapter 7 is Epiphanian". (2) "Chapter 2 contemplates a survival of all the first three kingdoms down to the moment when the fourth is liquidated." The upper parts of the statue crumble only when the legs do, and—of greater cogency—the kingdom of God is to be established "in the days of those kingdoms" (2:44). This, Ginsberg takes to be an allusion to the survival of "residual Median and Persian kingdoms" right through the Greek age, and to the existence of a Babylonian kingdom under the first Seleucids. The convergence of these political circumstances gives him his narrower dating.

Yet it is difficult in the extreme to attribute any cogency to the first consideration. While the description is less specific than in chapter 7, can anyone doubt that a Jewish empire is meant? What else is to be said of the miraculous character of the stone cut out without hands that presently became a great mountain? Here is "the kingdom of the saints" just as unmistakably as in chapter 7. The argument from the residual kingdoms is impressive. But one carries an uneasy feeling that Ginsberg has made an ornate, apocalyptic figure "go on its two feet." The familiar interpretation is not to be lightly dismissed, namely, that the writer is here grouping all these kingdoms together as a sort of unified paganism of his time, and thus treats them as contemporary. He seems to be contrasting "the times of the Gentiles" with the imminent coming of the kingdom of God. Still, in the end, by a more commonplace route one comes to essential agreement. For absence of reference to Antiochus Epiphanes in chapter 2, although he is the focus of chapter 7, is highly presumptive evidence that the former arose prior to his accession. Also, the marriage of Berenice to Antiochus II, alluded to in 2:43, appears to have been the most recent significant political event of which the author was aware. If, then, Ginsberg is right in claiming that this verse is intruded, then obviously the original is still earlier.

But we must beware of assuming that this conclusion carries a date for the section as a whole. Ginsberg admits that the stories were "originally independent tales" but denies that this makes them "distinct documents." It is a delicate differentiation; apparently it means that they were put together by the author of chapter 2. But such temporal unity of chapters 1-6 is just what has not been demonstrated; and the unique character of chapter 3, for example, serves to warn of the necessity for careful examination of the process by which the section was built up.

A comparably equivocal result emerges from examination of some of Ginsberg's text criticism, notably of 7:4-5. He takes from the bear the three "ribs" (really fangs, he holds) and the eating of much flesh, and gives them to the lion; then, conversely, transfers from the lion to the bear the feature of standing on two feet. For this he has several lines of argument which he carries through with skill and cogency. But the complex transpositions are reminiscent of a former era of Pentateuchal criticism, and provoke spontaneous skepticism. Also, his "zoological" argument falls short of conviction, for a more extended examination of references to the bear in the Old Testament would show that, although obviously ignorant of the polar bear and the grizzly, it did, nonetheless, use this beast as a symbol of ferocity. The "structural" argument is complicated—and unconvincing, as is also the eminently sound observation that standing on two feet is characteristic not of a lion but of a bear, for precisely this item, with its added note of the human heart given to the lion, serves to link this vision with the story of Nebuchadnezzar's madness. But, still, the fact that the first beast has no characteristic number, while the second has two, is sufficient to carry the weight of the argument. There has evidently been some displacement of matter in these verses, whether or not as extensive as Ginsberg believes.

The comment that the series of metals in chapter 2 does not "constitute a descending series, either spiritually or materially" (p. 10) cannot be right, whatever one may deduce about Babylon as the destroyer of the temple and Medo-Persia as its restorer. For this is precisely what is told in verse 39, as indeed Ginsberg himself points out only three pages farther on.

For the view that Aramaic was the original language of the entire book, Ginsberg claims no priority, but generously calls attention to

articles of ten years ago by Zimmermann. Nonetheless, his own accumulation of evidence is highly impressive, as he gives passage after passage where obscure if not absurd Hebrew expressions immediately become lucid on the theory of corruption or mistranslation of an Aramaic original. Yet it is to be observed that he has done little to illumine the long-standing perplexity, why the change of language comes at the end of chapter 7 instead of at the natural break at the end of 6. He reverses the familiar theory that 7 was meant to serve as a sort of bond between the two sections. He adds the observation that "ch. 7, because it was appended to Daniel A (i.e., chs. 1-6) from the beginning . . . was read in times of relative calm as well as of persecution, and was therefore too well known in Aramaic for translation to be advisable" (p. 39). But obviously this is only theory; and we remain just as ignorant of the actual motivation as formerly.

A minor point, yet deserving serious thought, is the structure of the book. Its sixty-two pages of text are followed by twenty-two of notes in small type, hence constituting a still larger proportion of the whole. The importance of scholarly documentation no one may call in doubt, but a considerable bulk of Ginsberg's notes are not of this character at all, but are extensions of his argument which properly should have been integrated into it. The resultant awkwardness for the reader is apparent. And Ginsberg is by no means alone in this error. It is high time that we reconsider carefully and thoroughly the function and limits of scholarly notation. A comparable comment is due his use of the word "proof," especially when intensified as "overwhelming additional proof" (p. 42). These are words which no critic, textual or other, should ever use. The tattered condition of the "overwhelming proof" of a former critical day should warn us solemnly against claiming finality for our conclusions. Doubtless Ginsberg is fully aware that, in the study of literature, "proof" does not exist—and does it anywhere else?—all we deal with is greater and less probability; and the nature and extent of our evidence is such that we may be sincerely thankful when the balance between them is clear. So it is to be presumed that all he meant was "additional cogent evidence." Yet the use of the words, even though with a mental reservation, is pernicious. It misleads the uninitiated reader. Still worse it has an insidious way of deceiving the critic himself, who comes presently under the lure of his own words to believe that he has settled the issue, finally and irrev-

ocably, when in reality the best he can ever do is to amass a bulk of relevant facts and cogent considerations.

It is fitting to conclude on these minor notes, for it will thus become clear that all the criticisms advanced are greater or less peccadillos. Ginsberg's book is of high importance.

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God Was in Christ. By D. M. BAILLIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. vi, 213 pp. $2.75.

This book, whose subtitle is "An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement," is certainly one of the most important recent works in English on Christological questions. Somewhat uneven in quality, as will appear below, it is yet on the whole "a *right* book," emphasizing the points that need to be emphasized and putting lesser matters in their place. Above all, in its fruitful use of the analogy of human freedom and divine grace for the mystery of the person of Christ, it makes an invaluable contribution to our theological reconstruction.

The earlier chapters have a certain historical nature, in that they discuss the swing from primary interest in the Christ of faith to the centering of attention in the Jesus of history, thanks to the new emphasis on the historical and the widespread influence of biblical criticism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and then the swing back, in some of the German theologians especially, to what Dr. Baillie would describe as historical agnosticism and a high Christology. The author's conclusion is that there is a great deal that can be known about Jesus, the historical figure; he thinks that the radical criticism of the form-critical school has gone to absurd lengths in reducing this kind of historical certainty.

In a review of the length here proposed, it is impossible to discuss adequately the position enunciated by Dr. Baillie in this regard. Perhaps it will suffice to say that, while it is unquestionably true that form-criticism has often seemed to reduce the Jesus of history to a faint and vague figure, as in R. H. Lightfoot's by now famous closing sentences of *History and Interpretation in the Gospels,* this does not necessarily follow. As the reviewer has himself pointed out in the early chapters of his *Christ and Christian Faith,* we may properly assert that

what has been effected by the newer criticism is not so much a dissipation of the historical data as the establishment of a new *stance* from which that data is seen. The knowledge of Jesus, historically conceived, is a mediated knowledge; it comes to us through the apostolic witness and is proposed "from faith to faith"; it is "interpreted history." But, in this respect, it does not differ in kind from the rest of our so-called historical knowledge, although the fact that this One is taken, by faith, to be God-Man does give it a unique and peculiar quality. It is not historical agnosticism which is required by the methods of the form-critics, although some of them have reached that conclusion; rather, it is a recognition and acceptance of the fact that the historical Jesus is portrayed to us through faith, and this both explains and (to a degree, in any event) justifies the "heightening," the change in proportion, the modification in detail, of the event, in a fashion not unlike that in which an artist (especially one of the impressionist school) may modify the object painted, precisely in order that the reality of the object in all its richness and suggestiveness may be grasped by others.

Baillie's insistence on Christology is altogether admirable. His chapters on this subject, with their clear style and their grasp of the popular mind, say almost the final word to the objection that we need no doctrinal definitions about Christ but only a simple belief in him or a simple following of him. And he states well the "perennial task of theology" in this matter, which is "to think out the meaning of the Christian conviction that . . . Jesus is God and Man." After an analysis and criticism of Brunner's (and others') *anhypostsia,* the kenotic theory, and Karl Heim's *führer*-conception, Baillie goes on to his own constructive suggestions. These are of the greatest value.

Faith, he asserts, is full of paradoxes. But by this he means, not "a mere *asylum ignorantiae,* a theological mystification," but a frank acceptance of the way in which the Christian faith, like the Christian life, is incapable of precise and complete comprehension "in any human words or in any of the categories of our finite thought." Here he quotes with approval Bulgakov's words:

> An antinomy [the word which the Russian writer preferred to "paradox," but the meaning of which is identical with the latter] testifies to the existence of a mystery beyond which the human reason cannot penetrate. This mystery, nevertheless, is actualized and lived in religious experience. All fundamental dogmatic definitions are of this nature.

From this assertion, Professor Baillie proceeds to the paradox which, he rightly says, "lies at the very heart of the Christian life and vitally affects every part of it." This is the paradox of divine grace, as it relates itself to the human response to God. Thus the Christian must ascribe all good to God and give him all glory, while, at the same time, man is seen to be "morally responsible" so that "he is free to choose and . . . in a sense everything depends upon his choice." Either of these terms, in isolation from the other, misrepresents the Christian life in grace, giving us either sheer divine determinism or Pelagian voluntarism.

> What I wish to suggest is that this paradox of grace points the way more clearly and makes a better approach than anything else in our experience to the mystery of the Incarnation itself . . . that life of Jesus which, being the perfection of humanity, is also, and even in a deeper and prior sense, the very life of God himself.

The same theme, here suggested with respect to the Incarnation, is in succeeding chapters related to the Atonement. And the whole picture of Christian faith, including the Trinity (where it seems to the reviewer that Dr. Baillie has set the "economic Trinity" admirably—though without sufficient development of theme to be adequate—against the background of ontological Godhead) and the nature of the Church as the Body of Christ, is likewise interpreted with this central paradox of grace and moral freedom as the clue and key.

To this reviewer, the line of approach suggested by Dr. Baillie seems altogether right; in the volume mentioned above, he himself sought to use precisely the same clue to an understanding of the Incarnation. But he would feel, as he said in that book, that it is exactly this line of approach which the Chalcedonian definition implies, while the historic theology of the Church, insisting as it does on the full humanity of Christ (body, mind and soul, and also will), and, at the same time, insisting on the full deity of Christ ("of the substance of the Father, as touching his Godhead"), has been entirely correct and has safeguarded, better than any more "modern" Christology, the inescapable yet indescribable mystery which lives at the heart of the Church, and is, indeed, its sole raison d'être.

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Marcion and His Influence. By E. C. Blackman. London: S. P. C. K., 1948. x + 181 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*

Few figures in early Christian history have received more attention in recent years than has Marcion of Pontus. To him has been ascribed the origin of the Apostles' Creed and the canon of the New Testament, as well as the recovery of the true meaning of the apostle Paul. Most of this emphasis is due to the studies of Adolf von Harnack, whose *Marcion: das Evangelium vom fremden Gott* (ed. 2, Leipzig, 1924) contains not only a detailed and often highly subjective interpretation of Marcion's thought, but also a reconstruction of Marcion's *Apostolicon* (collection of ten Pauline epistles), *Evangelium* (a revised version of Luke), and *Antitheses* (contrasts between the Old Testament with its merely-just creator and the good Father of Jesus). Harnack viewed his reconstruction as especially important because Marcion completed the triad of Paul-Marcion-Luther. He held that, while in the sixteenth century it had been fatally necessary to retain the Old Testament in the Church, since the nineteenth century there had been no excuse for its use. Back to Marcion! was Harnack's appeal, although as he claims (on pp. 221 f.) this also means Back to Schleiermacher.

In this country Marcion has received especial attention from A. C. McGiffert, of Union Seminary, a pupil of Harnack, who tried to show in *The Apostles' Creed* (1902) and *The God of the Early Christians* (1925) that the influence of Marcion created the old Roman Symbol, and that Marcion was the only early Christian who "had a splendid faith in moral influence and in the supremacy of spiritual values" (*God,* p. 153). Another important student of Marcion is John Knox, of Chicago and Union, who argues in his *Marcion and the New Testament* (1942) that "the impulse toward a distinctively Christian canon was given largely by Marcion; that the organization of the new canon followed the general pattern of the Marcionite Scriptures . . . ; that the method of the anti-Marcionite churches was in general to accept Marcion's Scriptures and to enlarge them" (p. 165). Knox contends that Marcion's gospel was the original gospel of Luke to which additions were made when it was recovered by the Catholic Church. This part of his thesis has been adversely criticized by H. J. Cadbury and S. E. Johnson.

Now, E. C. Blackman of Chestnut College, Cambridge, tries to avoid the danger of isolating Marcion from the "great church" by examining

his relation to the development of Christian life and thought in the second century. He "considers in turn Marcion's work as the organizer of a Christian church, as Biblical critic, canon-maker and textual emendator, and, finally, as theologian." (1) Is Marcion responsible for the Catholic Church, as Harnack held? Blackman points out that, while there undoubtedly was a Marcionite crisis and schism, only the definition of "catholic" as what exists in the time of Irenaeus can make one regard the Catholic Church as a late second-century creation. (2) Blackman investigates Marcion's work on the text of the New Testament, and concludes that "his emendations consisted largely of omissions." The basis of his text was a form of the current widespread "Western" text-type, although some of his alterations are evidently due to his dogmatic ideas. Here Blackman has done significant work by comparing various Old Latin manuscripts of Luke and the Pauline epistles with Marcion (as reconstructed by Harnack). His conclusion is that there was a very slight influence of Marcion on the Old Latin, but that "no connection of Marcion's text with any Old Latin MS. or group of Old Latin can be established." He denies that Marcion was ultimately responsible for Tatian's *Diatessaron* (a reference to Kraeling's publication of a Greek fragment from Dura would have been in order). (3) The chapters on Marcion's theology are interesting but lack the clarity which a more detailed comparison with Basilides or Valentinus—or Justin—would have given. The statement that Marcion's dualism was not metaphysical is somewhat one-sided, since his moral arguments against the God of the Old Testament are like those of Epicurus against the gods of Homer, and his discussion of insects as against a theory of providence takes up a common philosophical theme (cf. Waszink on Tertullian, *De anima* 10. 6). Marcion's rejection of prophecy in favor of miracle (cf. philosophical rejection of divination in Cicero, *De divinatione* i. 5-6 with Pease's notes) is interesting (Blackman p. 73, where *virtutes* should be translated "miracles," not "virtues"). We may observe that neither Tertullian nor Origen found it satisfactory, and that Origen claims that, with the passage of time, miracle stories lose credence (*In Ioh.* ii. 34). In any event, as Blackman reminds us, Marcion emphasized soteriology to the neglect of cosmology. A better balance was preserved by his opponents, who believed in God as creator, redeemer, and judge.

Marcion's opponents asked what deterrent from sin there could be if God is not a just judge. Blackman criticizes Marcion's reply, "Absit,

absit," as "a doctrine for the giants of faith, not for ordinary Christians." But he does not observe that it is the Pauline (and Stoic) μὴ γένοιτο, which, in a way, implies the existence of a kind of natural law (cf. C. H. Dodd on Romans 3:6). This involves Marcion's theories in a basic confusion.[1]

Chapters on Marcion's Christology and his Paulinism deal cautiously with these questions and reach the conclusion that, while Marcion understood Paul better than most Christians of his time, he neglected the fact that the Pauline interpretation of the gospel does not stand alone in the Church. "It may have been the sole adequate interpretation for the third quarter of the first century, but it was not on that account the best interpretation for the following century and for all time" (p. 111).

The final chapter, on Marcion and the Old Testament, is the least satisfactory in the book.[2] There are two reasons for this. In the first place, Blackman has too uncritically followed Harnack in assigning to Marcion passages in which Tertullian is simply being ironical at his opponent's expense (this makes Blackman's pages 115-17 fairly inconsistent). In the second place, the whole study of Marcion has been modified by G. Quispel's dissertation, *De Bronnen van Tertullianus' Adversus Marcionem* (Leiden, 1943; also summarized by J. W. Ph. Borleffs in *Vigiliae christianae* 1 [1947], 192-98). The main points Quispel demonstrates are these: (1) Tertullian knew Marcion's writings in Greek; (2) Harnack ascribed far too many of Tertullian's hypothetical remarks to Marcion; (3) Tertullian used Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* (written about 155-160) as his principal source in his third book, and Harnack ascribed many passages to Marcion which actually come from Trypho's arguments.[3] This point destroys the force

1. We may also observe that Harnack's enthusiasm for the epistemology of the Marcionite Apelles (*Marcion,* pp. 184-87), which he identifies with the subjectivism of Augustine and Schleiermacher (!) would have been lessened had he recalled the Aristotelianism of Apelles' *Syllogisms* and remembered that κινεῖσθαι comes from Aristotelian epistemology.

2. Except for the slight section called "Points of Comparison: Luther and Kagawa" (pp. 81 f.), which is not noticed in the index.

3. Quispel (p. 59) explains Tertullian's use of these interpretations as "een meesterstuk van den advocaat, die tusschen de twee partijen in staat en tot de paradox komt, dat het eene viterste eigenlijk het zelfde wil als het andere." What we know with certainty of Marcion's exegesis is hardly Jewish—e.g., the story that Cain, Korah, and the Sodomites were ready to accept salvation, while the patriarchs believed that God was testing them when Jesus descended into Hades.

of many of Blackman's remarks on Marcion and the Old Testament.

Two lengthy appendices carefully analyze the relation of Marcion to the Old Latin and Old Syriac texts. M. C. Tenney (cited by Cadbury in *JBL*, LXII [1943], 127), has shown that Tertullian's own quotations from Luke are almost as close to the Old Latin as those he ascribes to Marcion. And if Tertullian knew Marcion's works in Greek, we may imagine that Marcion's influence on the Old Latin is even less than Blackman supposes.[4]

Blackman has written on a difficult topic, and in general has handled it well. His work is hampered by an inadequate understanding of Tertullian's polemical methods. For this Harnack is primarily responsible. Had Harnack not collected every possible witness to Marcion's teaching, including some which are highly improbable, we should not have so many opinions about Marcion, but we might have more knowledge. At the same time, Blackman has done well to lessen the significance of Marcion. He has shown that he was not the one great Christian of the second century. His book is marked by a judicious balance, an admission of certain weaknesses in the early Church combined with an awareness that on balance the Catholic position was more adequate because more inclusive.

We may finally observe that Blackman's attitude toward historical criticism is somewhat ambiguous. He is not alone among modern theologians in this respect. But his statement, "Who will not say *errare malo cum Tertulliano quam cum istis vera sentire!*" (p. 116) arouses one's wonder after his remark on a similar point on the preceding page, "Marcion is clearly right"—although it should be, "Trypho is clearly right," since the example comes from his argument in Justin, *Dial.* 68 (p. 244 Otto). Blackman's insistence upon "the deepest truths in scripture"—found by Tertullian as against Marcion, who suffered from "lack of imagination"—is in harmony with much ancient and modern theological exegesis.[5] But I cannot see how this exegesis can run counter to the plain facts set forth by historical investigation. *Vera sentire malo cum Marcione!*

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4. Compare Tertullian's use of Theophilus for his Greek text of Genesis in *Adv. Hermogenem: JBL* LXVIII (1949), xv, expanded in a forthcoming note on *"Patristica"* in *Vigiliae christianae.*

5. On Tertullian's exegesis, see the criticism of A. d'Alès, *La théologie de Tertullien* (Paris, 1905), 247, who characterizes it as materialistic and verbal. Cf. my *The Bible in the Church* (New York, 1948), pp. 86-90.

The Theology of William Blake. By J. G. Davies. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948. viii, 167 pp. $4.00.

Apart from political figures, few personalities have attained the prominence of William Blake as a subject for scholarly research, particularly if the nature, scope, quantity, and influence of his work are considered. In every generation since his death in 1827, students have been attracted to him, as it were in bunches and at remarkably regular intervals. There was a "Blake boom" during the '20s, as there had been one a score of years earlier, in the first decade of this century. Now we are in the midst of another one. Formerly the interest was mainly biographical and critical; at the present time the new studies of Blake range from the psychological and sociological to the theological.

The idea of producing a monograph on Blake's theology is ingenious, and the result is certain to be useful. If any one word besides "artist" is desired to describe his mission, "prophet" is the word. In the light of recent investigations[1] it is clear that a *prophet* in Western culture is a *Christian* prophet, even if he is not devotionally a Christian or is intellectually anti-Christian. We have learned that the one-time rationalistic endeavor to stand entirely clear on that score is impossible for the man of the West, be he a French physiocrat, a Jew, or Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Blake, the creative artist and the anti-ecclesiastical prophet, was as preoccupied with Christianity as Spinoza was with God. His mythological recasting of the cycle of creation and redemption, which was his way of portraying what artists must portray of man and destiny, filled out a pattern that, however expressive of eternal truth, is at any rate not Eastern. Mr. Davies shows an awareness of Blake's response to a generic necessity, in undertaking to clarify the theology implicit in Blake's unfolding of apocalyptic visions. A closer theological relationship is provided by Blake's vocabulary.

The fact that Mr. Davies believes the generic necessity to be indicative of the truth of the Anglican mode of the Christian metaphysics makes him something of a special pleader in the case of Blake. Beginning his book with a discussion of Blake's relations with the Church (which were largely non-existent or negative), he concludes by citing that portion of the Apostles' Creed—interrupted by "several significant omissions"—to which Blake allegedly might have subscribed. He seems

1. Otto Rank, *Art and Artist* (New York, 1932); Northrop Frye, *Fearful Symmetry. A Study of William Blake* (Princeton, 1948).

quite ready to accept the visionary poet-painter as a worthy fellow-traveler, if not a full communicant. In other words, he thinks the Blake was really orthodox at heart, and that his heart was mainly in the right place.

Overlooking for the moment the interesting psychological question as to the motive of the desire to *claim* Blake in the name of the Church of England, we find it only fair to his memory to make place for echoes of Homeric laughter proceeding from whatever quarter of Swedenborg's hell (or heaven?) the cockney gadfly might currently inhabit. To do so likewise helps to direct attention to a leading shortcoming of the Davies book—its misapprehension of Blake's huge sense of humor. In the opening chapter, the author solemnly weighs the possibility of Blake's having been legitimately and regularly influenced by religious establishments, orthodox and otherwise. Later, with equal solemnity, he writes as if Blake had been primarily concerned with theology in a professional sense—overlooking, despite his knowledge of it, Blake's consistently anti-rationalistic point of view. We are informed, for instance (p. 8) that "the reason for Blake's failure to be a practising Churchman was twofold . . . he adhered strictly to Christ's injunction: 'when thou prayest, enter into thine inner chamber' . . . and . . . he was fiercely antagonistic to the Church itself." While the antagonism was certainly typical, the notion that Blake was formally troubled about any devotional policy (there is simply no evidence that the family had any churchgoing habits whatever) seems mostly an occasion for bringing forth further chuckles from Blake's present place of abode. Undoubtedly he was sensitive enough to Christ's injunction in its best meanings. It does not follow that such sensitivity, practically speaking, inspired him to adopt an explicit pose of devout dissent. The Church was never that significant in Blake's eyes, serving more as a foil than as a respectable antagonist.

Nevertheless, a genuine tribute to Blake's greatness seems to be contained in the desire to claim him institutionally. On the last page of the text, immediately following the presentation of the abbreviated Creed obligingly rewritten for Blake, is the suggestion that "to those whose experience of the Christian religion is as vital as was that of Blake, it is but a further testimony to the compelling truth of the Gospel" (p. 161)—that Blake was ecclesiastically presentable after all!

Elsewhere the vitality of Blake's Christian experience is made explicit when Mr. Davies presents him as a fellow supporter of the doctrine that "Christ was a revolutionary, so much so that even to-day people wilfully misinterpret His words and explain them away rather than accept their challenge" (p. 140). This total regard for Blake seems to clear up, at least in the case of the Davies study, one of the strange phenomena of the recurrent interest in Blake: a widespread misinterpretation of Swedenborg's influence on his religious outlook.

The misinterpretation, which is encountered in various forms in Davies, in Schorer,[2] and even in Frye, consists of first emphasizing and then virtually seeking to nullify Swedenborg's role in Blake's development as a poet and prophet. On the basis of philosophical reasoning enlightened by a spiritual "illumination" similar to Blake's quasi-mystical "double vision," Swedenborg rewrote Christian theology in terms of the "divine humanity" of Christ, the one God incarnate. He rejected the trinity, vicarious atonement, salvation by faith alone, as well as numerous other doctrines, and tied in his theory of providence with a careful and elaborate metaphysical system reminiscent in part of the systems of Plotinus and Spinoza. The arrangement called for a radical revaluation of the human social order, a revaluation that Swedenborg expressed mostly in terms of his theory of intrinsic retribution ("as are the means, so will be the ends"). It is not clear that, having arrived at a comfortable vantage point from which to say "I told you so," Swedenborg would have lifted a finger to apply his teachings in the revolutionary direction they logically supported. He saw civil governments as the outward manifestations of a spiritual principle of order, and seems to have shut his eyes to any vicious features they possessed. He died before the American Revolution took place, while Blake was enormously impressed by this event and by the French revolution that followed it.

As Mr. Davies suggests, Blake's theology (when pieced together from scattered passages in his poetry and prose) was a manifesto of liberation from every taint of hypocrisy and fraud in man's outlook and action. Blake laid the growth of these vices to the total drift of modern civilization, and, in particular, to its conservative institutions like the Church. He may have originated the epithet "creeping Jesus" to de-

2. Mark Schorer, *William Blake. The Politics of Vision* (New York, 1946).

scribe the insincere, purblind advocate of imperial and capitalistic progress, whom he regarded as one dead in the midst of what ought to be life. On many points he was, therefore, at one with Gospel teachings. His millennial vision was of a New Jerusalem to be achieved through the true coming to life of individuals as linked spiritually to the divine humanity of Christ. The enemy of established religion, he was no less an enemy of rationalistic reformers like Godwin's circle. And the Swedenborgian ideology provided an intellectual matrix for all his thinking. As Davies puts it, "he seized on those theories which he found acceptable, only in order to fuse them in the crucible of his own mind and represent them with a freshness of interpretation which is always striking in its originality. . . . Swedenborg had by far the greater influence on him" (p. 31). One might say that Blake poured Swedenborg into channels that Swedenborg would not enter.

Probably the misunderstanding on the part of recent Blake students is mainly the fault of confusion of language of which both Swedenborg and Blake were variously guilty. Like others, Mr. Davies is misled into supposing that Blake's essential fidelity to Swedenborg's positions was a fidelity to Boehme, Wesley, Plato, or even (shades of Swedenborg!) St. Paul. As to language confusion, Swedenborg made an unfortunate double use of the word "cause." For him, spiritual causality, manifested ultimately in natural relationships, proceeded by "discrete" degrees, and had nothing to do with the natural causality through "continuous" degrees that comprised the scientist's cause-and-effect. The discrete relationship was *correspondential,* while the continuous was empirical. Any phenomenon would thus be caused *naturally* by the antecedent events recognizable to science, while, at the same time, it would be caused *spiritually* by an appropriate essence needing the phenomenon as its manifestation. The natural sequence is the chain of causation as the term is ordinarily used; the spiritual sequence is an "influx" comparable to Plotinus' "emanation." Blake undoubtedly appreciated, whether from Swedenborg's writings or not, the belonging-together of the three concepts of discrete degrees, correspondence, and influx. Nevertheless, Mr. Davies is able to state of Blake that "if the doctrine of influx received little attention from him, he was most eager in his acceptance of the idea of correspondences." The two principles are inseparable.

Perhaps Blake differed principally from Swedenborg in being far more of a philosophical idealist than was his Spinozistic mentor.

While Swedenborg accepted the objective reality of the natural world, intelligible to scientific analysis, Blake consistently denied it and derided science. To him, imagination (a term comparable to Swedenborg's "opening of the spiritual degree") perceived true essences, which differed from perceptual "reality" as the "spiritual form" of the sun differs from the sun seen as a golden disk. Swedenborg allowed the disk interpretation as proper and valid on its own natural plane of awareness, and was inclined to write as if Blake's kind of imaginative awareness were usually reserved for the after-life. This difference helps to explain Swedenborg's calm benignity in the face of things as they are, as opposed to Blake's demand that spiritual insights be cultivated here and now in order to remake the world.

Blake's idealistic denial of independently real status to natural objects in their natural forms proved to be something of a boomerang in another connection. Swedenborg appropriately taught that everything in existence has a spiritual as well as a natural use, and that the former, if discovered, can vindicate the individual's motivation in his natural life and so provide him with an ethical foundation. This "doctrine of uses" seems to demand the acceptance of natural objects as reals. In his willingness to accept them as reals for the sake of the spiritual or imaginative uses, Blake violated his metaphysical idealism. (It should be remembered that Blake was a poet, not a systematic metaphysician; nevertheless, here is a basis for confusion.) It might be said that Blake's impetuous wish to evaluate everything exclusively from Swedenborg's spiritual plane interfered with the natural delights he otherwise prized, while, on the other hand, Swedenborg's anxiety to rationalize a Christian, if radical, position, led him to minimize the natural delights so dear to Blake, the anti-ascetic artist. At many points, Swedenborg's opposition of goods and evils was too pat for Blake (Swedenborg made much of the Ten Commandments, while Blake represented Jesus as demanding that they be broken), and Blake rebelled.

The fact nevertheless remains that, far from repudiating Swedenborg's metaphysical dynamic, Blake developed and advanced it, throughout his later and so-called prophetic poems. Demanding what he felt the ex-Lutheran Swedenborg ought to have demanded—a "marriage of heaven and hell," or a wiping out of ethical dualism, Blake went on, still under a Swedenborgian formulary, to portray poetically the cataclysm of creation, complemented by the apocalyptic descent of the New Jerusalem. Whether or not Blake's mythologizing was true

to the spirit of Swedenborg, it hardly lay in the direction of Anglican orthodoxy!

For Blake, the chief and distinctive point of Christ's teaching was the unconditional forgiveness of sins. With his mathematical and God-fearing demand for precise order, Swedenborg could never have accompanied Blake this far; yet Blake's conclusion is implied by Swedenborg, if one exhumes the latter from his self-burial in a system of antecedents and consequences that Blake derided as "predestinarian." Mr. Davies' effort to show that Blake's doctrine of unconditional forgiveness is orthodox Anglican teaching is somewhat labored. Even more serious is his rose-spectacled interpretation of Blake's views on sexual love and gratification. In so far as Blake denounced adultery, for instance, it was clearly in the light of Swedenborg's definition (according to inner, spiritual intent) rather than in that of any Pauline flesh-mortifying tradition. Mr. Davies appears to be at his weakest in discussing the religious implications of Blake's ideas about sex. On page 148 there is a rather wooden misinterpretation, as it seems, of Blake's famous "Never seek to tell thy love."

The book, however, is welcome, despite the thought of Blake's squirming at being rationalized by Mr. Davies or by anybody else. As stated above, Mr. Davies is not the first person to get into difficulties over Swedenborg in connection with Blake. It is perhaps Swedenborg's fault. It is also possible that twentieth-century Christian theology is able to sense the vitality of interpretation along Swedenborg-Blake lines while remaining unable to adjust or renounce traditional positions contrary to them. There is some amusement value in Davies' repeated use of expository material from Berdyaev in order to state Swedenborgian positions that he might have stated in Swedenborg's words—from the same works he uses in other connections.

One conclusion, then, is that we have another book on Blake that does not properly show Swedenborg's importance for Blake's life and work. Another is that Blake's superior religious grasp—however obtained—presents a continuing problem for rationalistic theologians. A third conclusion might be that poetry ought to be allowed to do its work as poetry. If codified religion still has a creative side, its creativity ought not to require a poetic crutch in order to step forth.

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Early Theological Writings. By Georg W. F. Hegel. Translated by T. M. Knox with an Introduction and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948. xi, 339 pp. $5.00.

British and American philosophers, theologians, and students of the history of western thought have long been without any English translation of Hegel's early writings on religion.[1] These writings, as Professor Knox points out in his prefatory note (p. vi), have given rise to a considerable literature in Germany, France, and Italy, but they have remained virtually unknown in England and America. The need has now been met, and in a very admirable way indeed, by the present volume, the first in a series of significant titles known as the Chicago Editions. The translations and the translator's notes are excellent (and anyone familiar with a text of Hegel knows the extent of this accomplishment), the Introduction by Richard Kroner is invaluable, in so far as it not only places the writings in their context but also provides the best brief account of the development of Hegel's thought known to this writer, and, lastly, the volume is well printed (containing the pagination of Nohl in brackets) and fitted out with a short bibliography that will be useful not only for beginners but for others as well.

In addition to the speech, "On Classical Studies" (delivered by Hegel in 1809, when rector of the Gymnasium at Nüremburg, and printed both in Volume XVI of the edition of Hegel's works made after his death, and in J. Hoffmeister's *Hegels Nürnberger Schriften* [Leipzig, 1938]), the volume includes translations of all writings to be found in Nohl,[2] with the exception of the following: five fragments in a chapter entitled by Nohl, "Volksreligion und Christentum," the writing "Das Leben Jesu," and all the *Entwürfe* in the appendix, with the exception of one, "Uber die Liebe." When the very fragmentary character of the short drafts is taken into account, and also the fact that "Das Leben Jesu"[3] has already been translated into French (as has *Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal),* there can be little question about the translator's selection of material. It can be said

1. The German text itself has been unavailable for a long time, copies of Nohl being very scarce.

2. Dr. Herman Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen, 1907).

3. See Professor Knox's comment on his exclusion of this writing (pp. v-vi).

without fear of contradiction that, in this volume, we now possess translations of all of Hegel's significant *Jugendschriften* on religion.

I shall divide my remarks into two sections, dealing first with Professor Kroner's introduction, and then with certain noteworthy points in Hegel's own writings. Richard Kroner's two volumes, *Von Kant bis Hegel,* unfortunately not translated into English, contain a thorough account of the development of German idealism, beginning actually with Leibniz and culminating in the vast system of Hegel. While it would certainly be wrong to say, or even to suggest, that his introduction, "Hegel's Philosophical Development," consisting of some sixty odd pages, represents a digest of the former work, it is not incorrect to say that the philosophical movement from the critical philosophy of Kant, through the idealisms of Fichte and Schelling to the dialectical metaphysic of Hegel is as admirably traced in this brief space as it was in *Von Kant bis Hegel,* although here the whole discussion is put in the context of Hegel's development alone. Such a parallelism is possible because Hegel's intellectual growth, like his final system, recapitulates to a degree the whole movement of German philosophy. Not only, as Professor Kroner clearly shows (pp. 4 ff. See, especially, the note on page 5 about the relation between Kant and Hegel), did Hegel come under the influence of Kant's critical philosophy at an early age, but he found elements of truth in the systems of Fichte and Schelling, despite his sharp criticism of these philosophers, and incorporated them in his mature system. If it can be said with truth that Hegel was the successor and heir of classical German idealism, it is no less true that Kant, Fichte, and Schelling were his predecessors and the molders of his thought, and that without them, on Hegel's own principles, his philosophy would not have been possible.

Professor Kroner has always been sympathetic to the so-called "right wing" or historical interpretation of Hegel, emphasizing as has been customary the religious, theological, and properly metaphysical aspects of his thought. This is in contrast to the "revolutionary" interpreters who have stressed the political and social thought of Hegel, particularly in its relation to such successors as Marx and Feuerbach. Professor Kroner's understanding of and regard for the religious and theological background of Hegel's thought is clearly manifest. This background is of considerable importance in the interpretation of Hegel, precisely because it is so often overlooked entirely or accorded a place

of only minor importance. Professor Kroner is correct in stressing the part played by Hegel's concern for the problems of religion and theology and, especially, the problem of the relation between religion and philosophy. No one who seriously studies the *Jugendschriften,* the last sections of the *Phenomenology of Mind (die Religion* and *das absolute Wissen),* and the *Logic* in the *Encyclopedia* (esp. sec. 24, 37 ff., 61 ff.) not to mention the *Philosophy of Religion,* can deny that Hegel's deepest problems are finally theological problems cast (as these must always be) in a philosophical form. They only misunderstand Hegel who believe that the "mystical" or "theological" part of his philosophy can be stripped off, leaving the dialectic unimpaired to be used as an instrument for other more "scientific" purposes. After all, it must be borne in mind that Hegel always regarded his thought as a translation into *Begriffe* of the basic truth of revealed religion. Failure to take this into account will inevitably lead to a distortion of Hegel's philosophy.

Professor Kroner carefully delineates the various strands in Hegel's background: the adoration of Greek culture,[4] the influence of the German Enlightenment, of Kantian philosophy, and of the ideals of the Romantics, and, finally, his vast reading in the fields of art, religion, and political theory. He traces the stages of Hegel's thought from its beginnings, when Hegel was at Bern and Frankfort, through the Jena period (ending with the publication of the *Phenomenology of Mind* in 1807), to its maturity at Heidelberg and, finally, at Berlin, covering the span of time (1795-1820) within which Hegel composed all his works from the early writings to the *Philosophy of Right.* The main theme of this development, according to Professor Kroner, is the tension which Hegel so deeply felt between romanticism in all its forms and rationalism. This tension is already found in the *Jugendschriften,* particularly in the difference between *The Positivity of the Christian Religion* (Parts I and II) and *The Spirit of Christianity.* The former might have been written, as Professor Kroner says, by "a contemporary of Moses Mendelssohn, Lessing, Sulzer, or Kant" (p. 8), while the latter is in marked contrast, being very close to the romanticism of a Herder or a Schelling. It is Professor Kroner's contention that the dialectical conception of philosophy first arrived at in Hegel's system

4. The speech "On Classical Studies," pp. 321-30, shows this very important element most clearly.

of 1800 (pp. 309-19) and the final system elaborated by that method represent Hegel's solution or resolution of this fundamental tension (see pp. 56 ff.). The opposition between life in its continuity and thought in the discontinuities resulting from its analytic procedure could be overcome, so Hegel finally came to believe, in a thought which, unlike the "mere" analytic understanding with its oppositions and divisions, retains identity in difference and overcomes division through synthesis. Such a type of thought is to be found in Hegel's *Logic* (particularly the large logic), a work which must ever remain the cornerstone of the system.

In addition to tracing the development of Hegel's metaphysical ideas, Professor Kroner makes mention of his social and political thought in two important particulars. In a short section on the *Philosophy of Right* (pp. 63 ff.) he rejects the charge, so often made, that Hegel in his later years became a Prussian reactionary and an advocate of the totalitarian state, by pointing out that Hegel (as a reading of the *entire Philosophy of Right* clearly shows) always remained a liberal true to the ideal of freedom vigorously proclaimed by Kant and the Enlightenment. This charge against Hegel has had wide currency in America, largely because the one writing of Hegel most often circulated and read is the lectures on the *Philosophy of History* (and generally only the introduction at that) containing an exaggerated emphasis on the state. The *Philosophy of Right*,[5] not only in selected passages, but in its entirety, should be consulted before any pronouncements are made about Hegel's politics.

The other noteworthy point in Professor Kroner's discussion of Hegel's social and political philosophy is the reference to historicism. He admits that Hegel, though not a believer in absolute historical determinism, yet "opened the door" (p. 65) to an exaggerated concern for the historical process and to the belief that it is driven on by "forces" independent of human will.

The introductory essay concludes with a brief reference to the famous "owl of Minerva" passage in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*. This passage is deceptive in its brevity and is not an easy passage to explicate. Professor Kroner takes it to be "a presentiment of cultural weariness and decay" (p. 65) and suggests that Hegel may

5. A very good English translation of this writing, together with invaluable notes, has already been made by Professor Knox. It appeared in 1942.

have had a foreboding of the events that were to befall Germany and the continent in the century following his death.

Turning now to the writings themselves, two things stand out at once: one is Hegel's acute awareness of what it is now fashionable to call the "existential" aspects of human life, involving for him in this early period the primacy of religion over philosophy (p. 261, and esp. p. 313), and the other is the extent to which Hegel's mature idea of *Geist* and the accompanying dialectic was the result of his struggle to find a form of philosophic thought as adequate to life in its unity as he believed spiritual religion to be. Many other points of interest to students of Hegel in these writings might be mentioned, such as Hegel's criticism of Kantian morality (pp. 210 ff., cf. sec. 5 ff. in the *Philosophy of Right* with pp. 214-15), the similarity between Hegel's idea of "positivity" in religion and the concept of revealed as distinct from natural religion in such Enlightenment thinkers as Kant, Rousseau, and Hume (p. 167), and also the contrast between duty and love, together with Hegel's belief in the superiority of the latter (pp. 232, 247). A more complete discussion of the writings would include some extended treatment of these important points, but it must suffice here to stress the two main considerations mentioned above.

There can be little doubt that the protest against rationalism made by the philosophy of existence, both in its beginning with Kierkegaard and in more recent thinkers, has been largely directed against Hegel and the gigantic system in which he claimed to show the ultimate identity between the rational and the real. Hegel has been charged by these thinkers with making the reflective, cognitive standpoint of the philosopher the most important standpoint and, consequently, with having submerged the participating standpoints of ethics and religion. In short, Hegel is said to have identified life in all its richness with thought. And, indeed, if the existentialist protest against rationalism is clearly understood apart from its more sensational current trappings, there is much truth in the charge. The later Hegel, the Hegel of the large *Logic* and the *Encyclopedia*, was as thoroughgoing a rationalist[6] as has ever appeared in the history of thought, and in his doctrine of spirit he wholly identified being with being known. How-

6. It should always be pointed out, however, that Hegel was a strange kind of "rationalist" in so far as the dialectic was intended by him to be a "reason" not subject to the usual charge that it is opposed to "life," precisely because its triadic structure is the very structure of life.

ever justified *Existenz* may be in its criticism of the Hegelian system, it is, nevertheless, clear that the early Hegel, the Hegel of the *Spirit of Christianity,* is open to no such criticism, and it can only be conjectured what the reaction of Kierkegaard would have been had he studied the *Jugendschriften.*

One section from the *Spirit of Christianity* particularly will serve to make this point clear. In his discussion of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel (pp. 256 ff., esp. pp. 260 f.), Hegel, in a series of surprising passages, contrasted the unity of a concept *(Begriff)* with the unity of life, regarding the former as abstract and devoid of the power possessed by life alone. Not only did he contrast unity of thought with living unity, but he contrasted thought and imagination as well, regarding the latter as closer to life and spirit than thought. At this early period, it is obvious that Hegel still thought of religion with its wealth of imagination as the highest expression of life and spirit, in opposition to philosophy, the concepts of which can only "kill" because they divide without uniting (see p. 313). The difference between this point of view and the one adopted in the last section of the *Phenomenology of Mind* (e.g., pp. 756, 764, 768, 771, in the English translation by Baillie) is very great indeed, and it is the difference between the Hegel who still regarded the *Begriff* as a "mere" concept opposed to life (see p. 260; Nohl, 308) and the Hegel who had discovered the systematic dialectic composed of *Begriffe,* the triadic development of which overcomes the gulf between life and thought because it mirrors the movement of life itself. The later Hegel, the philosopher who gave the primacy to thought over imagination and to philosophy over religion, no longer referred to concepts as "mere" and as less expressive of living experience than imagination. The Hegel who emerged from the *Phenomenology* and went on to build the system reversed the position he held in the *Spirit of Christianity* and in the "system" of 1800, because he came to believe in a type of thought whose form is purely conceptual, containing within itself no imaginative or sensory elements whatsoever. Philosophy replaced religion as the highest expression of truth, because it alone could have the form in which spirit knows itself. One sentence from the *Phenomenology* confirms this: "The content of religion, therefore, expresses earlier in time than (philosophical) science what spirit is; but this science alone is the perfect form in which spirit truly knows itself" (Baillie, p. 801).

There can be little question that the Hegel of the *Jugendschriften,*

and even of most of the *Phenomenology,* was more concerned over the purely "existential," than the Hegel of the *Logic,* whose main task was the speculative one of tracing the "labor of the notion." The early writings on religion are absolutely essential for an understanding of the change.

The second consideration mentioned above is closely related to the preceding and has to do with Hegel's discovery of the dialectical method and the idea of *Geist.* In both the *Spirit of Christianity* and the *Fragment* of 1800, thought, as has already been pointed out, appeared to Hegel as the opposite of life and spirit, precisely because intellect must conceive as distinct what truly exists only as a living unity. Consequently, he condemned as "intellectualistic" all those who "elevate the intellect, absolute division, destruction of life, to the pinnacle of spirit" (p. 264). The explanation of Hegel's position at this juncture in his development is simply that he had not yet found his dialectical method, and the form of thought which he believed free from the limitations of the "mere" intellect which divides but does not unite. Hegel could become a thoroughgoing rationalist as a result of his mature dialectic, first hinted at in the *Fragment* of 1800 (see p. 313 for what Professor Knox rightly calls the "fountainhead of Hegel's dialectic"), just because he was convinced that he had uncovered a form of reason which was not *rationalistic!* Since it is of the very nature of *Geist* that it is both at one with itself and separated from itself but destined to be at one with itself again, a dialectical logic can be the logic of *Geist* because such a logic has a triadic development structurally identical with that of spirit. Dialectical philosophy, Hegel finally maintained, is not only able to grasp life, but is the only discipline which can do so fully, because philosophy alone possesses truth in the form that is adequate to content; only in philosophy does spirit know itself as spirit. When philosophy with its *Begriffe* replaced religion with its imaginative representation, the young Hegel had grown old.

Students of the history of philosophy and theologians as well will find much that is of genuine significance in these writings on religion. Even if Hegel's whole enterprise was mistaken, as indeed there is good reason to believe it was, Professor Kroner is correct in saying, "Every epoch will learn from him."

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Witness to the Light: F. D. Maurice's Message for Today. By Alec R. Vidler. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. 238 pp. $3.00.

The 1948 publication of this book is singularly appropriate, inasmuch as that year witnessed two events directly related to the dominant interest of Maurice's life and teachings—the quest for unity. The first was the centennial celebration in St. Paul's Cathedral of the Christian Socialist movement in England; the second was the Amsterdam meeting of the World Council of Churches. Quite deliberately, Maurice and his followers a century ago had adopted the name "Christian Socialists," thereby opposing themselves, they said, to "unsocial Christians and unChristian socialists"; their chief motive had been to bring all classes of society together. So, too, the Church Universal was the idea around which all of Maurice's beliefs were organized. As early as 1834, he stated in a letter: "If I should ever write again, it will be, I think, on the subject nearest my heart, and from which I cannot wander long . . . without finding myself the worse for it—the principles and conditions of union among men." In a conversation with his son as late as 1871, he summarized his career with the statement: "I have laid a great many addled eggs in my time, but I think I see a connection through the whole of my life that I have only begun to realize; the desire for Unity, both in the Nation and the Church has haunted me all my days."

Dr. Vidler, by his summary of Maurice's teachings, has performed a significant service for scholars interested in nineteenth century social and religious thought. For one thing, he has presented Maurice *as theologian.* The jacket on the book describes Maurice as the "greatest theologian the Church of England produced in the 19th century." Probably few students today are sufficiently acquainted with Maurice's theological role to be competent to judge whether or not this is a fair appraisal. We have been more impressed by his practical activities, such as his participation in politics, in social reform, and in educational enterprises. Yet these activities stemmed from a theological base. Maurice thought that the political, religious, and social problems of his time testified to the lack of theological principles. A theological reformation was necessarily prior to any social reformation worthy of the name. "Begin with God," he said, and every phase of life would find its proper relation to the others. "My business, because I am a theologian, and have no vocation except for theology," he wrote to

his Christian Socialist colleague, Ludlow, who stressed activity, "is not to build, but to dig, to show that economics and politics . . . must have a ground beneath themselves, that society is not to be made anew by arrangements of ours, but is to be regenerated by finding the law and ground of its order and harmony, the only secret of its existence in God." In stressing the fact that Maurice was first and foremost a theologian, this book should correct an all too prevalent misunderstanding of what was his essential message.

The book is of value, also, in that it is the first thorough appraisal that has been made of Maurice's thought. Dr. Vidler states that his purpose is to discover some of the essential elements of Maurice's teachings and to determine whether they should be assimilated into modern Christian thought. Maurice was, to use a phrase he himself applied to another, "a generative thinker." Bishop Collins' evaluation, in 1902, indicates the seminal quality of Maurice's thought. "Many elements of his teachings," wrote Collins, "have been so generally assimilated amongst us that this very fact stands in the way of our realizing our debt to him. . . . On the other hand, it may be doubted whether we have yet begun to assimilate some of the most essential elements of his teaching." The probable reason for our generation's limited awareness of the significance of Maurice's teachings is the fact that his books do not make for congenial reading. They are books written, as Dr. Vidler explains, ad hoc and ad hominem, and thus require for their full understanding a fairly close acquaintance with the period. Furthermore, Maurice's style exhibits little grace or beauty; his sentences are long; and he is given to much repetition. As a result, excepting possibly his *Kingdom of Christ* and his *Theological Essays*, few of his books have been widely read. But, in spite of the difficulties of his style, the fact remains that a knowledge of the inherent features of Maurice's thought is essential to the understanding of the problems confronting us today. Dr. Vidler, by his succinct yet thorough and methodical exposition of Maurice's theological teachings, has placed scholars in his debt.

Many readers of this book, particularly those troubled as is the author (p. 41) by the extreme positions taken by some of the disciples of Karl Barth, will probably agree with Dr. Vidler that Maurice has a message for today. The central thought in Maurice's teaching, as in contemporary theology, is the appeal from man to God. Knowledge of

God, he said, must ever precede man's knowledge of himself: "We can know nothing of ourselves till we look above ourselves. . . . The knowledge of man is possible because the knowledge of God is possible." "The theological method," he declared, "is the oldest of all methods. The Bible begins with it in the first chapter of Genesis. God speaks, Man hears. But it is a new method to you, to me, to a great part of the Christian world." It seemed to Maurice that it was a proclamation, rather than arguments, that would bring men into the light. But, in contrast to many expressions of contemporary theology, he felt that it was his calling to proclaim the "fuller, more loving theology" that mankind stands "not in Adam but in Christ," and that the Redemption not the Fall is "the ground on which humanity rests." For Maurice, man is already a child of God; theology should begin not with a fallen man of evil nature, but with man's divine nature as revealed in Christ. At first glance, this might imply that he undervalued that Augustinian contribution to theology which our generation has rediscovered. Dr. Vidler's appraisal repudiates any such interpretation of Maurice's position. It was because evil is so intensely real that it seemed of crucial importance to him to know that Christ is the actual Lord of mankind. Sin consists in refusing to acknowledge our relation to God in Christ; it is our "departure from that state of union with Him into which He has brought us." Sin is real, but we deny the truth, Maurice would say, if we regard our sinfulness, our separation from God and from one another, as our true state.

This assertion of man's true state found expression in Maurice's idea of the Church Universal. According to Maurice, the Church is a universal reality "built upon the very nature of God Himself and upon the union which He has formed with His creatures." The sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, the Creeds, the Liturgy, the Ministry, and the Scriptures, are all facts which seemed to Maurice "on the face of them to impart that there is a spiritual and universal constitution of society for mankind." The Church is the body in which this God-made kinsmanship is acknowledged, and where the effectual signs of its reality are at work. It confronts the world, not in the sense of being separate from the world, but to protest against a world trying to base itself on a falsehood and supposing itself "to be a collection of incoherent fragments without a centre." In such a world the Church is the permanent witness to the true constitution of humanity. Its witness

is not exclusive but inclusive. It says to all men: "There *is* unity in Christ for all; do you come and claim it with us, and share it with us." Believing in the reality of the Church Universal, Maurice refused to align himself with any party within the Church or within society. The differences separating men would, he thought, be dissipated by drawing men's attention away from their systems of doctrines and practices to the underlying order of which these systems were varying expressions.

All of Maurice's teachings and activities, as has been stated, stemmed from his theological conviction regarding this order appointed for men. Some of his statements are as appropriate today as when delivered in his own time. Of university education he wrote: "We are likely to revolve in endless circles, not to advance at all, if we assume that nothing has been done or proved yet in the world concerning moral and spiritual principles." In the same vein he declared: "A university cannot be created by drawing together a troop of Professors and appointing a set of studies uncemented by any principle and tending to no object." So, also, the central issue in political life was "whether there shall be a living Politics, grounded on the acknowledgement of a permanent Order, adapting itself to the changing wants of man, or only endless altercations between one political dogma and another, and ending in a Tyranny in which men acquiesce, because they have tried all plans and notions and have found them barren." Regarding divisions within society and Church, he said:

> Unless we look upon ourselves as *called* to Unity, we shall never be united. If God does not will that we should be united, what can our devices for producing it avail? Whereas, if we believe that it is His Will, and that we are fighting against His Will by our divisions, we have a right confidently to hope that He will at last bring us to repentance, or if we do not repent, will accomplish His purposes in spite of us.

But confident as Maurice was that there is an order sustaining men amid their factional strifes, his own experience told him that it is through many tribulations that men must enter into the Kingdom of God. He entertained no easy-going hopes concerning the future. Neither did he despair; sooner or later the divine voice would be heard:

> When all schemes of human policy crack and crumble; when we discover the utter weakness of the leaders and teachers we have trusted most; when we begin to suspect that the world is given over to the spirit of murder and lies;

He says to us, "The foundations of the universe are not built on rottenness; whatever fades and perishes, I AM."

The scholarship of Dr. Vidler's book is trustworthy. The author is discriminating in his appraisal of the extent to which Maurice's theology has contemporary significance. Some readers may find that he devotes an undue proportion of his book to matters pertaining particularly to the Anglican communion within the Church. But it must be remembered that Maurice was a priest in the Anglican Church and that Dr. Vidler, as Hale Lecturer at Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, is addressing himself primarily to members of that communion. All readers of the book, however, will experience an expansion of their own thought concerning the universal elements of Christian truth.

The paragraph with which Dr. Vidler closes his book should in itself stimulate readers of this review to read the book in its entirety. Any age should wish to know more about a man who could exercise the personal influence suggested by the incident the author describes:

> Just over a hundred years ago, five Cambridge men, not bound to Maurice by any special tie, were discussing a recent execution, previous to which the chaplain of the jail had spent the whole day with the condemned man. They all agreed that there were very few persons whose presence at such a time and for such an interval would not add a new horror to death. The conversation then turned on the choice which each man would make, in the last hours of his life, of a companion to accompany him to its utmost verge, and it was agreed by all five that each should write down the name of the person he would choose. The five papers, when opened, were found to contain a single name—that of Frederick Denison Maurice. Almost every man who knew him would have turned to him, if it had been possible, "in the hour of death, and in the day of judgment."

"Is he not," concludes Dr. Vidler, "a theologian for Churches and Nations and for a world that stands 'on the last low verge of life'?"

Cyril K. Gloyn

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Morals and the New Theology. By H. D. Lewis. New York: Harper and Brothers. [N.D.] 160 pp. $2.00.

Professor Lewis has written a book which indicates both the seriousness with which English thinkers take the New Theology (most es-

pecially Barth, Brunner and Niebuhr) and the cogency of the Liberal reaction. Professor Lewis' attack on the New Theology is carefully aimed and closely reasoned. He has succeeded in putting into words many of the semi-conscious fears which have bedeviled those interested in contemporary Protestant theology.

Morals and the New Theology claims to show that present Protestant thought is a part of the general reactionary movement of our time. Nazism, Fascism, and the New Theology were born out of the same turbulent and disillusioned Europe. They were all aspects of a movement away from individual responsibility and toward an acceptance of human slavery. With the loss of individual responsibility goes human dignity and the discipline of duty. All of the reactionary forces of today can be seen to agree that man is individually worthless and collectively important. The New Theology, according to Lewis, admits only the idea of a shared responsibility and does not allow "the notion of individual guilt incurred by deliberate betrayal of principle" (p. 99).

No matter how the issue may be camouflaged by verbiage and biblical quotations, the simple fact is that the "crisis of the Western civilization turns on a true estimate of the individual" (p. 70). If man is to be thought sinful through no fault of his own, then the word "sin" has little meaning, and normal ethical judgments can be relegated to the dustbin. If sin is my simple human state and as much a part of me as my physical body, then sin has nothing to do with morals. I can prostrate myself before an altar, mouth traditional prayers and phrases of self-mortification, and go on living precisely as I did before, aware that I am infected with a disease for which there is no earthly cure. The moral life must be recognized as a snare which traps the "theologically illiterate" and actually prevents "full religious living." Man must be recognized as neither moral nor immoral, but simply as a sinner who is subject to a "force of evil prior to any human action."

Such a view makes it possible for Barth to be blind to the difference between "good and bad Caesars." The State must be obeyed, even when it is Hitler's state, except if it interferes with "the freedom to preach justification." Lewis points out that the so-called "heroic" stand of the Confessional Church against Nazism was made at this last ditch, after countless thousands of honest university professors had been put to death and all pretense of teaching truth had been abandoned. Even

here the protest was based on the privileges of the Church rather than the immorality of Nazism. The New Theology is at least consistent in Barth's case: what was lost to theory was lost to practice.

The serious argument between the Liberal and the theologians of Crisis centers in the problem of freedom. Is man free to make moral decisions? Niebuhr is quoted as saying that man "is most free in the discovery that he is not free" (p. 66). Even Niebuhr recognizes that this is a paradox, but confidently states at a later point that we should not sacrifice this paradox to "a premature logical consistency." By using the word "premature," he leads one to hope that logic will someday be able to show that the statement is clear, distinct, and consistent. Lewis' attitude toward such paradoxical assertions is understandably quizzical. If this be freedom, very little can be said about it, and no one really need bother to understand it.

In defining the Liberal alternative to the New Theology's definition of freedom, Lewis follows F. R. Tennant. Both Tennant and Lewis maintain that moral values only have meaning within the context of a freedom which is at least partially independent of all past experience. Sin is only meaningful when it is an action or intention which could have been better if the individual had so willed it. If the action or intention is the way it must be, then it is neither sinful nor morally evil. Lewis maintains that this position is based firmly in the New Testament, and that it is certainly in accord with all we know about man's moral consciousness.

In examining the attacks made by the New Theology upon this position, Lewis finds that they rest their case upon three general criticisms: (1) Paul and Augustine were against voluntaristic moralism; (2) psychoanalysis seems to point to determinism; (3) all books which hold to the Tennant-Lewis position are "Pelagian treatises" and therefore wrong. The first point is answered by saying that the burden of the New Testament, Paul included, places moral responsibility directly upon the individual. This is most especially true of Jesus. And we have come a long way in knowledge, wisdom, and Christian experience since Augustine. The use of the second prop for their criticism indicates how forgetful or illiterate some writers can be. Lewis refers the New Theologians to Freud's *Future of an Illusion* and to J. C. Flugel's recent work, *Man, Morals and Society*. After all, if the theologians want part of Freud, they should be able to give some reasons why the parts they

reject are inconsistent and therefore invalid. The criticism most often employed is that the supporters of moral freedom are Pelagians. Lewis calls this "sheer evasion," for after all, "What if Pelagius were more right than his detractors?" So far as Lewis can see, the New Theology has made a number of unsupported assertions which can never stand the strain of critical scholarly examination.

This book makes it abundantly clear that the exponents of the New Theology never intended their work to be subjected to rational criticism. Their love of paradox keeps them from wooing logical consistency. Lewis is trying to make human sense out of something that can be finally meaningful only to the mind of God. The human reason unaided by revelation (that is, incapable of accepting religious paradox) will never be able to fathom the ultimate nature of spiritual being. Here the theologians of Crisis must rest their case; and here is the wasteland into which Liberal theologians cannot travel. Lewis' analysis is important, because it cuts through a great deal of obscure verbiage and indicates the geographic limits to which each side can go.

Some readers will be rightly disturbed by this lumping of Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr. Niebuhr has done a great deal since the publication of the first volume of *The Nature and Destiny of Man* to show wherein he differs from the continental Crisis theologians. He has also made clearer his conception of moral virtue and the extent to which it is a matter of individual decision. Lewis' critique of Niebuhr is valid only with regard to the first volume of the Gifford Lectures. Lewis' coverage of the differences between Barth and Brunner is more adequate, but even here he could be taxed with some misrepresentation. The reviewer has no way of knowing when the book was written, since there is no date of publication given.

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Essays in the History of Ideas. By ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1948. xvii, 359 pp. $5.00.

The History of Ideas Club at the Johns Hopkins University and its originator, Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, are so closely associated that it seems meet for the birthdays of both to be concurrently commemorated in the publication of the present volume. The twenty-fifth birth-

day anniversary of the Club and the seventy-fifth of its founder were celebrated in 1948. The original versions of these essays have been, for the most part, published in learned journals between 1916 and the forties. Previously unpublished are "Herder and the Enlightenment Philosophy of History," and " 'Nature' as Norm in Tertullian." It is a real service to have united these sixteen studies, many of them read at meetings of the Club. They were selected by the author and are carefully edited[1] with a Foreword by Don Cameron Allen, an Author's Preface, and a bibliography of his published writings. A Committee consisting of Professors Allen, George Boas, and Ludwig Edelstein, have helped bring out this volume.

The history of ideas as a conscious discipline in our country owes much to Arthur Lovejoy, who, throughout the years, both by precept and practice has stressed the necessity for cutting across the compartmentalization that has artificially narrowed our modern vision of the past. Study of intellectual history has benefited enormously through Lovejoy's influence; the Club has helped stimulate work in the field and has served as inspiring model to be emulated elsewhere; and now the volume will disseminate wider interest in the history of ideas.

The fields of literary history and comparative literature are enriched by this contribution from the pen of a philosopher. The essays shed light on the interrelations of (1) literature, philosophy, and the arts; (2) different literatures, particularly German, English, Latin, and French. The range of erudition is vast, especially in belles-lettres, theology, philosophy, and the history of art. At least equally impressive are the acumen, finesse, scientific precision, and temperateness displayed. The scholarship is both critical and creative. Corrections of previous inaccuracies, of current misinterpretations, or of failures to discriminate, are often central to the articles.

One is particularly grateful for the penetrating way in which the author has refined the meaning of such words as "nature" and "romanticism." The horizons of literary historians have been broadened by Professor Lovejoy's focus upon ideas alluded to or expounded in literature.

"The Historiography of Ideas," the first of the *Essays in the History of Ideas,* is the author's credo, full of constructive proposals for the furtherance of historical studies in the field. After stressing the connec-

1. But the translation of foreign language citations would broaden its usefulness.

tions between literature, philosophy, and science, it advocates real team work among specialists in different branches.

Although the papers bear on a variety of topics, many of them in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, all are distinguished by the author's discriminating search for precise meanings of terms used by such elusive and self-contradictory writers, as, for example, Rousseau. To quote from the Author's Preface, the work as a whole illustrates "some general or frequently recurrent phenomena in the history of ideas."[2] These are:

> (1) The presence and influence of the same presuppositions or other operative "ideas" in very diverse provinces of thought and in different periods . . . .
>
> (2) The role of semantic transitions and confusions, of shifts and of ambiguities in the meanings of terms, in the history of thought and of taste. . . .
>
> (3) The internal tensions or waverings in the mind of almost every individual writer—sometimes discernible even in a single writing or on a single page—arising from conflicting ideas or incongruous propensities of feeling or taste, to which, so to say, he is susceptible. . . .

Among the most readable essays in the collection are those of particular interest to students of religion. "Milton and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall" displays sobriety allied to erudition. A less mature scholar, after exploring so many versions of the paradox prior to Milton's in *Paradise Lost,* might have shown less caution in concluding.

"The Communism of St. Ambrose" is a delightful piece, worked out from close examination of his texts. "But his preaching of a virtually equalitarian and communistic ideal of a Christian society had no effect commensurate with its earnestness and eloquence," concludes the author. "To the reflective historian this negative fact calls for an attempt at explanation, but such an attempt would require a long discussion upon which I shall not enter here."[3]

" 'Nature' as Norm in Tertullian" is rich in ideas. It illustrates all three of the above-mentioned intellectual phenomena. Tertullian's concept of nature as universal light of reason in some respects foreshadowed the deism or natural religion of the Enlightenment. The essay must be read along with its companion piece, "The Parallel of Deism and Classicism." By his faith in moral progress, the third century Tertullian was at the same time a precursor of Lessing.

2. *Essays in the History of Ideas,* pp. xiv ff.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 307.

rate papers. As such it was not composed as a unity, so that it is unfair to charge it with specific sins of omission. Within the framework of the author's own canons, the volume is beyond reproach. But those of us with a less positivistic concept of the task of the historian feel that

Here, the perspective is broad. The book is a compendium of sepacertain of the essays could have been more meaningful, of wider vision, had the author's historiographical axioms been different.

In the preface of his *Revolt Against Dualism* (1930), Professor Lovejoy decried "that impatience to simplify and synthesize which is the sin that doth most easily beset both philosophy and theoretical science" (p. xvi).

More recently, he writes:

> Historical analysis and moral or aesthetic evaluation are distinct processes; they should not be mixed; and the first, which demands (what is difficult) a high degree of cool detachment from the analyst's personal enthusiasm and moral or aesthetic ideals, should be in each case patiently completed before the second is attempted.[4]

In these passages, as throughout his career, Professor Lovejoy has served a useful function reminding us that thorough acquaintance with the facts is a *sine qua non* of history writing, which should not be confused with propagandizing, that the historian should submerge his own contemporary preoccupations to concentrate on seeing the past so far as possible through the eyes of the past, and that a wide knowledge of many factors is a necessary condition for synthesis or judgment.

But a query arises—is it possible to write history distinctly separate from evaluation, even moral or aesthetic evaluation? The very choice of the facts to be analyzed is determined by one's value judgments, including aesthetic ones. In choosing significant literature as subject matter one usually eliminates, for example, the comic strips and pulp magazines! And in tracing causation in human beings one makes certain moral assumptions. The entire process of history writing is more fraught with evaluation than the positivist with his cult of facts cares to admit. As Morris Cohen would say, the preconceptions of historians are none the better for being unavowed. Value judgments kicked out the front door may sneak in the back door. How much more fruitful an approach to history is that in which value and historical existence are envisaged as "independent of each other in the same sense that the

4. *Journal of the History of Ideas* (January 1949), p. 142.

two blades which form a pair of scissors are independent of each other. Both are necessary and intimately connected, but neither can absorb or . . . transcend the other."[5]

In practice, how far is it desirable for the historian to limit his evaluation and synthesis? It is my feeling that, had the author of these *Essays in the History of Ideas* respected the importance of building up general ideas as much as that of breaking-down "idea complexes," he would have made a still more valuable contribution to an understanding of ideas prevalent in the periods under scrutiny. Dissection is only part of the job of the historian. Professor Lovejoy, of course, after due process of historical analysis, does synthesize and evaluate, but this part of his work seems somehow slighted in comparison with the rest. It may be that where some of his conclusions leave me with a disappointing sense of incompleteness, it is because of what appears to me as a lack of proportion between the strength of his factual and analytic precision, and his general conclusions.

Specific examples from the Essays should illuminate the point. "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*" deftly uncovers different meanings Rousseau lends to "state of nature." It points out the disparaging way in which he referred to man's first state. A later stage, the patriarchal, pastoral life, similar to that enjoyed by the noble savage, was lauded in the *Discourse on Inequality* from which Professor Lovejoy quotes as follows: "The example of the savages . . . seems to afford further evidence that this state is the veritable youth of the world; and that all subsequent advances have been, in appearance so many steps toward the perfection of the individual, in reality towards the discrepitude of the species."

Or, as Lovejoy puts it in his essay on "Monboddo and Rousseau," both of these figures saw the best chapter of human history in an earlier phase of man's development. Such a stand, Professor Lovejoy informs us, constituted an abandonment of the orthodox primitivistic position. But one wishes the issue had been put on the basis of an analysis of "primitivisms." Our gratitude to Lovejoy, the authority on primitivism, would be enhanced if he had evaluated, both in the rest of Rousseau's work and in his historic influence, the portent of his glorification of man's "youthful" state of society as the ideal regime. In the *First Discourse,* the *Emile,* and elsewhere, Jean-Jacques obvi-

5. Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, 1931), p. 385.

ously inveighed against the corrupting influence of existing society and admired a more simple life than what he saw around him. Whether or not this strain be identified with a form of "primitivism," its coexistence alongside of his social progressivism or *perfectabilité* is indicative of a problem in understanding Rousseau that seems to cry aloud here for some kind of treatment. Science needs microscopic analysis of animal anatomy, but it needs also macroscopic studies of the relation of the part to the whole. When a master capable of such integration fails to give it to us, we are left, as here, with a let-down feeling.

"Rationalism" is another word that should be studied in the plural. The essay, " 'Pride' in 18th Century Thought," concludes thus:

> . . . it has become customary seriously to exaggerate the rationalism of the period, its "extravagant claims to reason," its "confidence in the dry light of reason." Unless "reason" is carefully and somewhat peculiarly defined such expressions are misleading. The authors who were perhaps the most influential and the most representative in the early and mid-eighteenth century made a great point of reducing man's claims to "reason" to a minimum, and of belittling the importance of that faculty in human existence; and the vice of pride which they so delighted to castigate was exemplified for them in any high estimate of the capacity of the human species for intellectual achievement, or in any of the more ambitious enterprises of science and philosophy, or in any moral ideal which would make pure reason . . . the supreme power in human life.[6]

Here the author's cautiousness about evaluating the period as a whole throughout Western Europe, makes the essay seem deficient in perspective. Of course, the Popes, Swifts, Voltaires, and other intelligent men belittled man's pretensions. Still, the century of the *Encyclopédie* and of notable scientific discoveries did have, and often act upon, great driving faith in the progress to which the *lumières* of added knowledge would point the way. A wise man may well be cognizant of the limitations of human reason, while still preferring its candle light, cast on the sea of ignorance, to other more illusory beacons. Would it not be more fruitful to assay definitions of eighteenth century rationalisms, rather than to leave the reader with the impression that unless "reason" is "peculiarly defined," the age was not so rationalistic after all? Too close an examination of a few trees has perhaps obscured a vision of the forest.

6. *Essays,* p. 68.

Professor Lovejoy has so well clarified our understanding of early phases of "romanticisms," that one wishes he had given us, along with examination of aesthetic theoreticians, more insights into romantic poetry, more aesthetic, hence emotional awareness of the personal message romantics tried to give their fellowmen. Discussion of literature is rendered more living, more human, when literary criticism is joined with literary history. Is it too much to hope for that some historians of ideas will feel criticism as part of their mission? American scholarship will be the richer if the task of formulating value judgments is welcomed by some who specialize in the humanities and their history.

Be that as it may, all of the essays in this volume are informative, challenging, and acute. Any second-hand account of them would be at best inadequate. They are a "must" on the reading list of all who are interested in the history of ideas.

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BOOK NOTES

Magic: A Sociological Study. By Hutton Webster. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1948. xv, 524 pp. $6.00.

This book is in the tradition of *The Golden Bough.* Like its great prototype, it fills the reader with amazement at the range and diversity of the literature which has been combed to provide its subject matter. The bibliographies, given at the end of each chapter, show an extensive sampling of rare and little known works, as well as a thorough coverage of better known ethnological reports up until approximately 1940. If any criticism of this part of such a truly monumental work may be hazarded, it is that the search for sources has sometimes not been selective. Statements of casual visitors, of missionaries who had known a people long rather than intimately, and of trained ethnologists are placed side by side and given equal weight.

This is a minor criticism. Much more important is the author's attitude toward his subject matter and his techniques for dealing with it. The former is expressed in the opening sentence of his Preface: "Magic and Taboo rank among the most important of those erroneous beliefs and futile practices which engage the interest of the philosophic student of mankind." While magic and taboo certainly rest upon erroneous beliefs, most anthropologists trained in the modern functional and psychological approaches to culture would dispute the assumption that they are futile. The rainmaker's magic does not bring rain, but it eases anxiety and the resulting social tensions. Infraction of taboos may involve no supernatural punishments, but it does have psychological effects which may be fatal. Death from fright following taboo-breaking is a fact as well established as any in ethnology. Moreover, in many societies the taboo system provides a combination of law code and police force indispensable to the proper functioning of the society. That this fact has been so little stressed in a book which styles itself "A Sociological Study" is extraordinary.

That the functions of magic and taboo have been so greatly undervaluated at many points seems to be directly due to the technique used in analyzing the material. Data gathered from innumerable diverse sources has been presented under subject headings such as "The Magical Word: Spells," "The Magical Object: Charms," "Magicians," "Professional Magicians," "The Making of Magicians," and so forth. The result is a breakdown of the data into a series of disassociated units, each of which is too small in itself to show pattern, and which, because of the disassociation, cannot reveal function. The use of this approach even fails to show the most important features which are common to supernaturalism throughout the world, for these features are dynamic rather than static. It is responsible for the author's conclusion that "Magic, both white and black, both beneficent and maleficent, presents itself as an inchoate, unorganized mass of beliefs and practices" (p. 497), a conclusion which he certainly would not have arrived at if he had studied the totality of supernatural beliefs and practices in particular cultures. It is also

responsible for his failure to arrive at better than superficial conclusions regarding the social and psychological significance of supernaturalism. At a time when the accumulation of scientific knowledge has rendered most supernatural beliefs untenable, there is urgent need to find out what purposes these beliefs have served and to begin designing replacements which will be immune to the radiation effects of modern science.

RALPH LINTON

Ancient Greek Religion. By HERBERT JENNINGS ROSE (Hutchinson's University Library: *World Religions,* edited by E. O. JAMES). London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1948. 160 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*

This volume inaugurates most happily the series of volumes which E. O. James is editing. H. J. Rose is a master of the subject and has performed a difficult task with great skill; selection and presentation are alike admirable. He makes some introductory remarks on the differences between ancient and modern religion, on the general implications of Greek worship, on the "element of unreality" produced by urbanization as superimposed on a pattern which belonged to a people who lived simply and raised most of their own food, and on the rise of individualism. We then have "The Plain Man's Gods," a chapter on divine functions and personalities, and the religious activities of the average man in his family. "The Origins of Gods" faces very well the hardest problem of Greek religious history, treating the fusion of pre-Greek and Greek elements and the crystallization of supernatural beings who, while subject to a process of give and take and capable of being credited with new functions, had, nevertheless, so much uniformity of character wherever Greek was spoken. "The Guardians of the City" gives a running comment on the Athenian religious year—just what our students need. (For further details they may turn to Rose's early article in Hastings, ERE, V, 857 ff.) "The Gods on Trial" discusses Orphism, criticisms and interpretations of mythology, and theories about *daimones.* "The Gods of the Wise" treats philosophical religion, astrology, magic—higher and lower—and gnosis. "Survivals" sums up with great skill and sobriety what can be asserted on a topic which has provoked much loose thinking. Finally, there is a brief bibliography of suitable works in English, and an index.

I do not see how this book could have been better done. It is an ideal introduction for students, and it deserves and should find many readers among the wider circle of people interested in the history of religion. Further, there are a number of points which deserve the careful and grateful consideration of fellow workers in the field. So Rose says (p. 11) on the exposing of unwanted children: "This was not the murder of a young member of the family, but merely refusal of admission into it and the society of which it formed part." On page 34, he remarks apropos of the offering of hair by adolescents

to the local river: "Without water there is no life, and with the hair in his possession the good river-god was in a position still to infuse life into his former nurseling. But, although this was probably the original meaning of such offerings, their beginning lies so far in the past that even the earliest Greek writings we have seem to regard them as nothing more than acknowledgements of past favours, thank-offerings and not quasi-magical performances." The remarks on Apollo (pp. 57 ff.) and on Hermes (p. 62) are too long to quote, but extremely good. On page 61, I note, "since other powers of the fertility of nature were already well known, Dionysos tended somewhat to specialize, not so much in ritual as in art and literature, into a god of wine." On page 92, in an explanation of the rise of Orphism, there is a very happy use of Hesiod's correlation of righteousness and unrighteousness with prosperity and the reverse.

On page 39, Rose gives the widespread explanation of the absence of human participation in sacrifices to chthonian deities: "the close communion with them implied in the shared meal was not wanted." But I still feel that the objections which I raised in the *Harvard Theological Review* (1944) are serious. Also, the suggestion (p. 109), that Serapis included "apparently also Babylonian elements" cannot be sustained. And I think that Tyche is a little unduly simplified and generalized (pp. 114 ff.)—*sed ista parva.*

In a second edition, it would be useful to add a page or two with the principal dates, as in Kern's *Die Religion der Griechen* (III, 320 ff.). It is a pleasure to have such a book as Professor Rose's to commend to the public.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK

Techniques du Yoga. By MIRCEA ELIADE. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1948. 266 pp. Fr. 265.

The general popular notion in many parts of the world is that Yoga is a collection of magic powers attained by certain adepts, in which disciplines are involved, of which breath control and "meditation" are the most famous. In the East, on the other hand, Yoga is generally understood as a structure of eight techniques, often with supplementary exercises, designed for various ends, or with emphasis upon particular disciplines. On the bodily side, physical excitements, or "tortures," are added, as in the Hatha Yoga. Some schools unite Tantric rituals with Yoga; still others, like the early Buddhists, resort only to the higher aspects of Yoga. Some look to these graded exercises to yield extraordinary powers, such as suspended animation. What is not so well understood is that the techniques of Yoga are employed in characteristic ways by various religious communities for their own ends.

It is here that the interests of the book under review center. After surveying the history of the doctrines in the development of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the author proceeds to show how Yoga disciplines are made use of in various sec-

tions of Indian religion. In a chapter on Yoga in Hinduism, he traces its use from the Upanishads to the present day. He then shows how it functions in Buddhism and the Tantric cults.

Yoga is far from being the simple or particular phenomenon that it is popularly believed to be. It is all-pervasive, affecting alike the philosopher, the illiterate villager, and the aboriginal. In his concluding chapter, the author emphasizes the fact that Yoga is a distinctively Indian phenomenon, whose roots lie far back of the appearance of the "Aryans" in India. It is primitive and indigenous, and was made into a "system" comparatively late, by Patanjali. Moreover, its influence has extended over much of the world, reaching the West probably via Egypt. Today, interest in Yoga is world-wide.

Dr. Eliade was, for some time, a student under Professor Surendranath Dasgupta, of Calcutta, and spent six months in an *ashram* in Rishikesh, the holy settlement on the Ganges above Hardwar. His book contains a careful examination and appraisal of Yoga, historically treated, and is highly interesting and useful.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

The Book of Beliefs and Opinions. By SAADIA GAON. Translated from the Arabic by SAMUEL ROSENBLATT. (Yale Judaica Series, volume 1.) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. xxxii, 496 pp. $5.00.

Since 1942, the thousandth anniversary of the death of Saadia Gaon, an active leader in the Jewish community of Babylonia, and a very learned sage and polygraph, interest in him has become relatively popular. The Cairo Geniza has yielded a considerable amount of new data regarding his activity, and new fragments of his works, all of which have augmented his importance and made present-day scholars realize why he enjoyed such a tremendous reputation in his day and age.

One concrete result of this revived interest is the publication of an English translation of Saadia's major philosophic work, *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions.* It was practically the first attempt in the Middle Ages to reconcile the traditional faith of the Jews with the conclusions of reason. Although *Kalam,* the particular brand of philosophy with which Saadia sought to work out a modus vivendi, was soon replaced in Jewish circles by Aristotelianism, so that new attempts at peace had to be, and were made, our author's efforts were not in vain. His basic premise that sacred Jewish writings had to conform to the exigencies of reason, and were to be interpreted metaphorically or allegorically whenever necessary, was adopted by all his successors, and in the ethical sphere much of Saadia's analysis and system survived for generations.

Dr. Samuel Rosenblatt's translation was made from the Arabic original with the aid of the medieval Hebrew version of Judah ibn Tibbon. The rendering is altogether reliable. Although the translator had to adapt the style to the

requirements of English writing by interpolation, circumlocution, and rearrangement, he is at all times faithful to the original. His notes are limited, and generally confined to recording variants, indicating sources, and offering brief explanations. A very detailed table of contents, and an equally detailed index provide invaluable help for reference purposes. A brief introduction summarizes the author's life and literary activity.

The Yale Judaica Series makes an auspicious start with the English version of Saadia's book. It is hoped that other volumes will make their early appearance and be as well appointed as the first volume.

A. S. HALKIN

The Ghetto and the Jews of Rome. By FERDINAND GREGOROVIUS. Translated by MOSES HADAS. New York: Schocken Books, 1948. 120 pp. $1.50.

Ferdinand Gregorovius, the nineteenth century German historian of Rome and Athens, lived in Rome for many years of his life. There he was early attracted to the Jewish quarter of Rome and its inhabitants, chiefly because "Rome's Jewry lives as it has from antiquity, virtually shut off from humanity. . . . Its people . . . are Rome's only living ruins" (p. 19). Included in Gregorovius' *Wanderjahre in Italien* is the brief essay here translated (and very well translated!) by Moses Hadas, under the title *The Ghetto and the Jews of Rome.* This is no masterpiece of historiography; it is, rather, an unsystematic, impressionistic, drifting account of a by-path of one historian's interests. Fortunately, the need for a systematic history has been met by historians of Jewish life. We must remember, however, that the impetus to the writing of this history was given by Gregorovius.

The essay has many interesting facets of which I select two for comment. One is the evidence it brings forward for a living continuity of the Roman Jewish community with the Palestinian captives brought to Rome in 63 B.C.E. by Pompey; this is worthy of particular note because the Roman community can not be compared with other Jewish communities of Europe for scholarship or for contributions to the development of Jewish life, yet it is one of the longest lived Jewish communities in the world. The second concerns the author's attitude rather than his subject. Gregorovius was a liberal, a supporter of the revolutions of 1848, and, furthermore, he was sympathetic to the Jews. Yet this sympathetic liberal preserved in his thinking not only historical "antiquities" but also the non-historical antiquities of prejudiced stereotypes: "Through slavery the Jews have grown more servile than all other slaves" (p. 25); "The nature of the Hebrews themselves was responsible for the contempt, equally great at all times, with which the Jews were regarded" (p. 43); "Mercury, the patron of merchants and brokers, the Rothschild of the Olympians" (p. 61)—these are typical examples. Not for nought have the Jews for centuries prayed Heaven to protect them from their friends.

J. L. B.

Passover: Its History and Traditions. By THEODORE HERZL GASTER. New York: Henry Schuman, 1949. 102 pp. $2.50.

This beautiful little book by Professor Gaster, of Dropsie College, demonstrates that erudition and readability can go hand in hand. Gaster has not merely retold the legends of Passover; he has set his traditional narrative in an unobtrusively accurate framework based upon recent archeological, historical, and folkloristic research. This is done without the vast and cumbrous apparatus of footnotes which advertise the assiduity of academic authors. This writer is the master of his materials.

A word of praise should be given to the designer, Maurice Serle Kaplan, for having embodied in beautiful form the beauties of Gaster's text.

J. L. B.

Days of Awe. By S. Y. AGNON. New York: Schocken Books, 1948. 300 pp. $3.50.

This beautifully made book is an abridged translation of a Hebrew work by the same author. Agnon has considerable reputation as a Hebrew stylist; among his earlier books was *The Bridal Canopy,* a novel which was widely read in the American edition. This comment on his literary qualities is not gratuitous; it is the key to what he has done in the work at hand. He has collected from more than three hundred Jewish sources informational and inspirational selections relating to the Jewish High Holydays—Rosh Ha-shanah and Yom Kippur—and to the ten penitential days between. Out of this he has not made a mere anthology, but has, rather, rewritten almost every item. There is a charm in his self-justification: "Those holy authors, their generation being fit and all men eager to hear words of Torah, had not the time to improve their style" (p. 7).

Unfortunately (as is so frequent in books brought out under the imprint of Schocken Books in this country), the original translator of the book had an awkward English style; an English-speaking reviser has done his best to improve the book in this respect, but not with complete success. Part of the charm of the Hebrew has thus been dissipated. For the general excellence of its content, however, this book is to be recommended.

J. L. B.

In the Heart of the Seas. By S. Y. AGNON. New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1948. 128 pp. $1.50.

This small book, erroneously advertised as a novel, is really a parable, a kind of Jewish "Pilgrim's Progress," with all the classic hardships and dangers and temptations of Satan successfully overcome. One of the characteristic differences between Protestant Christianity and Judaism appears in the fact that, whereas Bunyan's Pilgrim is alone on his quest, these Hasidic seekers form a close-knit social group making their journey together. The story is a subtle

blend of humor, gentle irony, and pathos, masterfully told by a master of style (the present reviewer is not competent to judge of the accuracy of the translation, but it certainly does "get across"). The book is altogether charming, and should be read by all Christians who are earnestly trying to understand the deep, emotional springs of Zionism. As a piece of book making, it surpasses even Schocken's usual high standard of excellence.

M. B.

Imperial Government and Catholic Missions in China during the Years 1784-1785. By Bernward H. Willeke, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1948. xiv, 227 pp.

The eighteenth century was a stormy period in the Catholic Missions of China. It was a stormy time within the Church. The discussions about the term for God, the divergent views as to whether Christians should take part in the rites to Confucius and to the ancestors were stirring the troubled waters. The dissolution of the Society of Jesus, though unconnected with the situation of China, had a profound influence upon it. The Chinese government was unable to dissociate these religious discussions from the ultimate aims of the colonial policies of the countries from which the missionaries came. Such debates aroused suspicions as to the ulterior motives of the missionaries. All these events took place in the general climate created by the purge from Chinese literature, during the period of Ch'ien-lung, of all elements considered treasonable or impairing state prestige. In such an atmosphere persecution was natural and inevitable. Especially was this true in China, where religious sects were regarded as attacks against the emperor, who had the mandate of Heaven and demanded the supreme loyalty of his people.

Under Ch'ien-lung (1736-1795) the attitude of the Chinese government became more hostile than under K'ang-hsi and Yung-Cheng. The Peking missionaries, who occupied a special position, tried to persuade Ch'ien-lung to modify the anti-Christian decrees, but a new edict was issued ordering Chinese Christians to renounce their faith, and forbidding bannermen, both Chinese and Manchu, to adopt the foreign religion.

The situation was brought to a head by the arrest of four Franciscan missionaries in Hupeh on their way to Shensi, in 1784. At this time, the Muslim rebellion in Kansu was threatening the government, which suspected a Christian-Muslim alliance and believed these missionaries were on their way to make contact with the Muslims. At this time the Chinese did not appreciate the great difference between the Muslim and Christian religions. The arrest was followed by decrees to the authorities all over China to arrest missionaries, priests, and Christians.

The author deals with the persecution during the years 1784 and 1785. He gives a summary of the relations between the Chinese government and the Catholic Missions before 1784. Then he takes up in detail the arrest of the four Franciscan missionaries, the suspected Christian-Muslim Alliance, the

persecution in different parts of China, the trials in Peking and in the provincial capitals, and the end and effect of the persecution.

The work is well documented by reports from eye witnesses, material from the archives of the Sacred Congregaion for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome, and the Shih-lu (official documents of the emperor) made public in 1938, as well as modern sources. Thirteen imperial edicts in translation and one memorial are appended. An extensive bibliography, a glossary of Chinese terms, and an index add to the usefulness of the work. The author is objective, critical, and fair in presenting both sides. He comes to the conclusion that the government persecuted the Christians not because of opposition to Christianity, but because Christianity was the religion of the occidentals who conquered the Philippines, East Indies, and India, and were extending their influence in other parts of Asia.

LEWIS HODOUS

The Christian Churches of the East. By DONALD ATTWATER. Vol. II: *Churches Not in Communion with Rome.* Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1948. xii, 290 pp. $2.90.

In this revision of a former book, *The Dissident Christian Churches,* the author has brought together a striking amount of information as to the organization and customs of the Eastern Churches not in Communion with Rome. There is scarcely another volume which contains so much detail on the Churches as they actually exist at the present time. This makes it strikingly valuable as a reference book, and the author is to be congratulated on the mass of almost inaccessible material he has brought together.

It is, however, impossible to say as much about many of the author's interpretations and judgments. His severely Roman Catholic attitude leads him to overestimate the sincerity and piety of many of the Orthodox and other leaders who have returned to communion with Rome, and to prefer them to those of their companions who have remained in the native organizations. This is particularly marked when he has occasion to mention the Orthodox relations with the Anglican Communion (cf. pp. 152, 192, etc.), although he is very fair in dealing with the factual situation. He has, perhaps, a slight prejudice against the Greeks, largely because of the actions of the Patriarchs of Constantinople at the time of the Schism, and his general views are not so well rounded as in Every's *Byzantine Patriarchate,* which appreciates better the many conflicting currents in the West.

Mr. Attwater is, perhaps, the most competent authority on the position of the Eastern rites in communion with Rome, and he has many harsh words for that type of Roman Catholic who does not appreciate the validity of usages and customs other than the Roman Rite. This makes his work markedly irenic and, in expounding the Papal decrees on the various Eastern rites, he shows remarkable understanding and balance.

It may, perhaps, be asked why he consistently speaks of St. Sabas as the

patron saint of the Serbs, instead of the usual Slav form, St. Sava. It may also be added that there are recent reports that the non-Roman Malabar Jacobite Church has established relations with the Patriarch of Moscow (cf. p. 239), but it is still not known what this precisely means, and it is a development too late for inclusion in the book.

All in all, the work will fill a serious gap in the available material for a study of the Eastern Churches, and the author is to be congratulated upon it. It should serve as a valuable book of reference and, in Roman Catholic circles, should be of great importance in spreading an understanding of the Christianity of the East.

C. A. M.

A Treasury of Russian Spirituality. Compiled and edited by G. P. Fedotov. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948. xvi, 501 pp. $6.50.

The religious world owes a debt of gratitude to Professor Fedotov for making accessible to English readers such an important series of Russian spiritual writings. The authors selected are St. Theodosius, St. Sergius, St. Nilus Sorsky, Avvakum, St. Tychon, St. Seraphim, "The Pilgrim," John of Cronstadt, and Father Yelchaninov. These range in time from Kiev of the eleventh century to the contemporary scene, and cover almost all phases of Russian spiritual life. The translations are good and give the spirit of the originals.

The introductory notes are, on the whole, satisfactory and reflect many of the same ideas that Professor Fedotov has brought out in his recent book, *The Russian Religious Mind.* He stresses the kenoticism of the early saints "in the sense of charitable humility as well as of non-resistance" (p. xi). For a fuller appreciation of his point of view, we must wait for his definite study of the Moscow period, which was so different from that of Kiev in turning away from Western influences and in having its main exponents enter into a hearty approval of the autocratic powers of the Moscow tsars. Again and again he stresses the lack of influence of what he calls ancient Russia in the later periods. But this would lead into questions of the differences politically and psychologically between Kiev and Moscow. The work does not deal with those but, regardless of all such problems, it is a good thing to have such an excellent collection of Russian spiritual writings available, and we must congratulate both the compiler and the publisher for this work.

C. A. M.

Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossig. By Selina Gerhard Schultz. Norristown, Pa.: Board of Publication, Schwenckfelder Church (1947). ix, 453 pp. $2.50.

Caspar Schwenckfeld is less significant for his opinions than for himself. He is the unique example in the sixteenth century of a layman who, for over forty years, engaged in a ministry of itinerant evangelism without the au-

thorization of any of the established churches. That he was permitted to do so is amazing. He did, indeed, suffer interference and, on occasion, had to conceal his identity under an assumed name. But he did not suffer imprisonment and was not put to death. The explanation is certainly not that he was innocuous to the established churches, because in Ulm there were as many as two thousand who adhered to his opinions. The reason was, no doubt, in part that he stopped short of the extremer opinions of the Anabaptists. He did not reject infant baptism, though he was indifferent to baptism altogether. He did not reject the magistracy for the Christian. He did not repudiate the oath. Another reason was probably his dignified bearing, respectful and gracious manner, his irreproachable life, and perhaps also, in a measure, his aristocratic origin. There were, to be sure, those who wished for him the fate of Michael Servetus, but it never befell him.

He was the exponent of the gathered church, of the company of believers united in faith, exhibiting a high quality of Christian excellence and preserving the purity of the fellowship by the ban. The ethical emphasis was strong with him, as with all those who broke with the established churches in favor of conventicles. He insisted not only on the freedom of the will, but on the possibility among the regenerate of Christian perfection. The lack of it was evidence to him of a prior defect in the proper quality of faith.

The source of morality for Schwenckfeld was an inward regeneration entailing an immediacy of experience which does not despise but can dispense with external aids. Hence he exhibited indifference to the sacraments, to the outward word of Scripture, and to pictorial representations of religion. He was not so radical and hence not so offensive as those who considered these positively inimical. He could either use or dispense with them as occasion might dictate.

He did not separate Church and State absolutely, and was willing to accept the aid of the magistrate if he were favorable to a genuine reform, but he must use his coercive power only to protect rather than to restrict liberty. He should prevent Christians from coming to blows and restrain the hand of the persecutor. The sword, which is a carnal weapon, cannot be used to create anything so spiritual as faith, and the magistrate should beware lest he violate that most precious shrine of a man's integrity.

The book is the first biography of Schwenckfeld in any language. Perhaps for that reason, it goes into a good deal of detail about his movements, and his dealings with a large company of little known persons who are not properly introduced to the reader. One should, perhaps, not complain that a man whose greatness does not lie primarily in the realm of ideas is scantily treated in this area, save for his few cardinal tenets. But one would like to know how his views compared with those of men like Sebastian Franck and Michael Servetus. In other words, the book is stronger in factual detail than in the exposition of ideas.

R. H. B.

Norrlandsläseriet. By John Holmgren. (*Samlingar och Studier till Svenska Kyrkans Historia,* Vol. 19.) Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1948. 360 pp. Kr.12:00.

This doctoral dissertation constitutes a new volume in the interesting and praiseworthy *Acta Historico—Ecclesiastica Suecana* edited by Professor Hilding Pleijel, of Lund University. Holmgren's interpretation of the religious awakening in northern Sweden during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is a direct challenge to the views held by Professor Gunnar Westin, who, according to Holmgren, has exaggerated the Herrnhutian influences in the awakening of Norrland.

Holmgren does not deny the presence of Herrnhutian influences, especially in Tornea, but he feels that the soil of Norrland was not of such a nature as to permit the flowering of radical pietism or separatism. Instead, the foundations were laid for an orthodox Lutheran piety by so many factors that they can only be briefly mentioned. The geography of Norrland encouraged village prayers, even though these were contrary to the Conventicle Act. But here the influences of Franke and Spener through Nils Grubb and Johan Wegelius, Jr. were strongly felt. Orthodox piety was further stimulated by the sufferings endured by the people through Russian pillaging of the coast of Norrland, as well as by returning pietistic soldiers from Russian prison camps after the wars of Charles XII. The most disturbing separatistic Herrnhutian influence reached Norrland through its commerce with Stockholm, and in Tornea the inroads of Herrnhutianism was not inconsiderable. But the piety of northern Sweden was not to change the course prepared by Nils Grubb. The clergy of that area did not embrace Herrnhutian influences as did the clergy of southern and western Sweden. Dissension among the "Brethren" in Stockholm reacted unfavorably in Norrland upon the expansion of Herrnhutianism, as did the trial of Fredric Thingwall for violating the Conventicle Act.

Holmgren has collected a great deal of material not utilized before. The most interesting of these sources is the inventories of the property of deceased persons, which were made in the greatest detail, including even the titles of books and pamphlets. These inventories cause Holmgren to come to the conclusion that Lutheran orthodox pietistic literature outnumbered the Herrnhutian and non-orthodox literature. Therefore, he feels that the religious awakening in Norrland was essentially of Lutheran orthodox origin, which was never seriously threatened until the outbreak of the new radical pietism and separatism well after the turn of the eighteenth century.

Dr. Holmgren has made a very exhaustive and excellent study of the nature and expansion of pietism from one district of Norrland to another, but his approach makes the account seem repetitious. His method of reducing historical forces to statistics seems strange, and the more so since, on the basis of his own tabulations, his conclusions are a little too definite, and here is where Professor Westin would disagree with Holmgren's interpretation.

O. Fritiof Ander

The Religion of No-Religion. By FREDERIC SPIEGELBERG. Stanford, California: James Ladd Delkin, 1948. 130 pp. $5.00.

Five chapters make up this small but penetrating and rewarding book: "Is There Anything Else But Everything?"; "The Religion of No-Religion"; "In Search of a Meaning to Life"; "Why Man is Utterly Lost Without Art"; "Alchemy as a Way of Salvation." The first and last of these are new writings; the ideas of the other three were partly expressed, in order, in the periodical *Buddhism in England* (1938); *The Review of Religion* (March, 1938); and in the book, *Hatha-Yoga* (Dresden, 1936).

The Religion of No-Religion is issued in a limited edition of 600 copies. There is significance in this limitation, for the book traverses a psychological domain which is on the maps of but few Western explorers, though long familiar to Oriental sages, especially the Zen (Ch'an) masters. It was my privilege recently to talk with Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki at the Enkakuji Temple in Kamakura, Japan. I was struck by the justness of Dr. Spiegelberg's statement that Zen Buddhism is a "prototype of a religion of non-religion and a clear illustration of its main points." Although he regards *The Dark Night of the Soul* of St. John of the Cross as "the most elaborate document of religion of non-religion to be found in the whole world literature," the majority of Dr. Spiegelberg's references are to Chinese, Japanese, Tibetan, and Indian thinkers. And the nearest affinity to his own views seems to me to be found in Zen. The very title of his book reflects the use of verbal paradox and contradiction by which Zen teachers aim to exhaust and transcend words in their very use.

The problem of the "Religion of No-Religion" is the continuance and revitalization of the religious attitude while yet rejecting the adequacy of the symbolic formulations of every particular religion. No-religion has no theology, and is, in this sense, iconoclastic. Yet, in Dr. Spiegelberg's version, no-religion also rejects secularism and atheism:

> Religion is the acknowledgement of the fact of life's miraculousness in certain places, here and there. Religion of Non-religion, on the other hand, is the realization of the unrestrictedness of this miracle, and therefore an abandoning of all fixations and limiting statements about it. He who has entered into this super-religious state no longer believes in a system of theological knowledge, and suspects every claim which is made in this direction. Atheism, however, is the denial of the fact of the miracle of Being. . . . Atheists believe that they know, and so does the religious confessor; they are both wrong (pp. 40 f.).

The implication of this position is the need for the continual formation of new religious symbols, with the realization that the new symbols, like the old ones, will in time wither and become inadequate. The stress is on continual creativity and flexibility in the religious self: "Life is a process of changing and turning, and whoever wants to establish a fixed state of being, really prefers death to life" (p. 63). Only by recognizing this, it is held, is the human

self harmonious with "the infinite creative power of True Being, which is the Highest Miracle of all" (p. 90).

Dr. Spiegelberg's book would interest a wider audience than this limited edition makes possible. His religion of no-religion has more counterparts in the West than he realizes. He finds approaches to this viewpoint in the psychoanalysts, particularly Jung, and makes effective use of Whitman and Rilke. But he might well have called in Whitehead to his aid. Dr. Suzuki expressed his feeling of affinity with Whitehead, and made the wise observation that, when we have learned to distrust each specific symbol, we can then make use of all symbols.

CHARLES MORRIS

Civilization and Religion. By CHARLES W. HENDEL. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. ix, 75 pp. $2.00.

This book is the joint outgrowth of a course in philosophy at the United States Army University in Shrivenham, England, and the Rockwell Lectures on Religion, given at the Rice Institute in 1947. The title indicates what the Army students considered to be the two subjects of their discussions. The first two chapters attempt "simply to report the course of this very argument about religion and civilization." The third and last chapter is a sequel which states the author's own thoughts on the questions that were raised.

The volume is very readable and does a good piece of interpreting, as well as reporting what Professor Hendel terms the drama in education enacted at Shrivenham. It describes sympathetically how the experiences of war and, especially, combat led the men to concern themselves with the meaning of life, and how their study of Plato's dialogues brought them to appreciate Socrates' conception of the immortal soul and his sense of responsibility to the community.

But this was as far as the Army students' reading took them, because "our time was too short . . . for adequate consideration of the other great concept of the spiritual in our western tradition"—the biblical. So a passage from I Corinthians 15 which the men knew from the burial service had to suffice to indicate the Christian view of immortality. And, apparently, there was no time at all to outline the biblical idea of personal responsibility, since Professor Hendel supplements the Army discussions in order to illustrate the biblical emphasis on a responsibility to God that takes precedence over human claims.

This limitation of the discussion materials to the Socratic dialogues results in a weakness in the concluding chapter and in the whole "argument." For, although in summary Professor Hendel suggests that religion may have the resources to free men from the prevailing nationalism against which philosophy, the arts, and the sciences are powerless, the reader, like the Army students, must largely give his own content to the term "religion." Furthermore,

discussions in which biblical concepts are presented only as supplementary to Socratic ones do not lead naturally to the conclusion that *religion* has central importance today. This is apparent from a student's comment at the end of the Army course, which Professor Hendel quotes as an Epilogue: "If religion comes into man's experience as well, it should never mean that men cease to have these philosophic and civilized virtues of being fair, tolerant, and of large vision, seeing the whole of things." Such a conclusion follows logically from the plan of the course and the volume as a whole, but it is incompatible with much of what the author has to say on *civilization and religion.*

ELEANOR BUSTIN MATTES

From Failure to Fulfilment. By JOHN MARTIN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. 168 pp. $2.00.

This is a book on psychological counselling by a British pastor who was, for two years, a chaplain in a hospital which handled cases of battle fatigue, and who has been in charge of three "pastoral psychology" centers. The author assumes that, for most purposes in pastoral counselling, the proper starting point is a wide knowledge of *normal* psychology. From this basis the pastor can then move forward, as training and experience permit, into attempts to deal with pathological and unconscious factors, up to that degree of seriousness where the problem calls for referral to a psychiatrist.

This thesis is fundamentally sound, and Mr. Martin enriches his account of how to handle counselling interviews with case material drawn from his own experience. Substantially his book describes and illustrates those psychotherapeutic methods which can be most effectively employed by the pastor, social service worker, or other non-medical consultant who does not want to go any further than he has to in probing the "depths." The author sees clearly that a non-condemnatory, non-coercive orientation is necessary and possible for the pastor as he undertakes this sort of task. He also shows how constructive religious attitudes and mental health go hand in hand. Not until the last chapter does he turn specifically to a vindication of Christian convictions against psycho-analytic and other attacks upon belief in God; and though what he says there is highly condensed, it is calmly and incisively argued.

Despite all the above merits, the book is unsatisfactory in one respect. It is badly written. Although, in a Foreword, Leslie Wetherhead refers to Mr. Martin's style as "facile," I found it tortuous and, at times, sloppy. Some of the author's praiseworthy attempts to be non-technical have resulted in phrases and concepts that are so loose as to be vague. And much of his case material is presented in such a condensed form that one gets no clear conception of how the therapeutic process was carried through, stage by stage. The book also contains a large number of typographical errors, though this may not be the author's fault.

D. E. R.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Oriental Religions

The Rise and Decline of Buddhism in India. By Swami Sundarananda. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxvi (1949), 51-54.

Early Kings of Ceylon. By Bimala Churn Law. *The Aryan Path,* xx (1949), 301-5.

Buddhist Literature in South India. By V. G. Nair. *Sino-Indian Journal,* i (1948), Part 2, 156-68.

Buddhist Secular Literature. By N. Aiyaswami Sastri. *Sino-Indian Journal,* i (1948), Part 2, 121-39.

Indian Literature in Central Asia. By Prabhat K. Mukherjee. *Sino-Indian Journal,* i (1948), Part 2, 85-93.

A Tibetan Account of Nagarjuna. By S. C. Sarkar, *Sino-Indian Journal,* i (1948), Part 2, 94-120.

Discourses on Buddhism. By P. C. Bagchi. *Visva-Bharati Quarterly,* xiv (1949), 243-58.

Buddhism: The Religion of Here and Now. By Anagarika Dharmapriya. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxv (1949), 473-75.

Introduction to the Study of the Upanishads. By Swami Nikhilananda. *Prabuddha Bharata,* liv (1949), 190-95, 269-76, 318-21.

The Problem of Moral Evil: A Vedantic Approach. By Prabas Jiban Chowdhury. *Prabuddha Bharata,* liv (1949), 277-80.

Valmiki's Outlook upon Life. By Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxvi (1949), 130-35.

An Appreciation of Vaishnava Lyricism. By Lalmohan Mookerjea. *Aryan Path,* xx (1949), 170-74.

Mysticism in Hindi Poetry. By Indar Nath Madan. *The Aryan Path,* xx (1949), 252-55.

El Hombre Moderno en una India que Cambia. By Paul D. Devanandan. *Luminar,* ix (1949), 35-52.

Back to Indian Catholicity. By Sir Anthony Elenjitmittan. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxv (1949), 463-72.

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